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Two-part Pricing (two-part + pricing)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	100%

Selected Abstracts

Two-part Pricing, Public Discriminating Monopoly and Redistribution: A Note

METROECONOMICA, Issue 2 2002
Philippe Bernard
This note analyzes some properties of optional two-part pricing in a two-type economy. First, the optimal contracts along the Paretian frontier are described. Then, the duality relation between the Rawlsian program and the discriminating monopoly is demonstrated. Last, this property is used to build a mutualist mechanism implementing the constrained Pareto optima. [source]

Rent extraction, principal,agent relationships, and pricing strategies: vendor licensing during the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta

MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 8 2001
Ralph C. Allen
Two-part pricing, price-discrimination, rent creation and extraction, principal,agent theory, and public choice perspectives on public bureaucracies are used to interpret a vendor-license marketing arrangement and controversy arising out of the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta, GA. Containing features predicted by principal,agency theory, Atlanta's arrangement with its marketing agent was a response to the behavior of public bureaucracies and a low cost method of converting visitors' consumer surplus to rent, which could be extracted by the marketing agent and then by Atlanta. Atlanta's incentive to enforce vendor property rights was influenced by the nature of the game between Atlanta and prospective vendors. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Competition for exclusive customers: comparing equilibrium and welfare under one-part and two-part pricing

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2008
James D. Reitzes
Abstract., This paper compares one-part and two-part pricing in a discrete-continuous choice model, providing more extensive welfare results than prior literature. Under two-part pricing, firms may set fixed fees with or without ,unit-price commitment,' where the lack of unit-price commitment is consistent with ,after-market monopolization.' We find that two-part pricing with unit-price commitment is firms' dominant unilateral and joint pricing policy. Two-part pricing without unit-price commitment is the least desirable policy from a welfare standpoint. Under appropriate conditions, one-part pricing produces the highest consumer and social welfare, but the lowest profits. Ce mémoire compare la tarification en une et deux parties dans un modèle de choix discret-continu et fournit des résultats plus extensifs en termes de bien-être que ce qui était disponible auparavant. Dans la tarification en deux parties, les firmes peuvent établir des prix fixes à l'entrée avec ou sans engagement pour ce qui est du prix unitaire qui suivra, alors même que ce manque d'engagement porte à conséquence puisqu'il y aura de facto monopole après coup. On découvre que la tarification en deux parties avec un engagement quant au prix unitaire constitue la stratégie dominante et unilatérale de tarification conjointe. La tarification en deux parties sans engagement pour ce qui est du prix unitaire est la moins désirable des possibilités au plan du bien-être. Dans des conditions appropriées, la tarification en une partie engendre le plus haut niveau de bien-être pour le consommateur et la société, mais les profits les plus bas. [source]