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Service Market (service + market)
Selected AbstractsSuccessive expansion method of network planning applying symbolic analysis methodEUROPEAN TRANSACTIONS ON ELECTRICAL POWER, Issue 4 2002kokljev The conventional power system network successive expansion planning method is discussed in the context of the new paradigm of competitive electric power, energy and service market. In sequel, the paper presents an application of the conceptually new computer program, based on the symbolic analysis of load flows in power system networks. The network parameters and variables are defined as symbols. The symbolic analyzer which models analytically the power system DC load flows enables the sensitivity analysis of the power system to parameter and variable variations (costs, transfers, injections), a valuable tool for the expansion planning analysis. That virtue could not be found within the conventional approach, relying on compensation methods, precalculated distribution factors, and so on. This novel application sheds some light on the traditional power system network expansion planning method, as well as on its possible application within the system network expansion planning in the new environment assuming the competitive electric power market. [source] Maintenance contract assessment for aging systemsQUALITY AND RELIABILITY ENGINEERING INTERNATIONAL, Issue 5 2008Anatoly Lisnianski Abstract This paper considers an aging system, where the system failure rate is known to be an increasing function. After any failure, maintenance is performed by an external repair team. Repair rate and cost of repair are determined by a corresponding maintenance contract with a repair team. There are many different maintenance contracts suggested by the service market to the system owner. In order to choose the best maintenance contract, a total expected cost during a specified time horizon should be evaluated for an aging system. In this paper, a method is suggested based on a piecewise constant approximation for the increasing failure rate function. Two different approximations are used. For both types of approximations, the general approach for building the Markov reward model is suggested in order to assess lower and upper bounds of the total expected cost. Failure and repair rates define the transition matrix of the corresponding Markov process. Operation cost, repair cost and penalty cost for system failures are taken into account by the corresponding reward matrix definition. A numerical example is presented in order to illustrate the approach. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Telecommunications Reforms In MalaysiaANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2002C. Lee The article examines the range and scope of physical and structural changes that have taken place in the telecommunications sector in Malaysia in the past 15 years. It reviews the main policy reforms that have shaped the sector, including corporatization and privatization, and liberalization in fixed line and cellular services. The article documents the increase in competition, particularly in the cellular phone service market. Major regulatory reforms were introduced in the 1990s with the passage of the Communications and Multimedia Act and the establishment of the Malaysia Communications and Multimedia Commission. The key principles for regulating the sector are reviewed, including those directed towards economic regulation and consumer protection. With the absence of a formal competition law in Malaysia, the onus for addressing competition issues in the telecommunications sector rests with the sectoral regulator. [source] SIMILAR PROBLEMS, DIFFERENT SOLUTIONS: COMPARING REFUSE COLLECTION IN THE NETHERLANDS AND SPAINPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Issue 2 2010GERMĄ BEL Because of differences in institutional arrangements, public service markets, and national traditions regarding government intervention, local public service provision can vary greatly. In this paper we compare the procedures adopted by the local governments of The Netherlands and Spain in arranging for the provision of solid waste collection. We find that Spain faces a problem of consolidation, opting more frequently to implement policies of privatization and cooperation, at the expense of competition. By contrast, The Netherlands, which has larger municipalities on average, resorts somewhat less to privatization and cooperation, and more to competition. Both options,cooperation and competition,have their merits when striving to strike a balance between transaction costs and scale economies. The choices made in organizational reform seem to be related to several factors, among which the nature of the political system and the size of municipalities appear to be relevant. [source] Nonprofits as Local Government Service ContractorsPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, Issue 4 2009Richard C. Feiock Despite the growing role that contracts with nonprofits play in local service delivery, only limited attention has been directed to why some cities rely more on nonprofit organizations to produce services or how political institutions influence the role nonprofits play in service delivery. To investigate these issues, the authors present a transaction cost explanation that focuses on how political system characteristics and structures of service markets shape the costs of negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing contracts for local governments. The findings indicate that forms of government, mayoral turnover, racial segregation, and the market of nonprofit producers influence the role of nonprofits in delivering elder services, but decisions to contract exclusively with nonprofits are subject to different influences than decisions to jointly produce service with a nonprofit organization. [source] |