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Virtue
Kinds of Virtue Terms modified by Virtue Selected AbstractsMISGUIDED CORPORATE VIRTUE: THE CASE AGAINST CSR, AND THE TRUE ROLE OF BUSINESS TODAY1ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Issue 4 2009David Henderson The doctrine of corporate social responsibility (CSR) has now been accepted across the world , not only by businesses and business organisations, together with an array of commentators and NGOs, but also by many governments. This is a worrying development. The doctrine rests on mistaken presumptions about recent economic developments and their implications for the role and conduct of enterprises, while putting it into effect would make the world poorer and more over-regulated. [source] EXPANDING RATIONALITY: THE RELATION BETWEEN EPISTEMIC VIRTUE AND CRITICAL THINKINGEDUCATIONAL THEORY, Issue 2 2009Ryan Bevan According to Bevan, the critical thinking strategies characteristic of instrumentalism generally work to further the vocationalization of educational discourse as well as the cultivation of unreflective moral agents. He contends that critical thinking should be expanded beyond its rationalist criteria to focus on the process of inquiry. Such a virtue epistemology approach, according to Bevan, has the potential to uncover and change fundamental misconceptions that pervade current theoretical assumptions by encouraging learners to engage in a more inclusive inquiry that draws out alternative perspectives. Bevan concludes that citizenship education in particular can benefit greatly from this more expansive theory with concrete pedagogical implications. [source] FROM VIRTUE TO DECENCYMETAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 5 2006JOHAN BRÄNNMARK Abstract: In her work on virtue ethics Rosalind Hursthouse has formulated an Aristotelian criterion of rightness that understands rightness in terms of what the virtuous person would do. It is argued here that this kind of criterion does not allow enough room for the category of the supererogatory and that right and wrong should rather be understood in terms of the characteristic behavior of decent persons. Furthermore, it is suggested that this kind of approach has the added advantage of allowing one to make sense of the centrality of negative precepts in commonsense morality. [source] PATIENTS ARE A VIRTUE: WHAT STUDIES OF CLINICAL AND NEUROLOGICAL PATIENTS REVEAL ABOUT PHYSIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS OF EMOTIONPSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY, Issue 2008Article first published online: 12 AUG 200 No abstract is available for this article. [source] THE VICE OF SNOBBERY: AESTHETIC KNOWLEDGE, JUSTIFICATION AND VIRTUE IN ART APPRECIATIONTHE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 239 2010Matthew Kieran Apparently snobbery undermines justification for and legitimacy of aesthetic claims. It is also pervasive in the aesthetic realm, much more so than we tend to presume. If these two claims are combined, a fundamental problem arises: we do not know whether or not we are justified in believing or making aesthetic claims. Addressing this new challenge requires an epistemological story which underpins when, where and why snobbish judgement is problematic, and how appreciative claims can survive. This leads towards a virtue-theoretic account of art appreciation and aesthetic justification, as contrasted with a purely reliabilist one , a new direction for contemporary aesthetics. [source] WHEN IS PARSIMONY A VIRTUE?THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 235 2009Michael Huemer Parsimony is a virtue of empirical theories. Is it also a virtue of philosophical theories? I review four contemporary accounts of the virtue of parsimony in empirical theorizing, and consider how each might apply to two prominent appeals to parsimony in the philosophical literature, those made on behalf of physicalism and on behalf of nominalism. None of the accounts of the virtue of parsimony extends naturally to either of these philosophical cases. This suggests that in typical philosophical contexts, ontological simplicity has no evidential value. [source] PARENTAL VIRTUE: A NEW WAY OF THINKING ABOUT THE MORALITY OF REPRODUCTIVE ACTIONSBIOETHICS, Issue 4 2007ROSALIND MCDOUGALL ABSTRACT In this paper I explore the potential of virtue ethical ideas to generate a new way of thinking about the ethical questions surrounding the creation of children. Applying ideas from neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics to the parental sphere specifically, I develop a framework for the moral assessment of reproductive actions that centres on the concept of parental virtue. I suggest that the character traits of the good parent can be used as a basis for determining the moral permissibility of a particular reproductive action. I posit three parental virtues and argue that we can see the moral status of a reproductive action as determined by the relationship between such an action and (at least) these virtues. Using a case involving selection for deafness, I argue that thinking in terms of the question ,would a virtuous parent do this?' when morally assessing reproductive action is a viable and useful way of thinking about issues in reproductive ethics. [source] INTRODUCING MORAL THEOLOGY: TRUE HAPPINESS AND THE VIRTUESNEW BLACKFRIARS, Issue 1034 2010MARGARET ATKINS OSA No abstract is available for this article. [source] Virtue and Reflection: The "Antinomies of Moral Philosophy"CONSTELLATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CRITICAL AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY, Issue 1 2005Christoph Menke First page of article [source] Promoting the Interests of Virtue: Robert Porrett's Clarissa: or, the Fatal Seduction (1788)JOURNAL FOR EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUDIES, Issue 2 2002CAROLINE GONDA First page of article [source] The Wheel of Virtue: Art, Literature, and Moral KnowledgeJOURNAL OF AESTHETICS AND ART CRITICISM, Issue 1 2002Noël Carroll [source] When Being Thin Is Not a VirtueJOURNAL OF AMERICAN GERIATRICS SOCIETY, Issue 12 2008David S. Knopman MD No abstract is available for this article. [source] Hypothetical Markets: Educational Application of Ronald Dworkin's Sovereign VirtueJOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, Issue 3 2006STEPHEN GOUGH The purpose of this paper is to consider, in principle and at the most general level, a particular possible approach to educational policy-making. This approach involves an education-specific application of the notion of hypothetical markets first developed in Ronald Dworkin's book Sovereign Virtue: The theory and practice of equality (2000). The paper distinguishes the concept of the market from the operation of any actual market, and from the operation of ,market forces' in any generalised sense. It continues by arguing that hypothetical markets of the kind identified by Dworkin are not only distinct, in both their nature and purpose, from actual markets operating in education, but also,in the face of continuing widespread debate about the value, at particular times and places, of such actual markets,a potentially valuable theoretical tool for educational policy-making. The paper then briefly considers a particular instance of such debate about actual markets in education. [source] Alasdair MacIntyre on Education: In Dialogue with Joseph DunneJOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, Issue 1 2002Alasdair Macintyre This discussion begins from the dilemma, posed in some earlier writing by Alasdair MacIntyre, that education is essential but also, in current economic and cultural conditions, impossible. The potential for resolving this dilemma through appeal to ,practice', ,narrative unity', and ,tradition'(three core concepts in After Virtue and later writings) is then examined. The discussion also explores the relationship of education to the modern state and the power of a liberal education to create an ,educated public' very different in character from the electorates of contemporary democratic regimes. It concludes with some remarks on the role of education in combating prejudice against certain kinds of human difference. [source] AGAINST METAETHICAL IMPERIALISM: Several Arguments for Equal Partnerships between the Deontic and AretaicJOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS ETHICS, Issue 3 2010Jesse Couenhoven ABSTRACT Virtue and deontological ethics are now commonly contrasted as rival approaches to moral inquiry. However, I argue that neither metaethical party should seek complete, solitary domination of the ethical domain. Reductive treatments of the right or the virtuous, as well as projects that abandon the former or latter, are bound to leave us with a sadly diminished map of the moral territories crucial to our lives. Thus, it is better for the two parties to seek a more cordial and equal relationship, one that permits metaethical pluralism, and acknowledges mutual dependence. I do not seek to prescribe how that relationship should look: this essay offers less a positive metaethical position than a prolegomenon to such a position, one that attempts to head off harmful attempts to reduce the territory of the aretaic to that of the deontic, or that of the deontic to the aretaic. [source] Virtue and Community in Business Ethics: A Critical Assessment of Solomon's Aristotelian Approach to Social ResponsibilityJOURNAL OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Issue 4 2001Roger J. H. King [source] Virtuous Viragos: Female Heroism and Ethical Action in Shakespearean DramaLITERATURE COMPASS (ELECTRONIC), Issue 6 2010Unhae Langis Virtue, from the Latin vir for manly courage and strength, was the mark of male excellence in Renaissance culture. Embodying both physical and moral strength through the famous figure of Hercules, virtue took on other values of courtly gentility and political prudence as the medieval warrior society was gradually transformed into the modern state. In inverse proportion to the expansion of male virtue, the conception of the virago underwent a corresponding constriction and decline from a manlike, heroic woman to a scold. Encompassing both physical and moral excellence (OED 2a, 7), male virtue came to appropriate the heroic definition of virago, and female virtue, by Shakespeare's time, became confined to chastity (OED 2c). Challenging the traditions of male virtue and female monstrosity in Renaissance drama, this essay examines the virtuous viragos populating the Shakespearean canon, who present themselves as better models of ethical action than men, with whom virtue is etymologically and historically associated. This study examines two nuanced conceptions of female heroism and ethical action centering on the erotic and politic Cleopatra and the chaste, self-affirming Desdemona as virtuous viragos. Moreover, the notion of heroism, traditionally associated with tragedy, translates to the less exalted but more prudentially successful ethical action of viragos in Shakespeare's comedies such as The Taming of the Shrew. I argue that virtuous viragos attain their ethical stature against this male-inflected standard of tragic heroism even while calling for its dismantling and replacement with the more discerning framework of neo-Aristotelian virtue grounded on practical wisdom. [source] Truth in Virtue of Meaning.METAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2010By Gillian Russell First page of article [source] RIGHT ACT, VIRTUOUS MOTIVEMETAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 1-2 2010THOMAS HURKA Abstract: The concepts of virtue and right action are closely connected, in that we expect people with virtuous motives to at least often act rightly. Two well-known views explain this connection by defining one of the concepts in terms of the other. Instrumentalists about virtue identify virtuous motives as those that lead to right acts; virtue-ethicists identify right acts as those that are or would be done from virtuous motives. This essay outlines a rival explanation, based on the "higher-level" account of virtue defended in the author's Virtue, Vice, and Value. On this account rightness and virtue go together because each is defined by a (different) relation to some other, more basic moral concept. Their frequent coincidence is therefore like a correlation between A and B based not on either's causing the other but on their being joint effects of a single common cause. [source] Pomponazzi: Moral Virtue in a Deterministic UniverseMIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, Issue 1 2002John L. Treloar [source] Book Reviews: Crooked Stalks: Cultivating Virtue in South India by Anand PandianAMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST, Issue 3 2010John Harriss No abstract is available for this article. [source] Healthy Communities: Beyond Civic VirtueNATIONAL CIVIC REVIEW, Issue 4 2001Ken Jones [source] Evidentialism, Vice, and VirtuePHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH, Issue 3 2009JASON BAEHR First page of article [source] The New Bureaucracies of Virtue or When Form Fails to Follow FunctionPOLAR: POLITICAL AND LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REVIEW, Issue 2 2007Charles L. Bosk As the prospective review of research protocols has expanded to include ethnography, researchers have responded with a mixture of bewilderment, irritation, and formal complaint. These responses typically center on how poorly a process modeled on the randomized clinical trial fits the realities of the more dynamic, evolving methods that are used to conduct ethnographic research. However warranted these complaints are, those voicing them have not analyzed adequately the logic in use that allowed the system of review to extend with so little resistance. This paper locates the expansion in the goal displacement that Merton identified as part of bureaucratic organization and identifies the tensions between researchers and administrators as a consequence of an inversion of the normal status hierarchy found in universities. Social scientists need to do more than complain about the regulatory process; they also need to make that apparatus an object for study. Only recently have social scientists taken up the task in earnest. This paper contributes to emerging efforts to understand how prospective review of research protocols presents challenges to ethnographers and how ethnographic proposals do the same for IRBs (Institutional Research Boards). This essay extends three themes that are already prominent in the literature discussing IRBs and ethnography: (1) the separation of bureaucratic regulations,policies,and procedures from the everyday questions of research ethics that are most likely to trouble ethnographers; (2) the goal displacement that occurs when the entire domain of research ethics is reduced to compliance with a set of federal regulations as interpreted by local committees; and (3) the difficulties of sense making when ethnographers and IRB administrators or panel members respond each to the other's concerns. [source] VI,My Station and its Duties: Ideals and the Social Embeddedness of VirtuePROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY (HARDBACK), Issue 1 2002Julia Annas In the Stoics we find a combination of two perspectives which are commonly thought to conflict: the embedded perspective from within one's social context, and the universal perspective of the member of the moral community of rational beings. I argue that the Stoics do have a unified theory, one which avoids problems that trouble some modern theories which try to unite these perspectives. [source] Exchange Rates Under The East Asian Dollar Standard: Living With Conflicted VirtueTHE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 512 2006Domenico Lombardi First page of article [source] Exchange Rates Under the East Asian Dollar Standard; Living with Conflicted Virtue.THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 509 2006Ulrich Volz No abstract is available for this article. [source] Science and Virtue: An Essay on the Impact of the Scientific Mentality on Moral Character.THE HEYTHROP JOURNAL, Issue 4 2008By Louis Caruana No abstract is available for this article. [source] Didymus the Blind and His Circle in Late-Antique Alexandria: Virtue and Narrative in Biblical Scholarship By Richard A. LaytonTHE HEYTHROP JOURNAL, Issue 4 2006Augustine Casiday No abstract is available for this article. [source] "Closely Draw the Cord of Virtue": Instructive Plays and American Society, 1795 to 1825THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN CULTURE, Issue 1 2004M. Susan Anthony First page of article [source] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||