Home  About us  Contact
 

Beauty Contest (beauty + contest)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting83%

Selected Abstracts

Keynesian Beauty Contest, Accounting Disclosure, and Market Efficiency

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 4 2008
PINGYANG GAO
ABSTRACT This paper examines the market efficiency consequences of accounting disclosure in the context of stock markets as a Keynesian beauty contest, an influential metaphor originally proposed by Keynes [1936] and recently formalized by Allen, Morris, and Shin [2006]. In such markets, public information plays an additional commonality role, biasing stock prices away from the consensus fundamental value toward public information. Despite this bias, I demonstrate that provisions of public information always drive stock prices closer to the fundamental value. Hence, as a main source of public information, accounting disclosure enhances market efficiency, and transparency should not be compromised on grounds of the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect. [source]

Auctions Versus Beauty Contests: The Allocation of UMTS Licences in Europe

ANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2003
L. Cartelier
The deployment of the so-called UMTS 3rd generation mobile networks is a step of vital importance for the promotion of competition in the telecommunications sector. The provision of high-traffic services presupposes that operators have access to the hertzian spectrum. The hertzian spectrum is a natural resource whose scarcity derives from the fact that only part of it is usable, for both technical and economic reasons. While the resource was sufficient to meet users' needs, the hertzian spectrum was allocated for little or no charge, on the principle of ,first come, first served'. However, with the explosion of technical progress in transmission technologies, new applications and new forms of use appeared, leading to a drastic increase in potential demand. It is in this context that the idea of charging for use of the spectrum arose, so as to discourage uneconomical use of the resource (e.g. stockpiling, wastage), to ensure a fair allocation between competing users and to forestall congestion. The purpose of this paper is first to examine the procedures for the allocation of hertzian spectrum operating licences, from the points of view of efficiency, transparency and sharing of the surplus. We shall then compare the results from the two approaches that were actually used in Europe: the open ascending auction and the beauty contest, before turning our attention to new forms of public action that result from the process of liberalization. [source]

,Are You Going to be MISS (or MR) Africa?'Contesting Masculinity in Drum Magazine 1951,1953

GENDER & HISTORY, Issue 1 2001
Lindsay Clowes
DrumDrum magazine was first published in March 1951. Like other magazines, it both reflected and shaped the society from which its audience emerged. During 1951, its audience, mainly urban black readers, was able to push the publication away from its original rural focus towards an urban emphasis. Town living, however, meant different things to different people. Thus, while readers were successful in shifting the focus of the magazine, they were less successful in influencing the way the publication presented urban life. This paper explores the struggle between readers, journalists and editors over the Miss Africa beauty contest announced at the beginning of 1952. Although the magazine reluctantly admitted men to the contest, it discriminated against male entrants in a variety of ways over the course of the year, and subsequent competitions barred male contestants entirely. Despite opposition from male readers who wished to be considered beautiful, the men of Drum were largely successful in asserting their own deeply gendered cultural vision of urban life. [source]

Keynesian Beauty Contest, Accounting Disclosure, and Market Efficiency

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 4 2008
PINGYANG GAO
ABSTRACT This paper examines the market efficiency consequences of accounting disclosure in the context of stock markets as a Keynesian beauty contest, an influential metaphor originally proposed by Keynes [1936] and recently formalized by Allen, Morris, and Shin [2006]. In such markets, public information plays an additional commonality role, biasing stock prices away from the consensus fundamental value toward public information. Despite this bias, I demonstrate that provisions of public information always drive stock prices closer to the fundamental value. Hence, as a main source of public information, accounting disclosure enhances market efficiency, and transparency should not be compromised on grounds of the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect. [source]

Auctions Versus Beauty Contests: The Allocation of UMTS Licences in Europe

ANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2003
L. Cartelier
The deployment of the so-called UMTS 3rd generation mobile networks is a step of vital importance for the promotion of competition in the telecommunications sector. The provision of high-traffic services presupposes that operators have access to the hertzian spectrum. The hertzian spectrum is a natural resource whose scarcity derives from the fact that only part of it is usable, for both technical and economic reasons. While the resource was sufficient to meet users' needs, the hertzian spectrum was allocated for little or no charge, on the principle of ,first come, first served'. However, with the explosion of technical progress in transmission technologies, new applications and new forms of use appeared, leading to a drastic increase in potential demand. It is in this context that the idea of charging for use of the spectrum arose, so as to discourage uneconomical use of the resource (e.g. stockpiling, wastage), to ensure a fair allocation between competing users and to forestall congestion. The purpose of this paper is first to examine the procedures for the allocation of hertzian spectrum operating licences, from the points of view of efficiency, transparency and sharing of the surplus. We shall then compare the results from the two approaches that were actually used in Europe: the open ascending auction and the beauty contest, before turning our attention to new forms of public action that result from the process of liberalization. [source]

Properties of scoring auctions

THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2008
John Asker
This article studies scoring auctions, a procedure commonly used to buy differentiated products: suppliers submit offers on all dimensions of the good (price, level of nonmonetary attributes), and these are evaluated using a scoring rule. We provide a systematic analysis of equilibrium behavior in scoring auctions when suppliers' private information is multidimensional (characterization of equilibrium behavior and expected utility equivalence). In addition, we show that scoring auctions dominate several other commonly used procedures for buying differentiated products, including menu auctions, beauty contests, and price-only auctions with minimum quality thresholds. [source]