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Stronger Incentives (stronger + incentive)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting85%
Distribution within Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting
General & Introductory Economics32%

Selected Abstracts

A Longitudinal Study to Determine the Effects of Mentoring on Middle School Youngsters by Nursing and Other College Students

JOURNAL OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC NURSING, Issue 4 2007
APRN-BC, Sylvia M. A. Whiting PhD
PURPOSE:, This study aims to utilize nursing and other college students in conducting a mentoring project aimed at determining outcomes of behavior and attitude of high-risk middle school students over a 5-year period. METHOD:, A quasi-experimental study with a sample of fifth and sixth graders was conducted in which mentored subjects were tested using multiple instruments and school data to identify behavioral and attitudinal outcomes. Statistical analyses were conducted using chi-square and one-way analysis of variance. FINDINGS:, Academically below-average males in the treatment group were the only cohort demonstrating significant change across all measures. The magnitude of change in this cohort, however, did significantly affect treatment group outcomes overall. Females in both treatment and control groups reflected similar changes. CONCLUSIONS:, Mentoring of schoolchildren is difficult to accomplish using college mentors because of time and schedule commitments. When college mentors are used, grade allocation seems to be a stronger incentive than when payment is the sole reward. Males whose grades are below average demonstrated positive outcomes from the mentoring experience. [source]

Avoidance Powers and Incentives to File for Bankruptcy,

ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, Issue 4 2010
Jeong-Yoo Kim
G33 Abstract In this paper, we examine the incentives for a failing debtor and creditors to file for bankruptcy either under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11, and discuss whether avoidance powers can provide proper incentives to file. We show that if the future profitability of a failing firm is known, avoidance powers can eliminate an inefficient delay in bankruptcy filing. However, if profitability is uncertain, in particular, if a creditor is pessimistic, what might result is an inefficient rush to file under Chapter 7. We also demonstrate that the conditional avoidance powers can give creditors a stronger incentive to gather information pertinent to future profitability, thereby enhancing efficiency. [source]

Delegation to Encourage Communication of Problems

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 4 2009
D. PAUL NEWMAN
ABSTRACT We study a principal's choice to centralize or delegate decisions to an agent when delegation can be used to encourage the agent to communicate potential problems. We find that the principal may choose centralization either to exercise better control over the agent's actions or to provide stronger incentives. Delegation emerges in equilibrium only if the costs of effort to acquire information for both the principal and the agent are sufficiently high. We find that increases in the principal's penalties for an incorrect decision may increase the principal's expected payoff, owing to optimal organizational responses. In addition, catastrophic risk, the risk of incorrectly accepting a defective audit (or product), may be greater under centralization than under delegation. Furthermore, catastrophic risk can be increased by well-intentioned legislative efforts to decrease such risk by, for example, increasing the agent's penalties for failing to take a corrective action, because the organizational structure may change. [source]

Incentive Effects of Expanding Federal Mass Transit Formula Grants

JOURNAL OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2001
Stephen Schmidt
Public subsidies to industries firms incentives to alter their behavior. When calculating the effects of such programs, previous assessments of transit subsidies have not included the effects of these incentives on the firms' output. This article reports the responses of mass transit firms to the federal transit subsidy program and changes the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA 21) made to that program, as predicted by a structural model of output choice. TEA 21 increases bus service in medium-sized cities by 6-8 percent, butincreases service in large cities by only 1-2 percent. The formula's incentive tier is weak, and the size of the subsidy depends little on whether that output results in increased ridership. The formula could be redesigned to provide stronger incentives to lower cost and increase ridership, thus encouraging a more efficient response from transit firms. © 2001 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management. [source]

Nominal Wage Flexibility, Wage Indexation and Monetary Union,

THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 508 2006
Lars Calmfors
Membership in a monetary union implies stronger incentives for nominal wage flexibility in the form of wage indexation and shorter contract length than non-membership. This counteracts the stabilisation policy cost of giving up monetary independence. But more wage flexibility is only an imperfect substitute for an individual monetary policy. It is possible that an increase in wage flexibility is welfare-decreasing because of the accompanying rise in price variability. The interaction between wage setting and central bank behaviour may result in either multiple equilibria or a unique full-indexation equilibrium. [source]

Wealth and Executive Compensation

THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 1 2006
BO BECKER
ABSTRACT Using new data on the wealth of Swedish CEOs, I show that higher wealth CEOs receive stronger incentives. Since high wealth (excluding own-firm holdings) implies low absolute risk aversion, this is consistent with a risk aversion explanation. To examine whether wealth is likely to proxy for power, I use lagged wealth (typically measured before the CEO was hired), and the results remain for one of two incentive measures. Also, the wealth,incentive result is not stronger for CEOs likely to face limited owner oversight. Finally, wealth is unrelated to pay levels, and is hence unlikely to proxy for skill. [source]

A Note on Efficiency Wage Theory and Principal,Agent Theory

BULLETIN OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Issue 3 2006
Uwe Jirjahn
J41; J33; D82 Abstract Why are principal,agent models used in some circumstances and efficiency wage models in others? In this note, it is argued that efficiency wages provide incentives based on an evaluation of the agent's input, while the incentives analysed in principal,agent models rely on the agent's output. The choice between the two incentive schemes depends on the probability that the agent is caught shirking. Moreover, we demonstrate that a combination of input- and output-related elements provides stronger incentives than payment schemes based on merely one of these elements. However, the combination requires a more complex labour contract involving an increased cost of writing the contract. The interaction between this transaction cost and a hiring cost is analysed. [source]