Home About us Contact
|
Home About us Contact | ||
|
|
||
Structure Regulation (structure + regulation)
Selected AbstractsSTRUCTURE REGULATION, PRICE STRUCTURE, CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION AND MARGINAL COST OF PUBLIC FUNDS,THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 6 2009MING CHUNG CHANG In this paper we study the social desirability of the structure regulation which transforms a single multi-product monopoly into an oligopoly where the industry produces differentiated complementary goods. In particular, we pay special attention to the cross-subsidization which will be eliminated by the structure regulation. It is established that if horizontal externalities between the goods are not too strong, then the monopoly has a socially optimal price structure. In contrast, the oligopoly always distorts the price structure. We also demonstrate that the monopoly will cross-subsidize a product if and only if this product has a relatively low absolute advantage. [source] Creating Securities Markets in Developing Countries: A New Approach for the Age of Automated TradingINTERNATIONAL FINANCE, Issue 2 2001Benn Steil The past decade has been one of enormous change in the securities trading industry. Automation of trading systems, led by the continental European exchanges and US ,electronic communications networks' (ECNs), has resulted in significant declines in trading costs, massive increases in turnover, internationalization of trading and settlement system operations, and major reforms in exchange governance. Yet the policy advice given to developing country governments looking to create or expand securitized finance in their markets has been largely unaffected by these developments. This is unfortunate, as developing countries now have the opportunity to leapfrog the evolving infrastructure of the mature markets and to define the global efficient frontier in trading technology, exchange governance, investor access and market structure regulation. This paper analyses the technological and economic forces driving change in the securities trading industry, and examines the implications for developing markets. [source] Hyperbranched polycarbosiloxane with dendritic boron cores: Synthesis, characterization, and structure regulationJOURNAL OF POLYMER SCIENCE (IN TWO SECTIONS), Issue 12 2006Jie Kong Abstract The synthesis, characterization, and structure regulation of hyperbranched polycarbosiloxane with dendritic boron cores were realized in this paper. First, dendritic boron core was synthesized via hydroboration with borane dimethylsulfide and bis(allyloxy)dimethylsilane. Then, the hyperbranched polycarbosiloxanes with dendritic boron cores were synthesized via hydrosilylation with AB2 type monomer of bis(allyloxy)methylsilane and dendritic boron cores. The molecular structures of the dendritic boron core and resulting hyperbranched polymers were characterized by using Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy, 1H nuclear magnetic resonance, and 13C nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopies. Size exclusion chromatography/multiangle laser light scattering analysis reveals that the structures of hyperbranched polycarbosiloxane can be regulated effectively by incorporation of functional dendritic boron cores. Compared with hyperbranched polycarbosiloxane of the same molecular weight level, the hyperbranched polycarbosiloxane with dendritic boron cores presents narrower molecular weight distribution as well as much smaller hydrodynamic radius and intrinsic viscosity. Thermalgravimetric analyzer analysis indicates that both the decomposition temperature and ceramic yields are increased as the results of the incorporation of dendritic boron cores into hyperbranched polycarbosiloxane. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. J Polym Sci Part A: Polym Chem 44: 3930,3941, 2006 [source] STRUCTURE REGULATION, PRICE STRUCTURE, CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION AND MARGINAL COST OF PUBLIC FUNDS,THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 6 2009MING CHUNG CHANG In this paper we study the social desirability of the structure regulation which transforms a single multi-product monopoly into an oligopoly where the industry produces differentiated complementary goods. In particular, we pay special attention to the cross-subsidization which will be eliminated by the structure regulation. It is established that if horizontal externalities between the goods are not too strong, then the monopoly has a socially optimal price structure. In contrast, the oligopoly always distorts the price structure. We also demonstrate that the monopoly will cross-subsidize a product if and only if this product has a relatively low absolute advantage. [source] | ||||||||||