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Superior Information (superior + information)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	83%

Selected Abstracts

Subfield atrophy pattern in temporal lobe epilepsy with and without mesial sclerosis detected by high-resolution MRI at 4 Tesla: Preliminary results

EPILEPSIA, Issue 6 2009
Susanne G. Mueller
Summary Purpose:, High-resolution magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) at 4 Tesla depicts details of the internal structure of the hippocampus not visible at 1.5 Tesla, and so allows for in vivo parcellation of different hippocampal subfields. The aim of this study was to test if distinct subfield atrophy patterns can be detected in temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE) with mesial temporal sclerosis (TLE-MTS) and without (TLE-no) hippocampal sclerosis. Methods:, High-resolution T2 -weighted hippocampal images were acquired in 34 controls: 15 TLE-MTS and 18 TLE-no. Entorhinal cortex (ERC), subiculum (SUB), CA1, CA2, and CA3, and dentate (CA3&DG) volumes were determined using a manual parcellation scheme. Results:, TLE-MTS had significantly smaller ipsilateral CA1, CA2, CA3&DG, and total hippocampal volume than controls or TLE-no. Mean ipsilateral CA1 and CA3&DG z-scores were significantly lower than ipsilateral CA2, ERC, and SUB z-scores. There were no significant differences between the various subfield or hippocampal z-scores on either the ipsi- or the contralateral side in TLE-no. Using a z-score ,,2.0 to identify severe volume loss, the following atrophy patterns were found in TLE-MTS: CA1 atrophy, CA3&DG atrophy, CA1 and CA3&DG atrophy, and global hippocampal atrophy. Significant subfield atrophy was found in three TLE-no: contralateral SUB atrophy, bilateral CA3&DG atrophy, and ipsilateral ERC and SUB atrophy. Discussion:, Using a manual parcellation scheme on 4 Tesla high-resolution MRI, we found the characteristic ipsilateral CA1 and CA3&DG atrophy described in TLE-MTS. Seventeen percent of the TLE-no had subfield atrophy despite normal total hippocampal volume. These findings indicate that high-resolution MRI and subfield volumetry provide superior information compared to standard hippocampal volumetry. [source]

Universal Banking, Asset Management, and Stock Underwriting

EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 4 2009
William C. Johnson
G24 Abstract This paper examines institutions that underwrite IPOs and have asset management divisions from 1993 through 1998. We provide evidence that these firms use asset management funds as vehicles to help them earn more equity underwriting business. We also show that asset managers affiliated with IPO underwriters use their superior information about their own institution's IPOs to earn annualised market adjusted returns 7.6% above asset managers of firms who did not underwrite the IPO. Superior future returns by asset managers who trade affiliated IPOs are dependent on the information environment for the IPO and the underwriter reputation rank. [source]

Are active fund managers collectors of private information or fast interpreters of public information?

ACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 3 2010
David R. Gallagher
G23 Abstract Recent studies of fund manager performance find evidence of outperformance. However limited research exists as to whether such outperformance is because of privately collected information, or merely expedient interpretation of publicly released information. In this study, we examine the trade sequences of active Australian equity fund managers around earnings announcements to provide insights into the source of fund managers' superior information. We document an increased occurrence of buy-sell trade sequences around good-news earnings announcements. The evidence is consistent with fund managers having both private information about forthcoming good-news earnings announcements and being ,short-term profiteers'. We find no evidence that fund managers have private information about forthcoming bad-news earnings announcements. However, we do find an increase in the frequency of fund managers not trading before bad-news earnings announcements only to subsequently sell during announcements. [source]

Asymmetric information, price discovery and macroeconomic announcements in FX market: do top trading banks know more?

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2010
Kate Phylaktis
Abstract This study investigates information asymmetry in the foreign exchange market by testing the hypothesis that top trading banks possess superior information on the macroeconomy because they process greater order flow, which, according to the micro-structure literature, helps them aggregate the dispersed information and feel the general movements of the economy. Examining the information share of the banks in the Reuters EFX system using indicative GBP,$US data over 5 years, we find that the top 10 banks, out of 100 quoting banks in the market, have a monthly average share of over 70% of total market information, and around 80% during some US macroannouncements. These results suggest the possibility of private information over public news in the foreign exchange market. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

When do central banks prefer to intervene secretly?

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2009
Montserrat Ferré
Abstract Central banks often intervene secretly in the foreign exchange market. This secrecy seems to be at odds with the signalling channel. In this article we will analyse when a central bank intervening in the foreign exchange rate market purely through the signalling channel would prefer to act secretly or publicly. By using a microstructure model, we will show that the consistency of the intervention with fundamentals, the volume of noise trading, the weight given to the effectiveness of intervention and the degree of superior information held by the central bank will influence the decision to intervene secretly or publicly. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Insurance Markets With Differential Information

JOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE, Issue 2 2009
S. Hun Seog
This article attempts to understand the outcomes when each party of an insurance contract simultaneously has superior information. I assume that policyholders have superior information about specific risks while insurers have superior information about general risks. I find that low-general-risk policyholders purchase insurance, while high-general-risk policyholders are self-insured. Among the low-general-risk policyholders, high-specific-risk policyholders purchase full insurance, while low-specific-risk policyholders purchase partial insurance. When insurers can strategically publicize their information, efficiency is improved because high-general-risk policyholders purchase actuarially fair insurance. The market segmentation is also found based on the general-risk type and the publicizing of information. [source]