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Bank Regulation (bank + regulation)
Selected AbstractsWaiving Technical Default: The Role of Agency Costs and Bank RegulationsJOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 9-10 2006Hassan R. HassabElnaby Abstract:, This paper examines whether the characteristics of banks and borrowers are associated with banks' decisions to waive violations of debt covenants. The findings suggest that banks possess sufficient private information about firms, and they use this information in their waiver decisions. Banks' decisions to waive violations vary with the borrowers' agency costs, debt features, the banks' characteristics and regulatory circumstances, and the bank-firm business relationship. There is no evidence that syndicated loans, bank structure, and adverse economic conditions are significant determinants of the waiver decision. Research findings offer valuable insight into the theoretical and practical implications of debt covenants and agency costs. [source] Optimization and its discontents in regulatory design: Bank regulation as an exampleREGULATION & GOVERNANCE, Issue 1 2010William H. Simon Abstract Economists and lawyers trained in economics tend to speak about regulation from a perspective organized around the basic norm of optimization. In contrast, an important managerial literature espouses a perspective organized around the basic norm of reliability. The perspectives are not logically inconsistent, but the economist's view sometimes leads in practice to a preoccupation with decisional simplicity and cost minimization at the expense of complex judgment and learning. Drawing on a literature often ignored by economists and lawyers, I elaborate the contrast between the optimization and reliability perspectives. I then show how the contrast illuminates current discussions of the reform of bank regulation. [source] Board Monitoring, Regulation, and Performance in the Banking Industry: Evidence from the Market for Corporate ControlCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 5 2010Jens Hagendorff ABSTRACT Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: The specific monitoring effect of boards of directors versus industry regulation is unclear. In this paper, we examine how the interaction between bank-level monitoring and regulatory regimes influences the announcement period returns of acquiring banks in the US and twelve European economies. Research Findings/Insights: We study three board monitoring mechanisms , independence, CEO-chair duality, and diversity , and analyze their effectiveness in preventing underperforming merger strategies under bank regulators of varying strictness. Only under strict banking regulation regimes, do board independence and diversity improve acquisition performance. In less strict regulatory environments, corporate governance is virtually irrelevant in improving the performance outcomes of merger activities. Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our results indicate a complementary role between monitoring by boards and bank regulation. This study is the first to report evidence consistent with complementarity by investigating the effectiveness (rather than the prevalence) of governance arrangements across regulatory regimes. Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our work offers insights to policymakers charged with improving the quality of decision-making at financial institutions. Attempts to improve the ability of bank boards to critically assess managerial initiatives are most likely to be successful if internal governance is accompanied by strict industry regulation. [source] Bank Mergers in Europe: The Public Policy IssuesJCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 3 2000Jean Dermine A very large merger wave in the banking industry has taken place in Europe over the last 15 years. Public policy-makers need to assess how bank mergers , be they domestic intra-industry, across-industry, or cross-border , affect their mission of protecting investors and ensuring financial stability, an appropriate level of competition, and the competitiveness of national firms. Moreover, as the banking world is becoming increasingly international, there is a need to reassess the structure of bank regulation and supervision which has been assumed historically by each nation-state. [source] Time Inconsistency and Free-Riding in a Monetary UnionJOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Issue 7 2008VARADARAJAN V. CHARI monetary regime; fixed exchange rates; dollarization; European Union; Maastricht Treaty In monetary unions, a time inconsistency problem in monetary policy leads to a novel type of free-rider problem in the setting of non-monetary policies. The free-rider problem leads union members to pursue lax non-monetary policies that induce the monetary authority to generate high inflation. Free-riding can be mitigated by imposing constraints on non-monetary policies. Without a time inconsistency problem, the union has no free-rider problem; then constraints on non-monetary policies are unnecessary and possibly harmful. This theory is here detailed and applied to several non-monetary policies: labor market policy, fiscal policy, and bank regulation. [source] Optimization and its discontents in regulatory design: Bank regulation as an exampleREGULATION & GOVERNANCE, Issue 1 2010William H. Simon Abstract Economists and lawyers trained in economics tend to speak about regulation from a perspective organized around the basic norm of optimization. In contrast, an important managerial literature espouses a perspective organized around the basic norm of reliability. The perspectives are not logically inconsistent, but the economist's view sometimes leads in practice to a preoccupation with decisional simplicity and cost minimization at the expense of complex judgment and learning. Drawing on a literature often ignored by economists and lawyers, I elaborate the contrast between the optimization and reliability perspectives. I then show how the contrast illuminates current discussions of the reform of bank regulation. [source] | |||||||||||||