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Vertical Merger (vertical + merger)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Selected Abstracts

Systems Competition, Vertical Merger, and Foreclosure

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 1 2000
Jeffrey Church
We address the possibility of foreclosure in markets where the final good consists of a system composed of a hardware good and complementary software and the value of the system depends on the availability of software. Foreclosure occurs when a hardware firm merges with a software firm and the integrated firm makes its software incompatible with a rival technology or system. We find that foreclosure can be an equilibrium outcome where both the merger and compatibility decisions are part of a multistage game which permits the foreclosed hardware firm to play a number of counter-strategies. Further, foreclosure can be an effective strategy to monopolize the hardware market. [source]

Vertical merger: monopolization for downstream quasi-rents

MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2009
Richard S. Higgins
This paper provides a welfare analysis of vertical merger between an input monopolist and downstream firms that compete perfectly in a homogeneous product market. The distinguishing feature of the present model is that the downstream firms face capacity constraints. As a result of downstream quasi-rents, vertical merger,the extent of merger is gauged by the capacity share of the acquired downstream firm,may either raise or lower final output. An analytical criterion for distinguishing pro- and anti-competitive mergers is derived, which relies entirely on pre-merger market quantities and the capacity share of the downstream target. A common result is that vertical merger is output-increasing even when unaffiliated downstream rivals are completely foreclosed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Cross-border mergers and acquisitions and European integration

ECONOMIC POLICY, Issue 57 2009
Nicolas Coeurdacier
SUMMARY Cross-border M&A Cross-border mergers and acquisitions activities (M&As) sharply increased over the last two decades, partly as a result of financial liberalization policies, government policies and regional agreements. In this paper, we identify some of the main forces driving M&As, using a unique database on bilateral cross-border M&As at the sectoral level (in manufacturing and services) over the period 1985,2004. The key empirical findings are: (1) EMU helped the restructuring of capital within the same sector of manufacturing activity among euro area firms; (2) joining the EU favoured both horizontal and vertical mergers; (3) policy-makers can help attract capital by reducing the corporate tax rates and the degree of product market regulations and by improving the country's financial systems; (4) the service industry has not yet fully benefited from European integration because the level of protection and barriers to entry in the services sector act as a strong deterrent to cross-border M&As in services. , Nicolas Coeurdacier, Roberto A. De Santis and Antonin Aviat [source]