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Vertical Restraints (vertical + restraint)
Selected AbstractsTHE ECONOMIC THEORY OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTSJOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS, Issue 5 2006Oana Secrieru Abstract The types of contracts arising in a typical vertical manufacturer,retailer relationship are more sophisticated than a simple uniform price. In addition to setting per unit prices, manufacturers and retailers also revert to non-linear pricing and non-price instruments. These instruments or contracts are referred to as vertical restraints and can take the form of franchise fees, resale-price maintenance, exclusive dealing, exclusive territories and slotting allowances. The use and the effects of one type of instrument versus another depend crucially on specific market assumptions upstream and downstream and on the division of bargaining power between manufacturers and retailers. This paper surveys the industrial organization literature on retail pricing and shows that vertical restraint instruments have important effects on producer and consumer prices, market structure, efficiency and welfare. [source] Influence of size on the constitutive equations of concrete or rock dowelsINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR NUMERICAL AND ANALYTICAL METHODS IN GEOMECHANICS, Issue 15 2008Letícia Fleck Fadel Miguel Abstract The numerical fracture analysis of non-homogeneous rock or concrete dowels subjected to shear and compression is described in detail. The method of analysis allows the consideration of scale and rate effects due to material non-homogeneity and fracture. The proposed approach is verified by comparing numerical predictions with experimental results reported in the literature for a series of small rock samples, since experimental evidence for large bodies is not yet available (2007). Results generated by Monte Carlo simulation using the so-called discrete element method to model the dowels suggest that a simple three parameters law can be used to predict the relationship between tangential stress at the base and lateral distortion. It is observed that the larger the size of the cubes, the smaller both the peak tangential stress and the rupture distortion. Size effects are also evaluated in samples with vertical restraint. The influence of loading rate is likewise numerically assessed for two sample sizes. The effect is compatible with experimental evidence available for concrete using small samples. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTSJOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS, Issue 5 2006Oana Secrieru Abstract The types of contracts arising in a typical vertical manufacturer,retailer relationship are more sophisticated than a simple uniform price. In addition to setting per unit prices, manufacturers and retailers also revert to non-linear pricing and non-price instruments. These instruments or contracts are referred to as vertical restraints and can take the form of franchise fees, resale-price maintenance, exclusive dealing, exclusive territories and slotting allowances. The use and the effects of one type of instrument versus another depend crucially on specific market assumptions upstream and downstream and on the division of bargaining power between manufacturers and retailers. This paper surveys the industrial organization literature on retail pricing and shows that vertical restraint instruments have important effects on producer and consumer prices, market structure, efficiency and welfare. [source] ,Consumer' versus ,Customer': The Devil in the DetailJOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY, Issue 2 2010Pinar Akman According to the European Commission, the objective of EU competition rules is enhancing ,consumer welfare'. In EU competition law, however, ,consumer' means ,customer' and encompasses intermediate customers as well as final consumers. Under Article 102TFEU, harming intermediate ,customers' is generally presumed to harm ,consumers' and where intermediate customers are not competitors of the dominant undertaking, there is no requisite to assess the effects of conduct on users further downstream. Using advances in economics of vertical restraints and, in particular, non-linear pricing, this article shows that there are instances where the effect on ,customer welfare' does not coincide with the effect on ,consumer welfare' and the presumption can potentially lead to decisional errors. Thus, if the law is to serve the interests of ,consumers', the Commission should reconsider this presumption and its interpretation of the ,consumer' in ,consumer welfare'; otherwise, it remains questionable whose interests EU competition law serves. [source] The dynamic behaviour of stacked shipping units during transport.PACKAGING TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE, Issue 5 2004Part 1: model validation Abstract This paper deals with the dynamic behaviour of stacked packaging units when subjected to vertical vibrational inputs as experienced in transport vehicles. Although the vibrational performance of single-unit packaging systems has been thoroughly studied, the behaviour of stacked packaging units is not fully understood. The complexity of the problem is compounded when the effects of vertical restraints are taken into account. The paper presents the development of a numerical computer model designed to predict the dynamic response of stacked package systems when subjected to vertical vibrational excitation. Provisions have been made to account for the effects of vertical restraint tension and stiffness. In addition, a physical model representative of a generic stacked packaging system has been developed to assist in validating the numerical model. The paper includes results from preliminary experiments in which the frequency response functions of the models were evaluated and compared. The validity of the numerical model in the time domain was tested using random burst excitation signals. These preliminary experiments reveal that, when the effects of frictional damping are taken into account, the numerical model can be used to generate reasonably accurate predications of the dynamic behaviour of the equivalent physical system. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] |