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Utility Regulation (utility + regulation)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Selected Abstracts

UK Utility Regulation: Licences, Commitment and Judicial Review

ANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2005
Michael Harker
The functional logic of delegation which underpins much principal,agent analyses is discussed, together with the credibility problem emerging from a divergence between a principal's long-term and short-term policies. Levy and Spiller contend that the UK has a successful model of utility regulation in part because of the use of licences which restrict the regulator from deviating from the broad substantive principles settled at the time of vesting. This contention is examined through the detailed consideration of five judicial review cases which have cast light on how, and to what extent, the licences restrict regulatory discretion. [source]

Regulatory Contracts and Stakeholder Regulation

ANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2005
Tony Prosser
It argues that there are serious problems in conceiving of regulatory relations as analogous to contracts, though particular contracts may be a useful tool in the regulatory armoury. This is partly due to problems with principal/agent theory, which has been conceived in different ways by economists and lawyers, and partly due to the essentially political nature of regulatory relations, which make it difficult to tie down regulatory discretion in ways which resemble contractual relations. There is also ambiguity as to who is principal and who is agent, with the danger of adopting a single theoretical category for relationships which are radically different. The early legal structures adopted for UK utility regulation did have elements of a regulatory contract, but with the growth of competition and social regulation, a different model, that of a network of stakeholders, has largely replaced it. This offers the opportunity to develop more sophisticated regulatory procedures, but does not replace the need for substantive values drawn from economics but also from public service values as guides for regulatory decisions. [source]

Telecom Regulation: Lessons from Independent Central Banks

BUSINESS STRATEGY REVIEW, Issue 4 2001
Jon Stern
Consumers do not choose their preferred central bank base rate in the way that they buy, say, telephone services from one of a number of competing companies: independent central banks (ICBs) and utility regulators have different tasks. However, those concerned with the emerging field of utility regulation can still learn much from research on ICBs, not least because, for historical reasons, there is much more of it. The authors of this article argue that the key to the success of both ICBs and utility regulators is proper governance arrangements. They reject the arguments for procedures that are totally rule-based with little or no discretion. Within clear rules, they say, both ICBs and regulators should be given discretion combined with high accountability. [source]