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Stabilization Programs (stabilization + program)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting66%

Selected Abstracts

On the Political Economy of Temporary Stabilization Programs

ECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 2 2002
Laura Alfaro
This paper provides a political economy explanation for temporary exchange-rate-based stabilization programs by focusing on the distributional effects of real exchange-rate appreciation. I propose an economy in which agents are endowed with either tradable or non-tradable goods. Under a cash-in-advance assumption, a temporary reduction in the devaluation rate induces a consumption boom accompanied by real appreciation, which hurts the owners of tradable goods. The owners of non-tradables have to weigh two opposing effects: an increase in the present value of non-tradable goods wealth and a negative intertemporal substitution effect. For reasonable parameter values, owners of non-tradables are better off. [source]

Die deutsche Fiskalpolitik während der Wirtschaftskrise 2008/2009

PERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, Issue 4 2009
Michael W. M. Roos
After discussing the arguments for and against a fiscal stabilization program, I discuss several features a reasonable program should have. Applying those criteria to the German fiscal package, I find that while it satisfies most of them, it has two major flaws. First, the fiscal stimulus is likely to come too late, and second, the political marketing of the policy was disastrous. As a consequence the policy is likely to stabilize the economy in the second half of 2009 and in 2010, but did little to soften the initial blow of the recession. [source]

Beyond treatment of individual behavior problems: an effective residential continuum of care for individuals with severe behavior problems

BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTIONS, Issue 1 2007
Terry J. Page
We report on one component of a residential continuum of care designed to integrate children and adolescents with severe behavior problems into community residential and educational placements. The continuum featured three components: a behavior stabilization unit, campus apartments, and community group homes. Data are reported for a 5-year period, during which 116 children and adolescents were admitted to a behavior stabilization program for treatment of severe self-injury, aggression, and/or property destruction, and non-compliance. Additional problems for some admissions included stereotypy, feeding disorders, sleeping disorders, seizure disorders, and other medical conditions. Archival data were collected retrospectively on age, gender, length of stay, prescribed medications, function of problem behaviors, acuity level of behavioral interventions, and discharge site. Analysis of data indicated (1) the behavior stabilization unit was successful in reducing occurrence of severe behavior problems, and increasing adaptive behaviors, (2) Seventy-three individuals were able to successfully transition to a campus apartment program that had been designed as a step-down program from the behavioral stabilization unit, and (3) Sixty-seven individuals were able to transition to community group homes. The benefits of a residential continuum of care for individuals with severe behavior problems are discussed. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

On the Political Economy of Temporary Stabilization Programs

ECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 2 2002
Laura Alfaro
This paper provides a political economy explanation for temporary exchange-rate-based stabilization programs by focusing on the distributional effects of real exchange-rate appreciation. I propose an economy in which agents are endowed with either tradable or non-tradable goods. Under a cash-in-advance assumption, a temporary reduction in the devaluation rate induces a consumption boom accompanied by real appreciation, which hurts the owners of tradable goods. The owners of non-tradables have to weigh two opposing effects: an increase in the present value of non-tradable goods wealth and a negative intertemporal substitution effect. For reasonable parameter values, owners of non-tradables are better off. [source]

International Institutions and Domestic Compensation: The IMF and the Politics of Capital Account Liberalization

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 1 2010
Bumba Mukherjee
Certain governments have been faster than others in relaxing their restrictions on the cross-border movement of capital. How can we explain the timing and extent of financial liberalization across countries since the 1970s? We argue that IMF stabilization programs provide a window of opportunity for governments to initiate financial reforms, but that policy makers are more likely to seize this opportunity when welfare expenditures are high. Large loans from the IMF shield policy makers from the costs of financial reform, while welfare expenditures provide credibility to the government's,ex ante,promises of compensation to individuals who are harmed by the reforms. We test this hypothesis on data for 87 countries from 1975 to 2002. We employ a spatial autoregressive error sample selection model which accounts for the nonrandom participation of countries in IMF programs as well as the processes of international policy diffusion. The results provide strong support for the interactive effect of IMF programs and domestic welfare expenditures on financial liberalization. [source]

Canadian Agricultural Programs and Policy in Transition

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2008
Andrew Schmitz
Canada does not have an agricultural policy, rather it has agricultural programs. The history of price and income stabilization programs is discussed along with supply management. Programs for the grains and oilseeds sectors have witnessed major changes while supply management has not. Canadian agricultural policy falls under the responsibility of both federal and provincial governments. As a result, farmers in Alberta, for example, receive far greater assistance than farmers in Saskatchewan. Under the new Canadian farm program (CAIS) large payments have been made to Canadian farmers even though many of the farmers who applied for CAIS payments received none. Le Canada ne possède pas de politique agricole, mais plutôt des programmes agricoles. Le présent article porte sur l'histoire du programme de stabilisation du revenu, du programme de stabilisation des prix et de la gestion de l'offre. Contrairement à la gestion de l'offre, les programmes destinés aux secteurs des céréales et des oléagineux ont subi des modifications importantes. La politique agricole canadienne relève des gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux. Par conséquent, les agriculteurs de l'Alberta, par exemple, reçoivent une aide supérieure à celle accordée aux agriculteurs de la Saskatchewan. Dans le cadre du nouveau Programme canadien de stabilisation du revenu agricole (PCSRA), certains producteurs ont reçu des paiements importants alors que de nombreux autres producteurs ayant fait une demande n'ont rien reçu. [source]