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Resource Rents (resource + rent)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	57%

Distribution within Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting

Agricultural Economics & Resource Management	49%

Selected Abstracts

Natural Resources and Regional Development: An Assessment of Dependency and Comparative Advantage Paradigms

ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY, Issue 1 2003
Thomas Gunton
Abstract: The role of natural resources in regional development is the subject of a debate between dependency theorists, who argue that natural resources impede development, and comparative-advantage theorists, who argue that resources can expedite development. This debate is assessed by a case study analysis of the impact of resource development on a regional economy. The case study uses a model to estimate the comparative advantage of the resource sector. The results show that natural resources have the potential to provide a significant comparative advantage relative to other economic sectors by virtue of generating resource rent, which is a surplus above normal returns to other factors of production. The case study also shows that there are considerable risks in resource-led growth, including the propensity to dissipate rent and increase community instability by building surplus capacity. These risks are amenable to mitigation because they are largely the result of poor management of resource development. The case study demonstrates that the most productive analytical approach for understanding the role of natural resources in the development process is a synthetic approach, which combines the insights of the dependency and comparative-advantage paradigms into a unified framework. It also demonstrates that the concept of resource rent, which has frequently been ignored in development theory, must be reintegrated into the unified framework to improve the understanding of the role of natural resources in the regional development process. [source]

Bioeconomic analysis of protected area use in fisheries management,

AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2007
Jared Greenville
Protected areas in fishery management have been suggested to hedge management failures and variation in harvests. In this paper, a stochastic bioeconomic model of a two-species fishery in the Manning Bioregion is used to test the performance of protected areas as a management tool in a fishery. The establishment of a protected area is analysed under the assumption of heterogenous environments that are linked via density-dependent or sink-source stock dispersal relationships. The sensitivity of the results to different degrees of management is also explored. The model is applied to the Ocean Prawn Trawl, and Ocean Trap and Line fisheries within Manning Bioregion in New South Wales, Australia. The focus of the study is placed on the biological and institutional characteristics that yield benefits to the fishery. It was found that protected area use in the Manning Bioregion is likely to have differing effects on the two fisheries examined, benefiting Ocean Trap and Line fishers but adversely affecting Ocean Prawn Trawl fishers. Overall, it is unlikely that protected area use will lead to an increase resource rent in the fishery. [source]

Demand for Wildlife Hunting in British Columbia

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2005
Lili Sun
We present estimates of the demand for hunting licenses by residents and nonresidents in British Columbia for the period 1971,2000. We obtain estimates of both short-run and long-run price elasticities and discuss their revenue implications for future fee increases. We find the demand by nonresidents to be strongly correlated with U.S. income variation over the business cycle, but find no such role for cyclical income variation for resident hunters. The ability of the government to increase revenues from resident hunters turns out to be limited, particularly in the long run, while greater opportunities exist for raising revenues from U.S. hunters as short- and long-run price elasticities of demand are quite inelastic. We argue that conservation surcharges on foreign hunters are one way of capturing more of the resource rent. Nous analysons la demande de permis de chasse par les résidants et les non-résidants de Colombie-Britannique pour la période 1971,2000. Nous présentons des élasticités de court terme et de long terme que nous utilisons ensuite pour évaluer l'effet d'augmenter le coût des permis sur les revenus générés par la vente de ces permis. La demande des non-résidants est fortement corrélée aux fluctuations des revenus américains, mais les variations cycliques du revenu n'ont pas la même incidence sur la demande des chasseurs locaux. La capacité du gouvernement d'augmenter ses revenus en augmentant les coûts des permis des chasseurs locaux est restreinte, surtout à long terme. Ce constat ne s'applique pas aux chasseurs américains puisque leur demande de permis est inélastique, à court terme comme à long terme. Des frais supplémentaires de conservation imposés aux chasseurs étrangers permettraient au gouvernement de s'accaparer une part plus importante de la rente associée à la ressource. [source]

RANDOM PENALTIES AND RENEWABLE RESOURCES: A MECHANISM TO REACH OPTIMAL LANDINGS IN FISHERIES

NATURAL RESOURCE MODELING, Issue 3 2009
FRANK JENSEN
Abstract Recent literature considers illegal landings a moral hazard problem that arises because individual landings are unobservable. The literature proposes incentive schemes to solve the information problem. However, most of the proposed schemes raise huge information requirements and social budget balance is not secured. In this paper, we suggest a random penalty mechanism that reduces the information requirements and secures budget balance in the case of a given number of licensed vessels. In the random penalty mechanism, aggregate landings are measured through stock sizes and the natural growth function. If aggregate landings are below optimal landings, each fisherman receives a subsidy. If aggregate catches are above optimal landings, the mechanism works such that either the fisherman is randomly selected and pays a fine or the fisherman is not selected and receives a subsidy. The fine and subsidy can be designed such that budget balance is secured. Provided risk aversion is sufficiently large and the fine is high enough, the random penalty mechanism will generate optimal individual landings. The budget balance combined with risk aversion drives the result for this advanced tax/subsidy system that does not exhaust the resource rents. The budget balance creates interdependence between fishermen that secure optimality. [source]

Natural resources and ,gradual' reform in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan

NATURAL RESOURCES FORUM, Issue 4 2003
Richard Auty
Abstract Among low-income transition reformers, natural resource rents are an important initial condition that helps explain choice of reform strategy. Resource-rich Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and resource-poor China and Vietnam all claim to pursue gradual reform, but their strategies differ. In China and Vietnam, low resource rents have nurtured developmental political conditions and encouraged efficient resource use, which initially promoted agriculture as a dynamic market sector, capable of absorbing labour from the lagging state sector. In contrast, the scale and ease of natural resource rent extraction in the Central Asian countries has consolidated authoritarian governments that postpone reform. Despite high energy rents, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan still extract agricultural rents in ways that repress farm incentives, perpetuate environmental degradation and liquidate irrigation assets. Uzbekistan uses its rents to subsidize a manufacturing sector, that is neither dynamic nor competitive. As its dynamic sector, Turkmenistan promotes natural gas exports that depend on volatile markets. Resource-driven development models suggest that reform is required in both countries to avert a growth collapse. Turkmenistan's large energy rent-stream may postpone a collapse for some years, but Uzbekistan's position is already precarious: it has run down its rural infrastructure and accumulated sizeable foreign debts and will require external assistance to recover from a growth collapse. Such assistance should be made conditional on accelerated economic and political reform. [source]

SUSTAINABLE CONSTANT CONSUMPTION IN A SEMI-OPEN ECONOMY WITH EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES,

THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 2 2007
RYUHEI OKUMURA
To sustain constant consumption, Hartwick's rule prescribes reinvesting all resource rents in reproducible capital. However, Hartwick's rule is not necessarily the result of optimization. In this paper, we address this insufficiency by deriving a constant consumption path endogenously in a semi-open economy with an exhaustible resource, which has full access to world goods and capital markets, while the resource flows are not internationally tradable. Our findings show that, due to the essentiality of both capital and resource to the production process, the economy transforms its domestic assets into foreign ones, consuming a constant interest flow from the latter. [source]

Investing exhaustible resource rents and the path of consumption

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2005
Kirk Hamilton
We take up ,maintaining capital intact' and locally unchanging consumption. The percentage change in ,net investment' or ,genuine savings,' relative to the market rate of interest, denotes whether current consumption is rising, constant, or declining. JEL classification: O13, Q28, F0 Investir les rentes dérivées de l'exploitation d'une ressource épuisable et le sentier de consommation., On définit en dollars le produit national net d'une économie qui a un stock de ressources (un dépôt de pétrole) en train de s'épuiser. On envisage de maintenir le capital intact et la consommation locale inchangée. Le changement en pourcentage dans l'investissement net et dans les véritables épargnes, en relation avec le taux d'intérêt sur le marché, définit si la consommation courante croît, demeure constante, ou décline. [source]