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Single European Market (single + european_market)
Selected AbstractsBANK COMPETITION, CONCENTRATION AND EFFICIENCY IN THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET,THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 4 2006BARBARA CASU The deregulation of financial services in the European Union (EU), together with the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union, aimed at the creation of a level playing-field in the provision of banking services across the EU. The plan was to remove entry barriers and to foster both competition and efficiency in national banking markets. However, one of the effects of the regulatory changes was to spur a trend towards consolidation, resulting in the recent wave of mergers and acquisitions. To investigate the impact of increased consolidation on the competitive conditions of the EU banking markets, we employ both structural (concentration ratios) and non-structural (Panzar,Rosse statistic) concentration measures. Using bank-level balance sheet data for the major EU banking markets, in a period following the introduction of the Single Banking Licence (1997,2003), this paper also investigates the factors that may influence the competitive conditions. Specifically, we control for differences in efficiency estimates, structural conditions and institutional characteristics. The results seem to suggest that the degree of concentration is not necessarily related to the degree of competition. We also find little evidence that more efficient banking systems are also more competitive. The relationship between competition and efficiency is not a straightforward one: increased competition has forced banks to become more efficient but increased efficiency does not seem to be fostering more competitive EU banking systems. [source] Intra-firm trade in the context of European integration: evidence from the French multinational agribusinessAGRIBUSINESS : AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, Issue 1 2009Emmanuelle Chevassus-Lozza This article identifies the factors that lead multinational firms to internalize their international exchanges and aims to determine the impact of the implementation of the Single European Market on firms' strategies. We analyze the interaction between the microeconomic characteristics of firms and those of their environment because this interaction determines a multinational firm's decision to internalize trade. The empirical work is based on the ,industrial globalization' survey conducted by the French statistics institutes in 1993 and 1999. With regard to the French agri-food trade, there has been an increase in intra-firm (IFT) trade within the EU-15 borders and the European multinational networks. The main determinants of intra-firm trade are the firms' need to generate economies of scale and to protect and exploit their ,firm-specific advantages' related to the technology and nature of the product. The model sheds light on the role and the development of intra-regional networks of subsidiaries. [JEL classifications: F10, F14, F23]. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [source] Weakening of one more alcohol control pillar: a review of the effects of the alcohol tax cuts in Finland in 2004ADDICTION, Issue 4 2009Pia Mäkelä ABSTRACT Aims To review the consequences of the changes in Finnish alcohol policy in 2004, when quotas for travellers' tax-free imports of alcoholic beverages from other European Union (EU) countries were abolished, Estonia joined the EU and excise duties on alcoholic beverages were reduced in Finland by one-third, on average. Design A review of published research and routinely available data. Setting Finland. Measurements Prices of alcoholic beverages, recorded and unrecorded alcohol consumption, data on criminality and other police statistics, alcohol-related deaths and hospitalizations, service use. Findings Alcohol consumption increased 10% in 2004, clearly more than in the early 2000s. With few exceptions, alcohol-related harms increased. Alcohol-induced liver disease deaths increased the most, by 46% in 2004,06 compared to 2001,03, which indicates a strong effect on pre-2004 heavy drinkers. Consumption and harms increased most among middle-aged and older segments of the population, and harms in the worst-off parts of the population in particular. Conclusions Alcohol taxation and alcohol prices affect consumption and related harms, and heavy drinkers are responsive to price. In Finland in 2004, the worst-off parts of the population paid the highest price in terms of health for cuts in alcohol prices. The removal of travellers' import quotas, which was an inherent part of creating the single European market, had serious public health consequences in Finland. [source] The creation of neo,liberal corporate bias in transnational medicines control: The Industrial shaping and interest dynamics of the European regulatory stateEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 1 2001GRAHAM LEWIS Drawing on the political theories of corporatism, neo,liberalism and pluralism, and on comparative empirical research in Brussels, Germany, Sweden and the UK, this article conceptualises the nature of Europeanised medicines regulation. It argues that a marketisation of regulation has been established in the European Union as a result of competition between national regulatory agencies for ,regulatory business' from the pharmaceutical industry. In the pharmaceuticals sector the Europeanised regulatory state is a product of three key factors: (a) the European Commission's commitment to an ,efficiency' regime which would meet the political objectives of a single European market and the commercial agendas of transnational pharmaceutical companies, (b) the endemic corporate bias associated with medicines regulation in the most influential member states, and (c) the considerable success of neo,liberal politics across a number of major member states, including Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom. [source] The European Commission: The Limits of Centralization and the Perils of ParliamentarizationGOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2002Giandomenico MajoneArticle first published online: 17 DEC 200 The idea of an inevitable process of centralization in the European Community (EC)/European Union (EU) is a myth. Also, the metaphor of "creeping competences," with its suggestion of a surreptitious but continuous growth of the powers of the Commission, can be misleading. It is true that the functional scope of EC/EU competences has steadily increased, but the nature of new competences has changed dramatically, as may be seen from the evolution of the methods of harmonization. The original emphasis on total harmonization, which gives the Community exclusive competence over a given policy area, has been largely replaced by more flexible but less "communitarian" methods such as optional and minimum harmonization, reference to nonbinding technical standards, and mutual recognition. Finally, the treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam explicitly excluded harmonization for most new competences. Thus, the expansion of the jurisdiction of the EC/EU has not automatically increased the powers of the Commission, but has actually weakened them in several respects. In addition, the progressive parliamentarization of the Commission risks compromising its credibility as an independent regulator, without necessarily enhancing its democratic legitimacy. Since the member states continue to oppose any centralization of regulatory powers, even in areas essential to the functioning of the internal market, the task of implementing Community policies should be entrusted to networks of independent national and European regulators, roughly modeled on the European System of Central Banks. The Commission would coordinate and monitor the activities of these networks in order to ensure the coherence of EC regulatory policies. More generally, it should bring its distinctive competence more clearly into focus by concentrating on the core business of ensuring the development and proper functioning of the single European market. This is a more modest role than that of the kernel of a future government of Europe, but it is essential to the credibility of the integration process and does not overstrain the limited financial and legitimacy resources available to the Commission. [source] Disciplinary Observance and Sanctions on German and Danish AuditorsINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF AUDITING, Issue 2 2002Reiner Quick This paper presents the results of a comparative study on disciplinary observance systems of the auditing profession within two member states of the European Union: Germany and Denmark. Disciplinary observance is an important factor in reducing the hidden action problem, but could also be used by the profession to signal quality. In Germany, the Wirtschaftsprüferkammer is the supervisory body which oversees compliance with standards and professional duties. It is entitled to sanction the minor violations of duties by auditors. Only more severe types of misbehaviour are dealt with by courts. In Denmark, a special court (Disciplinæernævn) is concerned with disciplinary actions against auditors. The results of this study will demonstrate that audit regulations and in particular disciplinary laws remain basically national, despite efforts to harmonise auditing. This study identifies characteristics of disciplinary systems common to both countries and provides information on the functioning of both systems that may be useful in a number of ways. The results presented might initiate a more systematic comparison of disciplinary systems within member states of the European Union, which would enhance institutional knowledge of the European market for auditing services. This in turn could promote the process of achieving a single European market for auditing services and thus reduce market inefficiencies. [source] |