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Rent Extraction (rent + extraction)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	75%

Selected Abstracts

Rent extraction, principal,agent relationships, and pricing strategies: vendor licensing during the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta

MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 8 2001
Ralph C. Allen
Two-part pricing, price-discrimination, rent creation and extraction, principal,agent theory, and public choice perspectives on public bureaucracies are used to interpret a vendor-license marketing arrangement and controversy arising out of the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta, GA. Containing features predicted by principal,agency theory, Atlanta's arrangement with its marketing agent was a response to the behavior of public bureaucracies and a low cost method of converting visitors' consumer surplus to rent, which could be extracted by the marketing agent and then by Atlanta. Atlanta's incentive to enforce vendor property rights was influenced by the nature of the game between Atlanta and prospective vendors. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Natural resources and ,gradual' reform in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan

NATURAL RESOURCES FORUM, Issue 4 2003
Richard Auty
Abstract Among low-income transition reformers, natural resource rents are an important initial condition that helps explain choice of reform strategy. Resource-rich Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and resource-poor China and Vietnam all claim to pursue gradual reform, but their strategies differ. In China and Vietnam, low resource rents have nurtured developmental political conditions and encouraged efficient resource use, which initially promoted agriculture as a dynamic market sector, capable of absorbing labour from the lagging state sector. In contrast, the scale and ease of natural resource rent extraction in the Central Asian countries has consolidated authoritarian governments that postpone reform. Despite high energy rents, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan still extract agricultural rents in ways that repress farm incentives, perpetuate environmental degradation and liquidate irrigation assets. Uzbekistan uses its rents to subsidize a manufacturing sector, that is neither dynamic nor competitive. As its dynamic sector, Turkmenistan promotes natural gas exports that depend on volatile markets. Resource-driven development models suggest that reform is required in both countries to avert a growth collapse. Turkmenistan's large energy rent-stream may postpone a collapse for some years, but Uzbekistan's position is already precarious: it has run down its rural infrastructure and accumulated sizeable foreign debts and will require external assistance to recover from a growth collapse. Such assistance should be made conditional on accelerated economic and political reform. [source]

Bureaucracies in the Russian Voucher Privatization

THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION, Issue 1 2000
Guido Friebel
The paper analyses the implementation of voucher privatization in Russia in the framework of incentive theory. The central government needs the support of local privatization agencies. These agencies possess private knowledge concerning: a) their personal reform attitude; b) local privatization conditions. According to the trade-off between rent extraction and efficiency, the speed of privatization (the efficiency goal) is constrained by the informational rents that the government must pay to local agents. Through voucher privatization, the government learns about local privatization conditions. Surprisingly, this additional information does not necessarily lead to more privatization. In fact, the government may even slow down reforms in order to save on bureaucrats' rents. This result of the model matches with the facts of Russian privatization in the period 1992,93. [source]

Option Awards for Australian CEOs: The Who, What and Why

AUSTRALIAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW, Issue 26 2002
Jeff Coulton
The compensation structure for Australian CEOs, and especially the extent to which they receive executive stock options, is explored. Evidence suggests that the award of executive stock options is common in Australia, but not in as systematic a manner as has been documented for US CEOs. Where ESOs are awarded, they form a significant component of total compensation, even allowing for limitations in the way we approximate their value. Modelling the use of ESOs shows relatively few empirical regularities, other than a positive association between firm size and ESO use. This is consistent with a view that ESOs are a form of "rent extraction" by CEOs, but it may also reflect a bias towards their use created by accounting rules. [source]