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Subnational Governments (subnational + government)
Selected AbstractsAustralian Federalism Confronts Globalisation: A New Challenge at the CentenaryAUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Issue 3 2002John M Kline Globalisation poses a special challenge for federal systems of government. Despite administrative reforms, Australia has not fully confronted crucial questions regarding the role of states and territories when international issues overlap areas of subnational government authority. This challenge emerged with controversies over environmental regulations, import quarantines and Aboriginal policies. Initial reforms focused mainly on treaty approval processes, leaving broader policy questions largely unexamined. Subnational governments sometimes react protectively when facing dislocation threats from global forces; conversely, they can carry out constituency representation and education functions in ways that promote Australia's competitiveness and counter public distrust of globalisation. Federalism's new challenge is to devise political processes that foster positive state and territorial participation in Australia's response to globalisation. [source] Political manipulation in a majoritarian democracy: central government targeting of public funds to English subnational government, in space and across timeBRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Issue 3 2001Peter John This article argues that it is rational for the executive to target resources in space and through time if it seeks to maximise its chances of electoral success. In majoritarian democracies such as the United Kingdom, there are particularly strong incentives to target resources to marginal legislative constituencies, although similar opportunies exist in other political systems. The benefits of such a practice could be growing, because the costs of forms of temporal targeting predicted by theories of the political business cycle have increased, owing to the effect of the global economy. In the United Kingdom one channel through which resources can be targeted is central grants to local authorities. This model is tested with pooled cross-section data on the central finance of English local government between 1981/1982,1995/1996. The article confirms that central government spatially targeted marginals after 1988/1989 while it continued to allocate greater funds near national elections, conditional on its opinion-poll ratings. Hypotheses from the literature on distributional politics are also tested, finding evidence for the temporal allocation of resources to win local elections. [source] FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF SEVEN FEDERATIONSECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 1 2010JONATHAN RODDEN Although fiscal policies of central governments sometimes provide modest insurance against regional income shocks, this paper shows that procyclical fiscal policy among provincial governments can easily overwhelm these stabilizing effects. We examine the cyclicality of budget items among provincial governments in seven federations, showing that own-source taxes are generally highly procyclical, and contrary to common wisdom, revenue sharing and discretionary transfers are either acyclical or procyclical. Constituent governments are thus left alone to smooth their own shocks, and we document the extent to which various restraints on borrowing and saving undermine their ability to do so. The resulting procyclicality of provincial fiscal policy is likely to have important implications in a world where demands for countercyclical fiscal policy are increasing but considerable fiscal responsibilities are being devolved to subnational governments. [source] Beyond Kyoto: Climate Change Policy in Multilevel Governance SystemsGOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2007BARRY G. RABE Climate change policy has commonly been framed as a matter of international governance for which global policy strategies can be readily employed. The decade of experience following the 1997 signing of the Kyoto Protocol suggests a far more complex process involving a wide range of policy options and varied engagement by multiple levels of governance systems. The respective experiences of the United States and Canada suggest that formal engagement in the international realm of policy is not a good indicator of domestic policy development or emissions reductions. The different contexts of intergovernmental relations, varied resources available to subnational governments for policy development and implementation, and role of subnational leaders in policy formation have emerged as important factors in explaining national differences between these North American neighbors. Consequently, climate change increasingly presents itself as a challenge not only of international relations but also of multilevel governance, thereby creating considerable opportunity to learn from domestic policy experimentation. [source] THE ECONOMICS OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATIONJOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS, Issue 4 2010Duc Hong Vo Abstract There is no complete overview or discussion of the literature of the economics of federalism and fiscal decentralization, even though scholarly interest in the topic has been increasing significantly over recent years. This paper provides a general, brief but comprehensive overview of the main insights from the literature on fiscal federalism and decentralization. In doing so, literature on fiscal federalism and decentralization is grouped into two main approaches: ,first generation approach' and ,an emerging second generation approach'. The discussion generally covers the two notions of fiscal decentralization: ,fiscal autonomy' and ,fiscal importance' of subnational governments as the background of the most recently developed index of fiscal decentralization in Vo. The relevance of this discussion to any further development of a fiscal decentralization index is briefly noted. [source] Decentralization's Nondemocratic Roots: Authoritarianism and Subnational Reform in Latin AmericaLATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, Issue 1 2006Kent Baton ABSTRACT This study challenges the common view of authoritarianism as an unambiguously centralizing experience by investigating the subnational reforms that military governments actually introduced in Latin America. It argues that the decision by military authorities to dismiss democratically elected mayors and governors opened a critical juncture for the subsequent development of subnational institutions. Once they centralized political authority, the generals could contemplate changes that expanded the institutional, administrative, and governing capacity of subnational governments. This article shows how cross-national variation in the content and consistency of the generals' economic goals led to quite distinct subnational changes; in each case, these reforms profoundly shaped the democracies that reemerged in the 1980s and 1990s. [source] Nachhaltige Finanz- und Investitionspolitik der Bundesländer,PERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, Issue S1 2007Wolfgang Kitterer Their portion of the public debt amounts to nearly 40 percent. Econometric tests show that the fiscal policy of the federal states taken collectively is not sustainable. The requirement for fiscal sustainability is fulfilled only by two western Laender, Hesse and North-Rhine Westphalia, and one eastern Land (Saxony). Furthermore, it is shown that the constitutional "golden rule" stipulating that borrowing should not exceed investment expenditures does not ensure the solvency of the states. This holds for theoretical reasons but also because there is a lack of clarity and enforceability. Finally, it is argued that the commitment of subnational governments to sustainable public finances could be strengthened by invigorating state-level tax and expenditure autonomy. [source] Developing Options for the Administration of Local Taxes: An International Review,PUBLIC BUDGETING AND FINANCE, Issue 1 2007JOHN L. MIKESELL Do decentralization arguments extend to administration of subnational taxes? While centralized administration promises quality service at reasonable cost, it may dull accountability and slow the revenue flow. Also, central administration may devote less attention to collecting these taxes than for its own. Self-administration brings administration closer to taxpayers and assures representation of jurisdictional interests in revenue apportionment disputes. However, subnational governments may lack technical capacity. That is the dilemma: while the central administration may be indifferent to rigorous collection of subnational taxes, subnational governments may lack capacity for self-administration. In practice, nations use many different alternatives for administering subnational taxes. [source] | |||||||||||||