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Auditor Choice (auditor + choice)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Selected Abstracts

The Association between Auditor Choice, Ownership Retained, and Earnings Disclosure by Firms Making Initial Public Offerings,

CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 1 2002
Paul A. Copley
Abstract Using a system of three simultaneous equations, we test the predictions of Datar, Feltham, and Hughes 1991 and Hughes 1986 between auditor choice, earnings disclosures, and retained ownership in U.S. firms making initial public offerings of securities. Using a sample of initial public offerings between 1990 and 1997, we find that the demand for high-quality auditors increases with firm risk. Additionally, we find that auditor choice, earnings disclosure, and risk are determinants of retained ownership, which is consistent with the predictions of Datar et al. and Hughes that auditor choice and direct disclosure are substitute signals for ownership retention. Further, our results suggest that the signals chosen (i.e., retained ownership, auditor choice, and disclosure) are related through their cost structures and are chosen jointly to minimize the overall cost to the entrepreneur. [source]

Ownership Concentration in Privatized Firms: The Role of Disclosure Standards, Auditor Choice, and Auditing Infrastructure

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 5 2006
OMRANE GUEDHAMI
ABSTRACT We rely on a unique data set to estimate the impact of disclosure standards and auditor-related characteristics on ownership concentration in 190 privatized firms from 31 countries. Accounting transparency can help alleviate the agency conflict between minority investors and controlling shareholders, which is evident in the extent of ownership concentration, since the expropriation of corporate resources hinges on these private benefits remaining hidden. After controlling for other country-level and firm-level determinants, we find weak (no) evidence that extensive disclosure standards (auditor choice) reduce ownership concentration. In contrast, we report strong, robust evidence that ownership concentration is lower in countries with securities laws that specify a lower burden of proof in civil and criminal litigation against auditors, consistent with Ball's [2001] predictions. Collectively, our research implies that minority investors worldwide value legal institutions that discipline auditors in the event of financial reporting failure over both the presence of a Big 5 auditor and better disclosure standards. Re-estimating our regressions on a broad sample of western European public firms provides similar evidence on all of our predictions. [source]

The Impact of R&D Intensity on Demand for Specialist Auditor Services,

CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 1 2005
JAYNE M. GODFREY
Abstract The audit fee research literature argues that auditors' costs of developing brand name reputations, including top-tier designation and recognition for industry specialization, are compensated through audit fee premiums. Audited firms reduce agency costs by engaging high-quality auditors who monitor the levels and reporting of discretionary expenditures and accruals. In this study we examine whether specialist auditor choice is associated with a particular discretionary expenditure - research and development (R&D). For a large sample of U.S. companies from a range of industries, we find strong evidence that R&D intensity is positively associated with firms' choices of auditors who specialize in auditing R&D contracts. Additionally, we find that R&D intensive firms tend to appoint top-tier auditors. We use simultaneous equations to control for interrelationships between dependent variables in addition to single-equation ordinary least squares (OLS) and logistic regression models. Our results are particularly strong in tests using samples of small firms whose auditor choice is not constrained by the need to appoint a top-tier auditor to ensure the auditor's financial independence from the client. [source]

The Association between Auditor Choice, Ownership Retained, and Earnings Disclosure by Firms Making Initial Public Offerings,

CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 1 2002
Paul A. Copley
Abstract Using a system of three simultaneous equations, we test the predictions of Datar, Feltham, and Hughes 1991 and Hughes 1986 between auditor choice, earnings disclosures, and retained ownership in U.S. firms making initial public offerings of securities. Using a sample of initial public offerings between 1990 and 1997, we find that the demand for high-quality auditors increases with firm risk. Additionally, we find that auditor choice, earnings disclosure, and risk are determinants of retained ownership, which is consistent with the predictions of Datar et al. and Hughes that auditor choice and direct disclosure are substitute signals for ownership retention. Further, our results suggest that the signals chosen (i.e., retained ownership, auditor choice, and disclosure) are related through their cost structures and are chosen jointly to minimize the overall cost to the entrepreneur. [source]

Auditor conservatism and voluntary disclosure: Evidence from the Year 2000 systems issue

ACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 1 2003
Peter M. Clarkson
This study further examines the phenomenon of conservative auditor behaviour by considering the level of voluntary disclosure of Year 2000 remediation information in company annual reports. Previous studies have provided evidence of conservative auditor behaviour by examining the link between Big 6 auditor choice and accruals (Francis and Krishnan 1999; Becker et al., 1998; Defond and Subramanyam 1998). Protecting their reputation capital increases Big 6 auditor incentives to act conservatively to avoid litigation risk. We propose and find that Big 6 auditor clients disclose more Year 2000 remediation information than non,Big 6 auditor clients. [source]

Ownership Concentration in Privatized Firms: The Role of Disclosure Standards, Auditor Choice, and Auditing Infrastructure

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 5 2006
OMRANE GUEDHAMI
ABSTRACT We rely on a unique data set to estimate the impact of disclosure standards and auditor-related characteristics on ownership concentration in 190 privatized firms from 31 countries. Accounting transparency can help alleviate the agency conflict between minority investors and controlling shareholders, which is evident in the extent of ownership concentration, since the expropriation of corporate resources hinges on these private benefits remaining hidden. After controlling for other country-level and firm-level determinants, we find weak (no) evidence that extensive disclosure standards (auditor choice) reduce ownership concentration. In contrast, we report strong, robust evidence that ownership concentration is lower in countries with securities laws that specify a lower burden of proof in civil and criminal litigation against auditors, consistent with Ball's [2001] predictions. Collectively, our research implies that minority investors worldwide value legal institutions that discipline auditors in the event of financial reporting failure over both the presence of a Big 5 auditor and better disclosure standards. Re-estimating our regressions on a broad sample of western European public firms provides similar evidence on all of our predictions. [source]

Market Implications of the Audit Quality and Auditor Switches: Evidence from China

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT & ACCOUNTING, Issue 1 2009
Z. Jun Lin
Independent audits enhance the credibility of corporate financial reports and assist investors to make rational decisions in the capital market. Nonetheless, the utility of the auditing function depends upon the quality of audits, which is determined by the independence and expertise of auditors. Hence, auditor choice and switch will not only affect an audit's quality, but will also influence decisions made by investors and other market participants. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how investors respond to the quality of audits and auditor switches in the Chinese context. Empirical results show that the quality of an audit and switching to a larger auditor have a positive (negative) impact on earnings response coefficients (ERCs) for firms with positive (negative) abnormal earnings. In contrast, switching to a smaller auditor has a negative (positive) impact on ERCs for firms with positive (negative) abnormal earnings. These results suggest that large auditing firms (Top 10) in China are perceived as more effective for curbing income-increased earnings management, which leads to higher (lower) ERCs for clients with positive (negative) abnormal earnings. Firms' switching to a larger auditor may signal high-quality earnings. Therefore, investors more often increase stock prices when firms have positive abnormal earnings and less often depreciate prices for negative abnormal earnings. Similarly, switching to a smaller auditor may signal lower earning quality, resulting in opposite market responses. In general, the empirical evidence suggests that audit information is valued by the capital market in China. Large auditing firms have been able to product-differentiate themselves within the Chinese stock market. [source]