Bankruptcy Code (bankruptcy + code)

Distribution by Scientific Domains


Selected Abstracts


A Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default

ECONOMETRICA, Issue 6 2007
Satyajit Chatterjee
We study, theoretically and quantitatively, the general equilibrium of an economy in which households smooth consumption by means of both a riskless asset and unsecured loans with the option to default. The default option resembles a bankruptcy filing under Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Competitive financial intermediaries offer a menu of loan sizes and interest rates wherein each loan makes zero profits. We prove the existence of a steady-state equilibrium and characterize the circumstances under which a household defaults on its loans. We show that our model accounts for the main statistics regarding bankruptcy and unsecured credit while matching key macroeconomic aggregates, and the earnings and wealth distributions. We use this model to address the implications of a recent policy change that introduces a form of "means testing" for households contemplating a Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing. We find that this policy change yields large welfare gains. [source]


Toward a New Corporate Reorganization Paradigm

JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 4 2007
Donald S. Bernstein
Chapter 11 is becoming an increasingly flexible, market-driven forum for determining who will become the owners of financially troubled enterprises. With increasing frequency, distressed companies are sold in Chapter 11 as going concerns. At the same time, distressed investors, including hedge funds and private equity investors, are actively trading the debt of such companies in much the same way that equity investors trade the stock of solvent companies. Market forces drive the troubled company's debt obligations into the hands of those investors who value the enterprise most highly and who want to decide whether to reorganize or to sell it. One way or the other, the Chapter 11 process is used to effect an orderly transfer of control of the enterprise into new hands, whether the creditors themselves or a third party. But if the market-oriented elements of this new reorganization process promise to increase creditor recoveries and preserve the values of corporate assets, other recent developments could present obstacles to achieving these goals. In particular, the increased complexity of corporate capital structures and investment patterns,including the issuance of second-lien debt and the dispersion of investment risks among numerous parties through the use of derivatives and other instruments,threatens to increase inter-creditor conflicts and reduce transparency in the restructuring process. These factors, coupled with provisions added to the Bankruptcy Code that selectively permit "opt-out" behavior by favored constituencies, could interfere with the ability of troubled companies to reorganize as the next cycle of defaults unfolds. [source]


The Squam Lake Report: Fixing the Financial System,

JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 3 2010
Kenneth French
In these excerpts from The Squam Lake Report, fifteen distinguished economists analyze where the global financial system failed, and how such failures might be prevented (or at least their damage better contained) in the future. Although there were many contributing factors to the crisis,including "agency" problems throughout the financial system and a bankruptcy code poorly suited for reorganizing financial firms,at the core of the problem is a potential conflict between the risk-taking proclivity of financial institutions and the interests of the economy at large that must be managed at least in part through more effective regulation. The Squam Lake Report provides a nonpartisan plan to transform the regulation of financial markets in ways designed to limit systemic risk while preserving,to the extent possible and prudent,the economies of scale and scope that justify the existence of today's large financial institutions. To reduce the risks that large banks will fail, the authors call for higher capital requirements based on more effective assessments of the risks of bank assets and liabilities, as well as a new systemic regulator that should be part of the central bank. To reduce the costs of failure when it occurs, the authors propose that banks be required to create "living wills" laying out their plan to sell assets or shut down operations in the event of financial trouble. As part of that plan, regulators are urged to "aggressively encourage" banks to issue "contingent" debt capital securities that convert into equity. [source]


Do Country Specific Bankruptcy Codes Determine Long-term Financial Performance?

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT & ACCOUNTING, Issue 2 2001
Columbia Gas System, The Case of Metallgesellschaft AG
In this paper, we examine the impact of financial distress, the bankruptcy code, and related procedures on the long-term performance of two companies engaged in similar businesses across two countries. Both the companies were driven into bankruptcy as a result of unanticipated changes in energy prices. Though the resolution of bankruptcy of the US firm took a longer time, the post-reorganization performance of the firm has been excellent. In contrast, the post-reorganization performance of the German firm, which emerged out of bankruptcy in 2 weeks, has been poor. These results are consistent with the view that one of the important determinants of post-bankruptcy performance of a firm is more likely to be the underlying economic fundamentals rather than the country specific bankruptcy code through which the firm reorganizes. [source]