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Banking Regulation (banking + regulation)
Selected Abstracts"Qualitative" Bankenaufsicht ,"Königsweg" der Regulierung?PERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, Issue 3 2000Stephan Paul Banking regulation in the twenty-first century is at the crossroads. The article discusses the question whether the supervisory review of bank risk management systems is superior to the minimum capital requirements in traditional style. It points out the serious problems of both ways , especially the first one, which was preferred by the Basle Committee of Banking Supervision in its proposal "A new capital adequacy framework" (June 1999). [source] Bank Capital Regulation in Contemporary Banking Theory: A Review of the LiteratureFINANCIAL MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS, Issue 2 2001João A. C. Santos This paper reviews the theoretical literature on bank capital regulation and analyzes some of the approaches to redesigning the 1988 Basel Accord on capital standards. The paper starts with a review of the literature on the design of the financial system and the existence of banks. It proceeds with a presentation of the market failures that justify banking regulation and an analysis of the mechanisms that have been suggested to deal with these failures. The paper then reviews the theoretical literature on bank capital regulation. This is followed by a brief history of capital regulation since the 1988 Basel Capital Accord and a presentation of both the alternative approaches that have been put forward on setting capital standards and the Basel Committee's proposal for a new capital adequacy framework. [source] Forbearance and Prompt Corrective ActionJOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Issue 5 2007NARAYANA R. KOCHERLAKOTA risky collateral; limited enforcement; banking regulation; optimal social contract This article investigates whether a bank regulator should terminate problem banks promptly or exercise forbearance. We construct a dynamic model economy in which entrepreneurs pledge collateral, borrow from banks, and invest in long-term projects. We assume that collateral value has aggregate risk over time, that in any period entrepreneurs can abscond with the projects but lose the collateral, and that depositors can withdraw deposits. We show that optimal regulation exhibits forbearance if the ex-ante probability of collapse in collateral value is sufficiently low, but exhibits prompt termination of problem banks if this probability is sufficiently high. [source] International Variation in Bank Accounting Information ContentJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT & ACCOUNTING, Issue 3 2008Ronald Zhao This study explores the cross-country impact of financial system and banking regulations on the information content of bank earnings and book value. Test results provide empirical evidence that financial system and banking regulations have a joint effect on the association of equity price with earnings and book value components in Germany, France, the United Kingdom and United States. This effect is explainable by the objective bank function, which shows that earnings of the period determine the terminal book value, thus consistent with the clean surplus accounting approach. Cross-country variation in bank accounting information content calls for caution in interpreting international bank financial and operating ratios. [source] | ||||||||||