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Russian Government (russian + government)
Selected AbstractsThe ,greening' of global project financing: the case of the Sakhalin-II offshore oil and gas projectTHE CANADIAN GEOGRAPHER/LE GEOGRAPHE CANADIEN, Issue 3 2007MIKE BRADSHAW This article responds to a plea for economic geographers to play greater attention to the world's resource peripheries. The article presents a detailed case study of oil and gas development offshore of Sakhalin in the Russian Far East. The study serves to illustrate the complexity of resource peripheries and to demonstrate how a critical approach to resource geographies aids economic geographic theorization of globalization. The case study focuses on how the ,greening' of global project financing has created a means by which environmental non-governmental organizations hold the international oil companies to account. The article describes the transnational advocacy network that has developed to protest against the Sakhalin-II project. The key issues are identified and the response of the operator, Sakhalin Energy, is considered. Finally, the recent actions of the Russian Government in relation to the environmental impacts of the Sakhalin-II project are examined. The article concludes by assessing the ways in which the Sakhalin case demonstrates the complex processes that construct resource peripheries and how such analyses contribute to the development of a truly global economic geography. Le ,verdissement' du financement de projets à l'échelle mondiale: Le cas du projet pétrolier et gazier en mer Sakhaline-2 Cet article plaide pour l'engagement des géographes économiques dans l'étude des régions ressources périphériques. L'article présente une étude de cas détaillée de l'exploitation des réserves de pétrole et de gaz au large de l'île russe de Sakhaline à l'extrémité Est de la Russie. L'étude a pour but d'illustrer la complexité des régions ressources périphériques et de démontrer comment une démarche critique dans le champ de la géographie des ressources contribue à la théorisation de la mondialisation en géographie économique. L'étude de cas porte sur la façon dont le , verdissement , du financement de projets à l'échelle mondiale a permis aux organismes environnementaux non gouvernementaux de demander des comptes aux sociétés pétrolières internationales. L'article présente un portrait du réseau transnational de défense mis sur pied dans le but de protester contre le projet énergétique Sakhaline-2. Les principaux enjeux sont abordés ainsi que la réponse apportée par l'opérateur du projet Sakhalin Energy. On termine par un examen des actions récentes menées par le gouvernement russe dans le dossier des impacts environnementaux du projet Sakhaline-2. Un bilan du cas de Sakhaline, présenté en conclusion, démontre les processus complexes par lesquels les régions ressources périphériques sont créées et comment de telles analyses sont une contribution au développement d'une géographie économique rayonnante à l'échelle mondiale. [source] The Russian Federation: Confronting the special challenges of ageing and social security policy in an era of demographic crisisINTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY REVIEW, Issue 3-4 2010Nicholas Eberstadt Abstract This article focuses on the Russian Federation's demographic crisis and the implications it holds for the ability of the Russian government (or the Russian people through their own efforts) to generate enough funds to provide a reasonable level of old-age economic security. Although Russia's overall population profile structure stands to be broadly similar to that of other more-developed societies, both today and in coming decades, the challenges of providing for an ageing population are far more acute for Russia than for typical Member States of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. One factor that adds significantly to the problem is that working-age Russians today suffer substantially worse health and higher mortality than residents of other countries at similar , and indeed even at much lower , levels of income. Although the arguments presented focus on pensions, the same factors that will make it difficult to supply adequate pensions also mean that other aspects of social protection will be similarly difficult to fulfil. Successful social security policy for Russia, consequently, will depend upon much more than social programmes alone: it will require the reduction of mortality rates for working-age individuals, the revitalization of higher education, and fundamental reform of the country's institutions and economic policies. [source] Comparative Entrepreneurial Cognitions and Lagging Russian New Venture Formation: A Tale of Two Countries,JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, Issue 4 2008Kristie W. Seawright Changes in Russian government and economic systems over the last 15 years led to expectations of increased entrepreneurial activity. Yet potential entrepreneurs are deciding to venture at a much lower rate than anticipated. New venture creation in Russia is occurring at a rate that is considerably lower than that of the United States and Western Europe. This research examines cognitive similarities and differences among Russian and U.S. entrepreneurs and nonentrepreneurs to find a possible explanation. Multivariate analysis of variance and multiple discriminant analysis results found similarities between U.S. and Russian experts and U.S. and Russian novices with respect to arrangements, willingness, and ability scripts, but differences in these scripts were found between experts and novices, particularly in Russia. Implications for entrepreneurship cognition research and public policy are discussed. [source] The Politics of Privatization in Russia: From Mass Privatization to the Yukos AffairPACIFIC FOCUS, Issue 1 2006Duckjoon Chang Privatization constitutes one of the most successful achievements in Post-Soviet Russian reform. However, apparent great successes notwithstanding, the privatization program tainted with distortions of its original ideas, political compromises and collusions between political leaders and business elites produced tremendous criticisms and distrust as well. Given those negative aspects of privatization, some people raised the necessity of review of the privatization programs conducted during the 1990s. But despite such criticisms and negative evaluations of the privatization program, as was shown in the case of the Yukos affair, the Russian government never denied the principle of private ownership nor reexamined the privatization results. To explain such a trend in Russian privatization, this paper adopts the concept of policy learning, in which reconceptualization of policy agendas-adopting private property as an essential element of the market economy, for example-take place. [source] Vladimir Putin on Raising Russia's Birth RatePOPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW, Issue 2 2006Article first published online: 26 JUN 200 The total fertility rate in what is now the Russian Federation has been below replacement level during much of the last 40 years. By the late 1990s it was barely above 1.2 children per woman. There may have been some recovery since: the United Nations estimate for 2000,05 is 1.33. Other reports set the 2004 rate at 1.17. Countries elsewhere in Europe have fertility levels that are equally low or even lower, but the Russian demographic predicament is aggravated by mortality that is exceptionally high by modern standards. Thus, despite large-scale net immigration (mostly due to return of ethnic Russians from other republics of the former Soviet Union), the population in the last decade-and-a-half has been shrinking: of late by some 700,000 persons per year. The United Nations medium estimate assumes a steady recovery of the total fertility rate to reach a level of 1.85 by 2050 and a considerable improvement in survival rates during that period,notably an increase in male life expectancy at birth of more than ten years. It also assumes further modest net immigration at a steady rate, amounting to a total of somewhat over 2 million by midcentury. Under these stipulations the projected population of Russia in 2050 would be 112 million,some 31 million below its present size. By that time, 23 percent of the population would be aged 65 and older. The government's concern with the demographic situation of the country and its intent to improve it have been manifest in various official statements, notably in the annual State of the Nation Address given by the president to the Federal Assembly (or State Duma). Formerly a subordinate theme (see the Documents item in the June 2005 issue of PDR), the issue constituted the centerpiece of the 2006 Address, delivered on 10 May in the Kremlin by President Vladimir Putin. Policies regarding health and mortality were given short shrift in the speech,road safety, bootleg alcohol, and cardiovascular diseases being singled out as areas of special concern. The president's remarks on immigration are of greater interest: immigration of skilled persons is to be encouraged. They must be educated and law-abiding and must treat the country's culture and national tradition with respect. The main focus of the address, however, was on the birth rate and policies to be introduced to raise it. (The need for an "effective demographic policy" as seen from the Kremlin was of course also voiced in the later stages of the Soviet era. See, for example, the excerpts from the addresses delivered by then Party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev and Premier Nikolai Tikhonov to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1981 that appear in the Documents item in the June 1981 issue of PDR.) In detail and specificity, and also in terms of the economic cost of the measures envisaged, Putin's speech is without parallel in addressing population policy matters by a head of state in Europe. The demo graphically relevant portion of the address is reproduced below in the English translation provided by the website of the president's office «http://www.kremlin.ru/eng». Calling Russia's demographic situation "the most acute problem facing our country today," Putin terms its causes as "well known," but lists only economic factors, presumably because these, at least in principle, lend themselves to remedial measures that the Russian government, its coffers now swollen with petrodollars, should be able to provide. His starkly economic interpretation of the problem of low fertility (in Russia apparently taking the form of convergence to a single-child pattern) may be overly optimistic. Causes of electing to have only one child may lie deeper than those Putin names: low incomes, inadequate housing, poor-quality health care and inadequate educational opportunities for children, and even lack of food. Putin's proposed policies to attack these problems in part consist of a major upgrading of existing child care benefits: to 1,500 roubles a month for the first child and 3,000 roubles for the second. The latter amount is roughly equivalent to US$113, a significant sum given Russian income levels. Maternity leave for 18 months at 40 percent of the mother's previous wage (subject to a ceiling) and compensation for the cost of preschool childcare round out the basic package proposed. Benefits are to be parity-dependent, highlighting the pronatalist intent of the measures. Thus the child benefit for the second child is to be twice as large as for the first, and payment for preschool childcare is to cover 20 percent of parental costs for the first, 50 percent for the second, and 70 percent for the third child. Putin mentions "young families" as recipients, but the payments are clearly directed to mothers. (Even the usually obligatory reference to western European,style paternity leave is missing.) The most innovative element of the proposed measures, however, is support for women who have a second birth. The state should provide such women (not the child, as called for in some European precedents) "with an initial maternity capital that will raise their social status and help resolve future problems." Citing expert opinion, Putin says that such support "should total at least 250,000 roubles [about $9,300] indexed to annual inflation." Evidently assuming, optimistically, that there will be many takers, Putin says that carrying out all these plans will require not only a lot of work but also "an immense amount of money." The measures are to be launched starting January 2007. [source] From Predation to Accumulation?: The Second Transition Decade in RussiaTHE ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION, Issue 3 2000Willem H. Buiter In this paper I argue that the insecure property rights and widespread predation that have characterized Russia during these past 12 or so years have depressed capital formation in all its dimensions, private, public, physical, human and environmental. The elimination of the conditions that gave rise to insecure property rights and predation is a necessary condition for the kind of sustained economic growth the Russian government anticipates in its new economic strategy, promulgated in June 2000. [source] Russia through the prism of the world biopharmaceutical marketBIOTECHNOLOGY JOURNAL, Issue 7 2007Dmitrij I. Bairamashvili Dr. Abstract Trends in the Russian pharmaceutical biotechnology and related fields representing the major sector of domestic biotech are reviewed through the prism of the world biopharmaceuticals market. A special emphasis is placed on biogenerics and follow-on biologics. The revival of national pharmbiotech is seen in close cooperation between private companies and the state, academia and industry. One of the first positive steps toward promoting development of domestic biopharmaceuticals is the Federal Program of subsidized supply of expensive pharmaceuticals (Dopolnitel'- noe Lekarstvennoe Obespechenie). The program allows the Russian government to purchases expensive drugs to be provided free of cost to certain preferential categories of individuals. As an example, production of recombinant human insulin by the largest Russian fundamental biotechnological institute, Shemyakin-Ovchinnikov Institute of Bioorganic Chemistry under the trademark Insuran (Insulin produced by the Russian Academy of Science) is reviewed. Some prospects and problems of Russian biotech research related to medical area are briefly discussed. [source] | |||||||||||||