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Signaling Hypothesis (signaling + hypothesis)
Selected AbstractsThe Pricing of French Unit Seasoned Equity OfferingsEUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2001Pierre Chollet Units are bundles of common stock and warrants. By issuing units, firms precommit to a future and uncertain seasoned offering at the exercise price of the warrants. This study shows that the issuance of units seasoned offerings in France is accompanied by significant abnormal returns of on average 9,12%, depending on the computing methods. Underpricing increases with the risk of the issuer and the relative size of the future seasoned equity issue linked to warrant exercises. Our results are consistent with our signaling hypothesis. [source] The Information Content of Multiple Stock SplitsFINANCIAL REVIEW, Issue 4 2008Gow-Cheng Huang G14 Abstract We examine the relationship between the frequency of stock splits and firms' motives for splitting their stock. Compared to their peers, infrequent splitters show higher post-split operating performance, but not so for frequent splitters. We find that split ratio and liquidity change explain the stock split announcement effect for the frequent splitters. In contrast, the change in operating performance in the split year explains the announcement effect for the infrequent splitters. Our results suggest that frequent splits are more consistent with the trading range-improved/liquidity hypothesis and infrequent splits are more consistent with the signaling hypothesis. [source] Insider Trading and Earnings ManagementJOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 3-4 2008Julia Sawicki Abstract:, This paper analyzes the relationship between earnings management and insider trading, specifically investigating whether discretionary accruals are related to insider trading and valuation. We find strong evidence of insiders managing earnings downward when buying and managing earnings upward when selling. On the marginal basis, value (high book-to-market value) firms manage their earnings upward compared to growth (low book-to-market value) firms, consistent with a signaling hypothesis. However, the opposite is true on the average basis, consistent with an opportunistic hypothesis. [source] The Information Signaling Hypothesis of Dividends: Evidence from Cointegration and Causality TestsJOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 3-4 2003Mbodja Mougoué This paper uses cointegration and causality tests to study the temporal behavior of dividends and earnings at the individual firm level. We find that, for a sample of 143 non-utility firms, approximately one-fifth of the firms exhibits a temporal relationship between dividends and earnings that is consistent with the information signaling hypothesis of dividends. In the case of 72 utilities, about a third exhibit dividend policies that are consistent with the signaling notion of dividends. Further examination of firm characteristic differences between signaling and non-signaling firms shows that, in the case of non-utility firms, signaling firms tend to be smaller, have a lower growth rate of total assets, and have a higher leverage ratio. In the case of utilities, we find no major differences in firm characteristics between signaling and non-signaling firms. [source] Adolescents' formal employment and school enrollment: Effects of state welfare policiesJOURNAL OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT, Issue 4 2004Lingxin Hao Variations in state welfare policies in the reform era may affect adolescents through two mechanisms: A competing labor market hypothesis posits that stringent state welfare policies may reduce adolescent employment; and a signaling hypothesis posits that stringent welfare policies may promote enrollment. To test these hypotheses, we use a dynamic joint model of adolescents' school enrollment and formal employment, separating state welfare policies from non-welfare state policies, state labor market conditions, and unobserved state characteristics. Longitudinal data from the NLSY97 on adolescents aged 14 to 18 and various state data sources over the period 1994,1999 support the competing labor market effect but not the signaling effect. In particular, lower-income dropouts suffer more severely from fewer labor market opportunities when state welfare policies are more stringent, which indicates that welfare reform may compromise work opportunities for lower-income dropouts. © 2004 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management. [source] The Information Content of Method of Payment in Mergers: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)REAL ESTATE ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2001Robert D. Campbell We provide evidence on the information content of the method of payment in mergers by examining shareholder returns in a sample of REIT mergers over the period 1994,1998. When the target firm is publicly held, we find that transactions are always stock-financed, and that acquiring firm shareholders sustain small negative returns around the announcement date. When the target is privately held, cash financing, mixed (stock and cash) financing, and placement of blocks of acquirer stock with target owners are more prevalent. Acquirer returns are positive in stock-financed mergers when the target is private, which is consistent with both the information signaling and monitoring by blockholders hypotheses. Further analysis supports the information signaling hypothesis as the dominant explanation. The effects of other explanatory variables are similar whether the target is public or private. Most significantly, acquiring shareholder returns are negatively related to the acquirer's size, but positively related to the acquirer's use of the UPREIT organizational structure. The positive wealth effects of the UPREIT structure are not fully explained as the capitalization of tax benefits. [source] The Market's Differential Reactions to Forward-Looking and Backward-Looking Dividend ChangesTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, Issue 4 2003Bong-Soo Lee Abstract Empirical evidence on the signaling hypothesis of dividends is weak and mixed. Recent studies find that dividend changes reflect mostly current and past earnings but not future earnings. We provide a model in which not all dividend changes contain new information about future earnings. Some dividend decisions are backward looking (noninformation or nonsignaling events). Other dividend decisions are forward looking (information or signaling events). The model helps identify the two types of dividend changes and predicts that the market will respond strongly only to forward-looking dividend changes. We provide evidence consistent with the implications of the model. [source] |