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Visual Awareness (visual + awareness)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Humanities and Social Sciences50%

Selected Abstracts

Transcranial magnetic stimulation of the human frontal eye field facilitates visual awareness

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF NEUROSCIENCE, Issue 11 2003
Marie-Hélène Grosbras
Abstract What are the brain mechanisms allowing a stimulus to enter our awareness? Some theories suggest that this process engages resources overlapping with those required for action control, but experimental support for these ideas is still required. Here, we investigated whether the human frontal eye field (FEF), an area known to control eye movements, is involved in visual awareness. Volunteers participated in a backward masking task in which they were able to detect a target in a small proportion of trials. We observed that a single pulse of transcranial magnetic stimulation applied over the FEF shortly before the target's onset facilitated visual sensitivity; subjects were able to detect an otherwise subliminal object. These results show that modulating the neuronal activity of the FEF can enhance visual detection, thereby yielding new insights into the neural basis of visual awareness. [source]

Vision, Action, and Make-Perceive

MIND & LANGUAGE, Issue 4 2008
ROBERT EAMON BRISCOE
I argue inter alia that the enactive account falsely identifies an object's apparent shape with its 2D perspectival shape; that it mistakenly assimilates visual shape perception and volumetric object recognition; and that it seriously misrepresents the constitutive role of bodily action in visual awareness. I argue further that noticing an object's perspectival shape involves a hybrid experience combining both perceptual and imaginative elements,an act of what I call ,make-perceive'. [source]

II,Naomi Eilan ON THE ROLE OF PERCEPTUAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN EXPLAINING THE GOALS AND MECHANISMS OF VISION: A CONVERGENCE ON ATTENTION?

ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME, Issue 1 2006
Naomi Eilan
ABSTRACT The strong sensorimotor account of perception gives self-induced movements two constitutive roles in explaining visual consciousness. The first says that self-induced movements are vehicles of visual awareness, and for this reason consciousness ,does not happen in the brain only'. The second says that the phenomenal nature of visual experiences is consists in the action-directing content of vision. In response I suggest, first, that the sense in which visual awareness is active should be explained by appeal to the role of attention in visual consciousness, rather than self-induced movements; and second, that the sense in which perceptual consciousness does not happen in the brain only should be explained by appeal to the relational nature of perceptual consciousness, appeal to which also shows why links with action cannot exhaust phenomenal content. [source]