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Relativism
Kinds of Relativism Selected AbstractsRELATIVISM (AND EXPRESSIVISM) AND THE PROBLEM OF DISAGREEMENTPHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES, Issue 1 2009James Dreier First page of article [source] INCOMMENSURABILITY, RELATIVISM, SCEPTICISM: REFLECTIONS ON ACQUIRING A CONCEPTRATIO, Issue 2 2008Nathaniel Goldberg Some opponents of the incommensurability thesis, such as Davidson and Rorty, have argued that the very idea of incommensurability is incoherent and that the existence of alternative and incommensurable conceptual schemes is a conceptual impossibility. If true, this refutes Kuhnian relativism and Kantian scepticism in one fell swoop. For Kuhnian relativism depends on the possibility of alternative, humanly accessible conceptual schemes that are incommensurable with one another, and the Kantian notion of a realm of unknowable things-in-themselves gives rise to the possibility of humanly inaccessible schemes that are incommensurable with even our best current or future science. In what follows we argue that the possibility of incommensurability of either the Kuhnian or the Kantian variety is inescapable and that this conclusion is forced upon us by a simple consideration of what is involved in acquiring a concept. It turns out that the threats from relativism and scepticism are real, and that anyone, including Davidson himself, who has ever defended an account of concept acquisition is committed to one or the other of these two possibilities.1 [source] MORAL CONTEXTUALISM AND MORAL RELATIVISMTHE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 232 2008Berit Brogaard Moral relativism provides a compelling explanation of linguistic data involving ordinary moral expressions like ,right' and ,wrong'. But it is a very radical view. Because relativism relativizes sentence truth to contexts of assessment it forces us to revise standard linguistic theory. If, however, no competing theory explains all of the evidence, perhaps it is time for a paradigm shift. However, I argue that a version of moral contextualism can account for the same data as relativism without relativizing sentence truth to contexts of assessment. This version of moral contextualism is thus preferable to relativism on methodological grounds. [source] MI-KYOUNG LEE'S EPISTEMOLOGY AFTER PROTAGORAS: RESPONSES TO RELATIVISM IN PLATO, ARISTOTLE, AND DEMOCRITUSANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, Issue 2 2010TIMOTHY CHAPPELLArticle first published online: 26 AUG 2010 First page of article [source] Daoist Relativism, Ethical Choice, and Normative MeasureJOURNAL OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY, Issue 1 2002Robert Cummings Neville [source] Moral Relativism and the Argument from DisagreementJOURNAL OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2003James A. Ryan First page of article [source] Relativism, Absolutism, and ToleranceMETAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 4 2003Hye-Kyung Kim Abstract: A common view is that relativism requires tolerance. We argue that there is no deductive relation between relativism and tolerance, but also that relativism is not incompatible with tolerance. Next we note that there is no standard inductive relation between relativism and tolerance,no inductive enumeration, argument to the best explanation, or causal argument links the two. Two inductive arguments of a different sort that link them are then exposed and criticized at length. The first considers relativism from the objective point of view ,of the universe', the second from the subjective point of view of the relativist herself. Both arguments fail. There is similarly no deductive relation between absolutism and tolerance,neither entails the other,and no inductive connection of any sort links the two. We conclude that tolerance, whether unlimited or restricted, is independent of both relativism and absolutism. A metaethical theory that says only that there is one true or valid ethical code, or that there is a plurality of equally true or valid ethical codes, tells us nothing about whether we should be tolerant, much less how tolerant we should be. [source] Relativism and the Interpretation of TextsMETAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 1-2 2000Jorg J. E. Gracia This article examines the relativistic view according to which the interpretation of texts is a matter of opinion and one interpretation is as good as any other. It clarifies the question by establishing precise understandings of texts and interpretations and by introducing various distinctions between different kinds of interpretations based on their function. It argues that not all kinds of interpretations are relativistic, although all interpretations are relative, and that even those interpretations that are relativistic are not so in the same ways. [source] Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic RelativismNOUS, Issue 2001Gideon Rosen First page of article [source] 7 A Cultural Critique of Cultural RelativismAMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY, Issue 1 2007Xiaorong Li This chapter explores a certain line of critical analysis according to which one can proceed to undermine the claim that judgments approving freedom, and standards upholding human rights, are culturally relativistic and cannot possibly have any universal validity. This exploration begins with a scrutiny of common assumptions about the nature of culture itself. The author tries to demonstrate that common misunderstandings of culture have provided ammunition to cultural relativists. Seeking clarity helps strengthen the philosophical objections to normative cultural relativism. The author refers to such a line of analysis as the "cultural critique of cultural relativism." [source] Teaching & Learning Guide for: Moral Realism and Moral NonnaturalismPHILOSOPHY COMPASS (ELECTRONIC), Issue 3 2008Stephen Finlay Authors' Introduction Metaethics is a perennially popular subject, but one that can be challenging to study and teach. As it consists in an array of questions about ethics, it is really a mix of (at least) applied metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and mind. The seminal texts therefore arise out of, and often assume competence with, a variety of different literatures. It can be taught thematically, but this sample syllabus offers a dialectical approach, focused on metaphysical debate over moral realism, which spans the century of debate launched and framed by G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica. The territory and literature are, however, vast. So, this syllabus is highly selective. A thorough metaethics course might also include more topical examination of moral supervenience, moral motivation, moral epistemology, and the rational authority of morality. Authors Recommend: Alexander Miller, An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003). This is one of the few clear, accessible, and comprehensive surveys of the subject, written by someone sympathetic with moral naturalism. David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Brink rehabilitates naturalism about moral facts by employing a causal semantics and natural kinds model of moral thought and discourse. Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). Smith's book frames the debate as driven by a tension between the objectivity of morality and its practical role, offering a solution in terms of a response-dependent account of practical rationality. Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson, Moral Relativism & Moral Objectivity (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1996). Harman argues against the objectivity of moral value, while Thomson defends it. Each then responds to the other. Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). Jackson argues that reductive conceptual analysis is possible in ethics, offering a unique naturalistic account of moral properties and facts. Mark Timmons, Morality without Foundations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). Timmons distinguishes moral cognitivism from moral realism, interpreting moral judgments as beliefs that have cognitive content but do not describe moral reality. He also provides a particularly illuminating discussion of nonanalytic naturalism. Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001). A Neo-Aristotelian perspective: moral facts are natural facts about the proper functioning of human beings. Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defence (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003). In this recent defense of a Moorean, nonnaturalist position, Shafer-Landau engages rival positions in a remarkably thorough manner. Terence Cuneo, The Normative Web (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007). Cuneo argues for a robust version of moral realism, developing a parity argument based on the similarities between epistemic and moral facts. Mark Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007). Schroeder defends a reductive form of naturalism in the tradition of Hume, identifying moral and normative facts with natural facts about agents' desires. Online Materials: PEA Soup: http://peasoup.typepad.com A blog devoted to philosophy, ethics, and academia. Its contributors include many active and prominent metaethicists, who regularly post about the moral realism and naturalism debates. Metaethics Bibliography: http://www.lenmanethicsbibliography.group.shef.ac.uk/Bib.htm Maintained by James Lenman, professor of philosophy at the University of Sheffield, this online resource provides a selective list of published research in metaethics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu See especially the entries under ,metaethics'. Sample Syllabus: Topics for Lecture & Discussion Note: unless indicated otherwise, all the readings are found in R. Shafer-Landau and T. Cuneo, eds., Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology (Malden: Blackwell, 2007). (FE) Week 1: Realism I (Classic Nonnaturalism) G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, 2nd ed. (FE ch. 35). W. K. Frankena, ,The Naturalistic Fallacy,'Mind 48 (1939): 464,77. S. Finlay, ,Four Faces of Moral Realism', Philosophy Compass 2/6 (2007): 820,49 [DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00100.x]. Week 2: Antirealism I (Classic Expressivism) A. J. Ayer, ,Critique of Ethics and Theology' (1952) (FE ch. 3). C. Stevenson, ,The Nature of Ethical Disagreement' (1963) (FE ch. 28). Week 3: Antirealism II (Error Theory) J. L. Mackie, ,The Subjectivity of Values' (1977) (FE ch. 1). R. Joyce, Excerpt from The Myth of Morality (2001) (FE ch. 2). Week 4: Realism II (Nonanalytic Naturalism) R. Boyd, ,How to be a Moral Realist' (1988) (FE ch. 13). P. Railton, ,Moral Realism' (1986) (FE ch. 14). T. Horgan and M. Timmons, ,New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth' (1991) (FE ch. 38). Week 5: Antirealism III (Contemporary Expressivism) A. Gibbard, ,The Reasons of a Living Being' (2002) (FE ch. 6). S. Blackburn, ,How To Be an Ethical Anti-Realist' (1993) (FE ch. 4). T. Horgan and M. Timmons, ,Nondescriptivist Cognitivism' (2000) (FE ch. 5). W. Sinnott-Armstrong, ,Expressivism and Embedding' (2000) (FE ch. 37). Week 6: Realism III (Sensibility Theory) J. McDowell, ,Values and Secondary Qualities' (1985) (FE ch. 11). D. Wiggins, ,A Sensible Subjectivism' (1991) (FE ch. 12). Week 7: Realism IV (Subjectivism) & Antirealism IV (Constructivism) R. Firth, ,Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer' (1952) (FE ch. 9). G. Harman, ,Moral Relativism Defended' (1975) (FE ch. 7). C. Korsgaard, ,The Authority of Reflection' (1996) (FE ch. 8). Week 8: Realism V (Contemporary Nonnaturalism) R. Shafer-Landau, ,Ethics as Philosophy' (2006) (FE ch. 16). T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), ch. 1. T, Cuneo, ,Recent Faces of Moral Nonnaturalism', Philosophy Compass 2/6 (2007): 850,79 [DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00102.x]. [source] Changing Places: Relatives and Relativism in JavaTHE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INSTITUTE, Issue 3 2002Andrew Beatty This article examines the social context of conceptual and moral relativism; more specifically, it explores links between religious orientation and experience in an ideologically plural setting. I argue that cultural models of ,changing places' serve to guide a number of Javanese practices: child,borrowing, gender,switching, language use, and even religious conversion. These models, formed in childhood experience, engender and express a relativism which is highly valued in rural Java. [source] Relativism and the Foundations of Philosophy , Stephen HalesTHE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 234 2009Benjamin L. Curtis First page of article [source] Anti-Representationalism and RelativismANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, Issue 2 2004Carol Rovane First page of article [source] I,The Relativism of Blame and Williams's Relativism of DistanceARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME, Issue 1 2010Miranda Fricker Bernard Williams is a sceptic about the objectivity of moral value, embracing instead a qualified moral relativism,the ,relativism of distance'. His attitude to blame too is in part sceptical (he thought it often involved a certain ,fantasy'). I will argue that the relativism of distance is unconvincing, even incoherent; but also that it is detachable from the rest of Williams's moral philosophy. I will then go on to propose an entirely localized thesis I call the relativism of blame, which says that when an agent's moral shortcomings by our lights are a matter of their living according to the moral thinking of their day, judgements of blame are out of order. Finally, I will propose a form of moral judgement we may sometimes quite properly direct towards historically distant agents when blame is inappropriate,moral-epistemic disappointment. Together these two proposals may help release us from the grip of the idea that moral appraisal always involves the potential applicability of blame, and so from a key source of the relativist idea that moral appraisal is inappropriate over distance. [source] 3. THE PUBLIC RELEVANCE OF HISTORICAL STUDIES: A REJOINDER TO HAYDEN WHITE,HISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 3 2005A. DIRK MOSES ABSTRACT Hayden White wants history to serve life by having it inspire an ethical consciousness, by which he means that in facing the existential questions of life, death, trauma, and suffering posed by human history, people are moved to formulate answers to them rather than to feel that they have no power to choose how they live. The ethical historian should craft narratives that inspire people to live meaningfully rather than try to provide explanations or reconstructions of past events that make them feel as if they cannot control their destiny. This Nietzschean-inspired vision of history is inadequate because it cannot gainsay that a genocidal vision of history is immoral. White may be right that cultural relativism results in cultural pluralism and toleration, but what if most people are not cultural relativists, and believe fervently in their right to specific lands at the expense of other peoples? White does not think historiography or perhaps any moral system can provide an answer. Is he right? This rejoinder argues that the communicative rationality implicit in the human sciences does provide norms about the moral use of history because it institutionalizes an intersubjectivity in which the use of the past is governed by norms of impartiality and fair-mindedness, and protocols of evidence based on honest research. Max Weber, equally influenced by Nietzsche, developed an alternative vision of teaching and research that is still relevant today. [source] Adopting a constructivist approach to grounded theory: Implications for research designINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF NURSING PRACTICE, Issue 1 2006Jane Mills PhD (Cand) Grounded theory is a popular research methodology that is evolving to account for a range of ontological and epistemological underpinnings. Constructivist grounded theory has its foundations in relativism and an appreciation of the multiple truths and realities of subjectivism. Undertaking a constructivist enquiry requires the adoption of a position of mutuality between researcher and participant in the research process, which necessitates a rethinking of the grounded theorist's traditional role of objective observer. Key issues for constructivist grounded theorists to consider in designing their research studies are discussed in relation to developing a partnership with participants that enables a mutual construction of meaning during interviews and a meaningful reconstruction of their stories into a grounded theory model. [source] Social Constructionism as Cognitive ScienceJOURNAL FOR THE THEORY OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR, Issue 4 2004THOMAS E. DICKINS Social constructionism is a broad position that emphasizes the importance of human social processes in psychology. These processes are generally associated with language and the ability to construct stories that conform to the emergent rules of "language games". This view allows one to espouse a variety of critical postures with regard to realist commitments within the social and behavioural sciences, ranging from outright relativism (language constructs all of our concepts) to a more moderate respect for the "barrier" that linguistic descriptions can place between us and reality. This paper first outlines some possible social construction-ist viewpoints and then goes on to show how each of them conforms to the basic principles of information theory. After establishing this relation the paper then argues that this leads to a great deal of commonality between social construction-ist positions and the baseline aims of cognitive science. Finally, the paper argues that, if information theory is held in common, this both suggests future research collaborations and helps to "mop up" some of the arguments surrounding realist commitments. [source] Sustainable Architecture and the Pluralist ImaginationJOURNAL OF ARCHITECTURAL EDUCATION, Issue 4 2007SIMON GUY In our review of the literature concerning sustainable architecture, we find a remarkably diverse constellation of ideas that defy simple categorization. But rather than lament the apparent inability to standardize a singular approach to degraded environmental and social conditions, we celebrate pluralism as a means to contest technological and scientific certainty. At the same time, we reject epistemological and moral relativism. These twin points of departure lead us to propose a research agenda for an architecture of reflective engagement that is sympathetic to the pragmatist tradition. [source] Child Maltreatment in Diverse Households: Challenges to Law, Theory, and PracticeJOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY, Issue 1 2008Julia Brophy In the United Kingdom relatively little attention has been paid to ,race' and racism and the role of cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity in care proceedings. This paper will look at the background, law, and guidance on diversity in this field and explore the impact of notions of diversity in evidence before the courts. It will look at their relevance in allegations of 'significant harm' to children and failures of parenting, and the coverage of diverse backgrounds in expert reports and parents' statements. It will argue that while there is no evidence that the threshold criteria for a care order require reassessing, there is room for considerable improvement in attention to issues of diversity in evidence and in the experiences of parents attending court. The paper will explore the implications of the studies for theorizing law and the duties of the state and look at notions such as cultural relativism and concepts imported from cultural anthropology for determining culturally acceptable parenting. It will highlight problems with these approaches and demonstrate why ,paradigms of intersectionality' is a more useful and robust approach. [source] Teasing Out the Lessons of the 1960s: Family Diversity and Family PrivilegeJOURNAL OF MARRIAGE AND FAMILY, Issue 3 2000Stephen R. Marks The tumult of the 1960s brought new strains of cultural relativism. I survey the continuing impact of some of these strains on family studies, focusing especially on the study of family diversity as an offshoot of the relativistic project. A dominant discourse still drives much of our work, however, and I illustrate it with some recent examples. The diversity agenda is hampered too often by unintended erasures of large categories of people in nondominant family arrangements. As a corrective to this tendency, I propose an agenda to study family privilege and entitlement, that is, to treat it as a "social problem" much as we treat poverty or juvenile delinquency. I illustrate with my own narrative of how I learned privilege and entitlement growing up male in a White, Jewish, upper-middle-class family. I end with some recommendations about how we might bring this agenda into our research and writing. [source] The Ethics of Integrity: Educational Values Beyond Postmodern EthicsJOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, Issue 1 2001Mark Mason I address the problems of diminished moral responsibility and of moral relativism, typically associated with education in late modern society, by developing, beyond the problematic contemporary formulations of postmodern ethics, an ethics of integrity as a moral resource for education. This ethics is constituted by the principles of respect for the dignity of persons, and the acceptance of responsibility for the consequences of our moral choices. I show how it offers more than the scant resources of postmodern ethics to educators who seek to enable their students to develop a deeply-founded sense of moral comportment and an authentic identity in the face of the moral complexity of late modernity's globalised and plural society. [source] Is Natural Law a Border Concept Between Judaism and Christianity?JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS ETHICS, Issue 2 2004David Novak ABSTRACT With the passing of disputations between Jewish and Christian thinkers as to whose tradition has a more universal ethics, the task of Jewish and Christian ethicists is to constitute a universal horizon for their respective bodies of ethics, both of which are essentially particularistic being rooted in special revelation. This parallel project must avoid relativism that is essentially anti-ethical, and triumphalism that proposes an imperialist ethos. A retrieval of the idea of natural law in each respective tradition enables the constitution of some intelligent common ground for ethical cooperation in both theory and practice between the traditions. This essay also suggests how the constitution of this common ground could include Muslims as well. The constitution of this common ground enables religious ethicists to present more cogent ethical arguments in secular space, but only of course, when those who now control secular space are open to arguments from members of any religious tradition. [source] Reasonably Traditional: Self,Contradiction and Self,Reference in Alasdair MacIntyre's Account of Tradition,Based RationalityJOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS ETHICS, Issue 3 2002Micah Lott Alasdair MacIntyre's account of tradition,based rationality has been the subject of much discussion, as well as the object of some recent charges of inconsistency. The author considers arguments by Jennifer Herdt, Peter Mehl, and John Haldane which attempt to show that MacIntyre's account of rationality is, in some way, inconsistent. It is argued that the various charges of inconsistency brought against MacIntyre by these critics can be understood as variations on two general types of criticism: (1) that MacIntyre's account of tradition,based rationality presents a picture of rationality with inconsistent internal elements, and (2) that MacIntyre, in the act of presenting his picture of rationality, makes the sort of claims to which his own account of rationality denies legitimacy, and thus MacIntyre's account is self,referentially incoherent. In response to criticisms of the first sort, it is argued that MacIntyre can further clarify or develop his position to take the current criticisms into account without altering the fundamental aspects of his picture of rationality. In response to the charge of self,referential incoherence, it is argued that the charge rests on a mistaken understanding of MacIntyre's position and of the nature of justification. In dealing with these arguments, the author hopes to not only vindicate MacIntyre's account of rationality against the charges of some of its recent critics, but also to shed some light on the nature of arguments both for and against relativism and historicism. [source] Passion and Reason: Aristotelian Strategies in Kierkegaard's EthicsJOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS ETHICS, Issue 2 2002Norman Lillegard Both Aristotle and Kierkegaard show that virtues result, in part, from training which produces distinctive patterns of salience. The "frame problem" in AI shows that rationality requires salience. Salience is a function of cares and desires (passions) and thus governs choice in much the way Aristotle supposes when he describes choice as deliberative desire. Since rationality requires salience it follows that rationality requires passion. Thus Kierkegaard is no more an irrationalist in ethics than is Aristotle, though he continues to be charged with irrationalism. The compatibility of an Aristotelian reading of Kierkegaard with the "suspension of the ethical" and general problems with aretaic ethical theories are treated briefly. The author argues that it is possible to preserve a realist ethics in the face of the "tradition relativism" which threatens the version of virtue ethics here attributed to Kierkegaard. [source] Containing "Contamination": Cardinal Moran and Fin de Siècle Australian National Identity, 1888,1911JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS HISTORY, Issue 1 2010MARK HEARN Cardinal Patrick Moran, the Catholic Archbishop of Sydney 1884,1911, believed that Australian Catholicism would flourish with the emergence of the new nation through Federation in 1901, provided that Australians turned away from foreign influences, including anarchism and nihilism. Moran also sought to use Australia to "Christianise" the enormous population of China, and believed that Chinese immigration could make a useful contribution to nation building. As the nineteenth century closed, Moran's aims were also complicated by the more insidious threats represented by a challenge to religious faith by fin de siècle ideas , a modernism manifesting as both a general challenge and a specific doctrinal relativism that might erode the Church's authority, and the threat Moran felt was posed to the development of the liberal Australian state and the Catholic Church by radical political alternatives. Concern that a mood of religious apostasy and secularisation might spread to the Catholic community also influenced Moran's support for the fledgling Australian Labor Party, which Moran believed could develop as an instrument to reinforce a moral and inclusive sense of Australian identity for the Catholic working class. Like his pro-Chinese views, Moran's advocacy of "the rights and duties of labour" was defined by an imagined alliance of evangelism and nation building, stimulated by the fear, as he expressed in 1891, of "an unchristianized world." [source] THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOSEPH MARGOLISMETAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 5 2005Göran Hermerén Abstract: In this article I focus on some of Joseph Margolis's contributions to medical ethics. I first discuss some of Margolis's normative and metaphysical views on death and abortion, particularly in his early work Negativities, as well as some of his metaphysical assumptions. Then these views and assumptions are related to his theory of persons and, by implication, his theory of culture, set forth in a number of later works. In the course of the discussion, I call attention to some controversial issues of today, such as embryonic stem cell research and the creation of embryos for the sole purpose of research, and ask for Margolis's views on them, given his earlier contributions and assumptions. Finally, I comment on his relativism and his program for research in aesthetics and ethics. [source] Logical Positivism, Analytic Method, and Criticisms of EthnophilosophyMETAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 4 2004Polycarp Ikuenobe Abstract: I argue that the analytic method has been circularly used to analyze the concept of "philosophy," and that the result of this analysis has also been used to criticize African ethnophilosophy as nonphilosophical. I critically examine the criticism that ethnophilosophy implies cognitive relativism and the criticism that it implies authoritarianism. I defend ethnophilosophy against these criticisms, arguing that they are rooted in logical positivism, the view that philosophy essentially involves the use of the methods of science and logical analysis. I argue that such analysis and criticisms, given their pedigree, do not provide an adequate or accurate picture of the nature of philosophy. [source] Pragmatism, Postmodernism, and Global CitizenshipMETAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 1-2 2004Larry A. Hickman Abstract: The founders of American pragmatism proposed what they regarded as a radical alternative to the philosophical methods and doctrines of their predecessors and contemporaries. Although their central ideas have been understood and applied in some quarters, there remain other areas within which they have been neither appreciated nor appropriated. One of the more pressing of these areas locates a set of problems of knowledge and valuation related to global citizenship. This essay attempts to demonstrate that classical American pragmatism, because its methods are modeled on successes in the technosciences, offers a set of tools for fostering global citizenship that are more effective than the tools of some of its alternatives. First, pragmatism claims to discover a strain of human commonality that trumps the radical postmodernist emphasis on difference and discontinuity. Second, when pragmatism's theory of truth is coupled with its moderate version of cultural relativism, the more skeptical postmodernist version known as "cognitive" relativism is undercut. [source] Relativism, Absolutism, and ToleranceMETAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 4 2003Hye-Kyung Kim Abstract: A common view is that relativism requires tolerance. We argue that there is no deductive relation between relativism and tolerance, but also that relativism is not incompatible with tolerance. Next we note that there is no standard inductive relation between relativism and tolerance,no inductive enumeration, argument to the best explanation, or causal argument links the two. Two inductive arguments of a different sort that link them are then exposed and criticized at length. The first considers relativism from the objective point of view ,of the universe', the second from the subjective point of view of the relativist herself. Both arguments fail. There is similarly no deductive relation between absolutism and tolerance,neither entails the other,and no inductive connection of any sort links the two. We conclude that tolerance, whether unlimited or restricted, is independent of both relativism and absolutism. A metaethical theory that says only that there is one true or valid ethical code, or that there is a plurality of equally true or valid ethical codes, tells us nothing about whether we should be tolerant, much less how tolerant we should be. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||