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Taylor Principle (taylor + principle)
Selected AbstractsEXCHANGE RATE STABILISATION, LEARNING AND THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLEAUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 2 2007Article first published online: 30 MAY 200, HEINZ-PETER SPAHN The paper explores whether central banks can keep their interest rates independent from given foreign rates, and to what extent interest policies designed to stabilise nominal exchange rate changes can be applied instead of, or in addition to, the traditional interest rate response to inflation gaps. This modification of a Taylor Rule is analysed in a simple macro model with some New Keynesian features. Information is imperfect; agents cannot build rational expectations but try to learn ,true' market relations. Results show that the Taylor Principle can be generalised in an open economy with flexible exchange rates. [source] Monetary Policy and the Taylor Principle in Open EconomiesINTERNATIONAL FINANCE, Issue 3 2006Ludger Linnemann Nowadays, central banks mostly conduct monetary policy by setting nominal interest rates. A widely held view is that central banks can stabilize inflation if they follow the Taylor principle, which requires raising the nominal interest rate more than one-for-one in response to higher inflation. Is this also correct in an economy open to international trade? Exchange rate changes triggered by interest rate policy might interfere with inflation stabilization if they alter import prices. The paper shows that this destabilizing effect can prevail if (a) the central bank uses consumer (rather than producer) prices as its inflation indicator or directly reacts to currency depreciation, and (b) if it bases interest rate decisions on expected future inflation. Thus, if the central bank looks at current inflation rates and ignores exchange rate changes, Taylor-style interest rate setting policies are advisable in open economies as well. [source] Government Spending and the Taylor PrincipleJOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Issue 1 2009GISLE JAMES NATVIK public expenditures; Taylor principle; fiscal policy rules; rule-of-thumb consumers This paper explores how government size affects the scope for equilibrium indeterminacy in a New Keynesian economy, where part of the population live hand-to-mouth. The main result is that a higher level of public consumption is likely to generate indeterminacy and render the Taylor principle insufficient as criterion for equilibrium uniqueness. This holds even though fiscal policy serves to reduce swings in current income. Only if government consumption is a substitute for private consumption, will it narrow the scope for indeterminacy. Hence monetary policy should be conducted with an eye to the amount and composition of government consumption. [source] EXCHANGE RATE STABILISATION, LEARNING AND THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLEAUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 2 2007Article first published online: 30 MAY 200, HEINZ-PETER SPAHN The paper explores whether central banks can keep their interest rates independent from given foreign rates, and to what extent interest policies designed to stabilise nominal exchange rate changes can be applied instead of, or in addition to, the traditional interest rate response to inflation gaps. This modification of a Taylor Rule is analysed in a simple macro model with some New Keynesian features. Information is imperfect; agents cannot build rational expectations but try to learn ,true' market relations. Results show that the Taylor Principle can be generalised in an open economy with flexible exchange rates. [source] Monetary Policy and the Taylor Principle in Open EconomiesINTERNATIONAL FINANCE, Issue 3 2006Ludger Linnemann Nowadays, central banks mostly conduct monetary policy by setting nominal interest rates. A widely held view is that central banks can stabilize inflation if they follow the Taylor principle, which requires raising the nominal interest rate more than one-for-one in response to higher inflation. Is this also correct in an economy open to international trade? Exchange rate changes triggered by interest rate policy might interfere with inflation stabilization if they alter import prices. The paper shows that this destabilizing effect can prevail if (a) the central bank uses consumer (rather than producer) prices as its inflation indicator or directly reacts to currency depreciation, and (b) if it bases interest rate decisions on expected future inflation. Thus, if the central bank looks at current inflation rates and ignores exchange rate changes, Taylor-style interest rate setting policies are advisable in open economies as well. [source] Interest rate rules and global determinacy: An alternative to the Taylor principleINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 4 2009Jean-Pascal Bénassy E43; E52; E58; E62; E63 A well-known determinacy condition on interest rate rules is the "Taylor principle," which states that nominal interest rates should respond more than 100 percent to inflation. Unfortunately, notably because interest rates must be positive, the Taylor principle cannot be satisfied for all interest rates, and as a consequence global determinacy may not prevail even though there exists a locally determinate equilibrium. We propose here a simple alternative to the Taylor principle, which takes the form of a new condition on interest rate rules that ensures global determinacy. An important feature of the policy package is that it does not rely at all on any of the fiscal policies associated with the "fiscal theory of the price level," which has so far been the main alternative for determinacy. [source] Simple Monetary Rules under Fiscal DominanceJOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Issue 1 2010MICHAEL KUMHOF optimal simple policy rules; fiscal dominance This paper asks whether interest rate rules that respond aggressively to inflation, following the Taylor principle, are feasible in countries that suffer from fiscal dominance. We find that if interest rates are allowed to also respond to government debt, they can produce unique equilibria. But such equilibria are associated with extremely volatile inflation. The resulting frequent violations of the zero lower bound make such rules infeasible. Even within the set of feasible rules the welfare optimizing response to inflation is highly negative. The welfare gain from responding to government debt is minimal compared to the gain from eliminating fiscal dominance. [source] Government Spending and the Taylor PrincipleJOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Issue 1 2009GISLE JAMES NATVIK public expenditures; Taylor principle; fiscal policy rules; rule-of-thumb consumers This paper explores how government size affects the scope for equilibrium indeterminacy in a New Keynesian economy, where part of the population live hand-to-mouth. The main result is that a higher level of public consumption is likely to generate indeterminacy and render the Taylor principle insufficient as criterion for equilibrium uniqueness. This holds even though fiscal policy serves to reduce swings in current income. Only if government consumption is a substitute for private consumption, will it narrow the scope for indeterminacy. Hence monetary policy should be conducted with an eye to the amount and composition of government consumption. [source] Monetary and Fiscal Policy SwitchingJOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Issue 4 2007HESS CHUNG regime change; policy interactions; Taylor rule; fiscal theory of the price level A growing body of evidence finds that policy reaction functions vary substantially over different periods in the United States. This paper explores how moving to an environment in which monetary and fiscal regimes evolve according to a Markov process can change the impacts of policy shocks. In one regime monetary policy follows the Taylor principle and taxes rise strongly with debt; in another regime the Taylor principle fails to hold and taxes are exogenous. An example shows that a unique bounded non-Ricardian equilibrium exists in this environment. A computational model illustrates that because agents' decision rules embed the probability that policies will change in the future, monetary and tax shocks always produce wealth effects. When it is possible that fiscal policy will be unresponsive to debt at times, active monetary policy (like a Taylor rule) in one regime is not sufficient to insulate the economy against tax shocks in that regime and it can have the unintended consequence of amplifying and propagating the aggregate demand effects of tax shocks. The paper also considers the implications of policy switching for two empirical issues. [source] | ||||||||||