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Statutory Interpretation (statutory + interpretation)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Law and Criminology	100%

Selected Abstracts

Comparative Statutory Interpretation in the British Isles

RATIO JURIS, Issue 4 2000
Kay Goodall
Existing studies of statutory interpretation are often of excellent quality but they have tended either to focus on legal practice to the detriment of comparative jurisprudence, or have examined legal reasoning at a level of abstraction which has made empirical study difficult. The author examines a recent development in this area and considers how it might be used to begin a project to identify any divergences in statutory interpretation among the various legal systems of the United Kingdom. [source]

In the Wake of ,Good Governance': Impact Assessments and the Politicisation of Statutory Interpretation

THE MODERN LAW REVIEW, Issue 3 2008
Roderick Munday
For some time ,regulatory reform' has been a government watchword, and the streamlining and improved quality of regulation its professed ambition. Impact assessments (formerly known as regulatory impact assessments) are a significant ingredient in these governmental initiatives, now promoted by the newly created Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform. Just as they have come to refer rather freely to the Explanatory Notes that now accompany all public Acts of Parliament, judges have also begun to invoke impact assessments when construing legislation. This paper investigates the extent of this practice and the manner in which judges employ impact assessments. It warns of the potential consequences if the judiciary avails itself too readily of these highly politicised, and sometimes deceptive, documents. ,The aim of good prose words is to mean what they say.' G. K. Chesterton, Daily News 22 April 1905 [source]

Comparative Statutory Interpretation in the British Isles

Judicial Responses to Bright Line Rules in Social Security: In Search of Principle

THE MODERN LAW REVIEW, Issue 3 2009
Article first published online: 1 MAY 200, Emma Laurie
This article considers judicial responses to the use of ,bright line' rules in social security law. It analyses, within the framework of judicial deference, the receptiveness of the judiciary to an argument by the executive that a rule is justified as being administratively convenient to operate. The article questions the proposition that the judiciary is at its most deferential when complex issues of socio-economic policy or resource allocation are raised in the context of social security law. A contrast is drawn between cases involving an issue of statutory interpretation and those applying a proportionality test. The article tests the presumption that a difference in approach should be discernable in these two situations. It concludes by criticising the courts for failing to articulate clearly the values at stake and by arguing for the need for greater transparency and a broader public debate concerning the use of bright line rules. [source]

The House of Lords and the Northern Ireland Conflict , A Sequel

THE MODERN LAW REVIEW, Issue 3 2006
Brice Dickson
This article begins by commenting on an analysis undertaken by the late Stephen Livingstone of 13 cases relating to the troubles in Northern Ireland decided by the House of Lords between 1969 and 1993. It then attempts to repeat the analysis in respect of 12 such cases decided between 1994 and 2005. Areas of law arising for consideration during both periods include the rules on the use of lethal force, aspects of substantive criminal law and criminal procedure and the rights of persons arrested or imprisoned. The more recent cases also raise fundamental questions concerning the status and meaning of the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. The article concludes that there has been a sea-change in the way the Law Lords have handled the Northern Irish cases. From treating them in a way which might have suggested a built-in bias in favour of police, army and government perspectives, they have moved to analysing the competing arguments in the light of more modern approaches to statutory interpretation, the rule of law and human rights. [source]