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Regulation
Kinds of Regulation Terms modified by Regulation Selected AbstractsRESTRUCTURING U.S. FEDERAL FINANCIAL REGULATIONCONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY, Issue 3 2007ROSE M. KUSHMEIDER Despite changes over the past 70 yr, the U.S. federal financial regulatory system remains rooted in the reforms of the 1930s. The institutions governed by this system have, nevertheless, continued to evolve. Today, regulation of large, multiproduct, internationally active financial organizations poses challenges for a system designed largely to regulate smaller, distinct, locally based organizations. Reform of the regulatory system, however, is not an easy task,complex issues regarding deposit insurance, the role of the central bank, and the dual banking system must be addressed. In the absence of a crisis, however, regulatory restructuring will not likely generate much political interest. (JEL G28) [source] STRATEGIC BEHAVIORS TOWARD ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: A CASE OF TRUCKING INDUSTRYCONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY, Issue 1 2007TERENCE LAM We used trucking industry's response to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's acceleration of 2004 diesel emissions standards as a case study to examine the importance of accounting for regulatees' strategic behaviors in drafting of environmental regulations. Our analysis of the time series data of aggregate U.S. and Canada heavy-duty truck production data from 1992 through 2003 found that heavy-duty trucks production increased by 20%,23% in the 6 mo prior to the date of compliance. The increases might be due to truck operators pre-buying trucks with less expensive but noncompliant engines and behaving strategically in anticipation of other uncertainties. (JEL L51, Q25) [source] LABOUR MARKET REGULATION: SOME COMPARATIVE LESSONSECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Issue 3 2005W. S. Siebert Labour market regulation that undermines freedom of contract leads to fewer, higher productivity jobs with employment being across a narrower range of ages. More people are excluded from the labour market, in highly regulated countries and they remain unemployed for longer. This seems to be damaging to welfare. It is possible that the extent of regulation is explained by the relative ability of those who gain from regulation (those in work) to influence the outcome of political processes to a greater extent than those who lose (the unemployed). However, the legal framework and legal traditions may also play a part. [source] LIFE INSURANCE: REGULATION AS CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT,ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Issue 4 2004Alan D. MorrisonArticle first published online: 28 JUN 200 Debating the minutiae of insurance regulation without a clear understanding of why insurance companies are regulated is futile. In this article I discuss the economic rationale for insurance business regulation and conclude that the appropriate role of the regulator is to enforce contracts which might otherwise be broken. I argue that if this is the case, regulation should be optional, and that it need not be a monopoly activity. [source] COMPETITION AMONG STAKEHOLDER GROUPS FOR POLITICAL INFLUENCE OVER BUSINESS REGULATION: THE CASE OF THE UK PENSIONS INDUSTRYECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Issue 3 2003Paul Klumpes This paper applies a stakeholder perspective to estimate various types of costs (taxes) and benefits (subsidies) affecting stakeholder groups whose constituents are most affected by recent, major reforms to the public regulation of the UK pensions industry. Both direct and indirect subsidies and taxes arising from regulation distinguishes groups representing both sophisticated and vulnerable investors. The analysis suggests that financial intermediaries, and industry regulators, are all effectively subsidised by other stakeholder groups. [source] THE REGULATION OF LIFE ASSURERS IN A LOW SOLVENCY ENVIRONMENT: THE UK EXPERIENCEECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Issue 3 2003Chris O'Brien When adverse financial conditions mean that many life assurers have sharply reduced solvency levels, a number of new issues arise for regulators, including the basic issue of how solvency is measured. There are also issues about life assurers' investments, and their products and how they are priced. Lastly, the regulator (in the UK, the Financial Services Authority) needs to ensure that customers and their advisers have suitable information about the solvency of the firms they are dealing with. [source] POLICY OPTIONS FOR ALCOHOL PRICE REGULATION: RESPONSE TO THE COMMENTARIESADDICTION, Issue 3 2010PETRA SYLVIA MEIER No abstract is available for this article. [source] IMPLEMENTING BEST PRACTICE REGULATION IN A DYNAMIC MARKETPLACE: CONSULTATION AND ACCOUNTABILITYECONOMIC PAPERS: A JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS AND POLICY, Issue S1 2008RIC SIMES The practice of financial regulation in Australia has drifted away from the lighted-handed principles articulated in the Wallis Report. The burden of regulatory compliance has steadily grown. The inconsistency between regulatory principle and practice is explained as the result of perverse incentives facing regulators, an absence of effective consultation with industry regarding the cost burden of regulation, and a failure to properly assess the social benefits and costs of regulatory intervention. The paper argues for the creation of a Bureau of Financial Sector Regulation to improve the accountability of regulators and publish independent social cost,benefit analyses of financial regulation. The paper also calls for a further inquiry into Australia's financial system ten years on from the Wallis Inquiry. [source] SOME THOUGHTS ON ECONOMICS AND REGULATIONECONOMIC PAPERS: A JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS AND POLICY, Issue 1 2004Graeme Samuel The author discusses the role of the ACCC in promoting competition policy in Australia. The ACCC's regulatory activities in focusing on of those industries where competition is limited are examined. It is argued that the focus here is two fold: to create conditions for fair competition in industries that rely on the services of facilities with natural monopoly characteristics and the administration of price caps to minimise the impact of monopoly power. [source] THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY: ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION IN AUSTRALIAECONOMIC PAPERS: A JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS AND POLICY, Issue 1 2004Gary Banks Chairman The paper examines the existing scope and role of regulations in Australia. While there are many benefits from regulation, there is also a myriad of, often underplayed, costs associated with regulations. While compliance costs are large, probably the most significant costs arise from behavioural responses to regulations that reduce efficiency or compromise social goals. These adverse effects are often unanticipated and arise from complex interactions between regulations. The main reasons for regulatory failure are excessive ambition (underestimating the deficiencies of the regulatory ,solution'), capture of regulatory agencies, and poor regulatory processes and institutions. The paper offers some guidelines for producing better regulation. [source] POLICY COMPROMISES: CORRUPTION AND REGULATION IN A DEMOCRACYECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2008TOKE S. AIDT This paper evaluates the extent of regulation in a democracy with corruption. Elected politicians can restrict entry of firms in exchange for bribes from entrepreneurs. Full liberalization implies free entry and allocative efficiency. Voters re-elect politicians based on observed performance. We demonstrate that voters agree to tolerate corruption and inefficient regulation; that efficient policies can be promoted by productivity growth; that productivity growth reduces the cost of providing wage incentives; and that corruption is procyclical and economic policy is countercyclical in a corrupt democracy. [source] [Commentary] ALCOHOL ADVERTISING REGULATION: WHERE TO FROM HERE?ADDICTION, Issue 7 2009DAVID H. JERNIGAN No abstract is available for this article. [source] GAMBLING BENEFICIARIES HAVING THEIR CAKE AND EATING IT: THE ATTRACTIONS OF AVOIDING RESPONSIBLE GAMBLING REGULATIONADDICTION, Issue 5 2009PETER J. ADAMS No abstract is available for this article. [source] COMPETITION AND REGULATION IN THE U.K. ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY (WITH A BRIEF LOOK AT CALIFORNIA)JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 4 2001Stephen C. Littlechild In this article, the U.K.'s Director General of Electricity Supply from 1989 to 1998 assesses the effects of deregulation and competition on the U.K. electricity industry after about a decade. Expansion of existing competitors, new entry, and further restructuring have reduced the aggregate share of the largest two generation companies from nearly 80% to 26%. Efficiency has improved and wholesale prices have fallen after an initial increase. Voluntary bilateral contracts markets are about to replace the mandatory "Pool," with centralised control limited to physically balancing the system and settling contract imbalances. Retail supply competition has been active for large industrial customers since the beginning, and 80% of them now buy from another supplier. The market for residential customers opened in early 1999, and already nearly a quarter of them have chosen another supplier. Incentive price controls on transmission and distribution have stimulated increased efficiency and significantly reduced use-of-system charges. Overall, prices for all classes of customers have fallen by 25,35% in real terms since privatisation, and quality of service has improved. California has adopted a policy that is similar in many respects, but with very different results. The problems there have stemmed partly from less favourable demand and supply conditions, but also from significant policy differences, including barriers to building new capacity, obstacles to the use of long-term supply (or hedging) contracts, retail price controls at untenable levels, and the requirement that (after a transition period) utilities pass through wholesale spot prices directly to their customers. Changes in such policies will eventually enable both producers and consumers in California to benefit from competition. [source] REGULATION OF PHENYLALANINE AMMONIA-LYASE ENZYME IN ANNONA FRUIT: KINETIC CHARACTERISTICS AND INHIBITORY EFFECT OF AMMONIAJOURNAL OF FOOD BIOCHEMISTRY, Issue 2 2007R. MALDONADO ABSTRACT In this work, we analyzed the kinetic properties of phenylalanine ammonia-lyase (PAL) extracted from "cherimoya" (Annona cherimola Mill.) fruits ripened at ambient temperature (20C) and stored under several environmental conditions, including high CO2 levels (20%) and low temperature (6C). The effect of different ammonia-related compounds on cherimoya PAL activity was also evaluated. PAL exhibited two different Kmvalues for L-phenylalanine (L-Phe ) and negative substrate cooperativity, with Hill coefficient (napp) values reaching 0.64 and 0.71 for low temperature and high CO2 levels, respectively. The kinetic analysis revealed that ammonia produced mixed inhibition of PAL enzyme, with inhibition constants (Ki and Ki,) values of 0.57 ± 0.2 mM and 2.54 ± 0.2 mM. We propose that the regulation of PAL by ammonia inhibition and the negative cooperativity may be essential in adjusting the active phenylpropanoid metabolism in Annonas to the requirement of L-Phe and in consequence, to the carbon skeleton demand for other anabolic pathways. [source] SEQUENCE ANALYSIS AND TRANSCRIPTIONAL REGULATION OF IRON ACQUISITION GENES IN TWO MARINE DIATOMS,JOURNAL OF PHYCOLOGY, Issue 4 2007Adam B. Kustka The centric diatom Thalassiosira pseudonana Hasle et Heimdal and the pennate diatom Phaeodactylum tricornutum Bohlin possess genes with translated sequences homologous to high-affinity ferric reductases present in model organisms. Thalassiosira pseudonana also possesses putative genes for membrane-bound ferroxidase (TpFET3) and two highly similar iron (Fe) permeases (TpFTR1 and TpFTR2), as well as a divalent metal (M2+) transporter belonging to the NRAMP superfamily (TpNRAMP). In baker's yeast, the ferroxidase,permease complex transports Fe(II) produced by reductases. We investigated transcript abundances of these genes as a function of Fe quota (QFe). Ferric reductase transcripts are abundant in both species (15%,60% of actin) under low QFe and are down-regulated by 5- to 35-fold at high QFe, suggesting Fe(III) reduction is a common, inducible strategy for Fe acquisition in marine diatoms. Permease transcript abundance was regulated by Fe status in T. pseudonana, but we did not detect significant differences in expression of the copper (Cu)-containing ferroxidase. TpNRAMP showed the most dramatic regulation by QFe, suggesting a role in cellular Fe transport in either cell-surface uptake or vacuolar mobilization. We could not identify ferroxidase or permease homologues in the P. tricornutum genome. The up-regulation of genes in T. pseudonana that appear to be missing altogether from P. tricornutum as well as the finding that P. tricornutum seems to have an efficient system to acquire Fe,, suggest that diverse (and uncharacterized) Fe-uptake systems may be at play within diatom assemblages. Different uptake systems among diatoms may provide a mechanistic basis for niche differentiation with respect to Fe availability in the ocean. [source] LIGHT REGULATION OF PHYCOBILISOME BIOSYNTHESIS AND CONTROL BY A PHYTOCHROME-LIKE PHOTORECEPTORJOURNAL OF PHYCOLOGY, Issue 2000K. Terauchi Ambient light quality changes dramatically affect the composition of light harvesting structures, the phycobilisomes, in many cyanobacterial species. In the cyanobacterium Fremyella diplosiphon, shifts in the ratio of red to green light lead to transcriptional changes and altered synthesis of several phycobilisome components. This process is called complementary chromatic adaptation (CCA). These two colors have opposite effects: red light activates an operon encoding the biliprotein phycocyanin (PC) and inactivates the operon encoding phycoerythrin (PE), whereas green light activates PE synthesis and shuts down PC synthesis. The effects of red and green light on CCA are photoreversible. Thus, CCA is similar to transcriptional processes that are controlled by phytochromes, a family of eukaryotic red/far red photoreversible photoreceptors. We are using molecular genetics to determine the mechanisms by which F. diplosiphon senses changes in the color of light of its environment. Initial mutant generation and complementation lead to the discovery of three CCA regulatory components that are part of a complex two component system. The most interesting of these is RcaE (regulator of chromatic adaptation), a histidine kinase-class protein containing a region in its amino-terminal half with similarity to the chromophore binding domains of phytochromes. Within this region, RcaE contains a cysteine residue in a similar location as that used for covalent attachment of the open-chain tetrapyrrole chromophore in phytochromes. We will present recent data characterizing RcaE, including in vivo analysis of the chromophore that is attached to RcaE, as well as results from our recent isolation of a new CCA regulatory component. [source] PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF TIMING AND REGULATIONNATURAL RESOURCE MODELING, Issue 2 2006MICHAEL FINUS ABSTRACT. We analyze the formation of self-enforcing international environmental agreements under the assumption that countries announce their participation either simultaneously or sequentially. It is shown that a sequential formation process opens up possibilities for strategic behavior of countries that may lead to inferior outcomes in terms of global abatement and welfare. We then analyze whether and under which conditions a regulator like an international organization, even without enforcement power, can improve upon globally suboptimal outcomes through coordination and moderation, given that recommendations must be Pareto-improving to all parties. [source] CAN THE ISO 14000 SERIES ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT STANDARDS PROVIDE A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO GOVERNMENT REGULATION?AMERICAN BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL, Issue 2 2000PAULETTE L. STENZEL First page of article [source] FEDERAL WETLANDS REGULATION: RESTRICTIONS ON THE NATIONWIDE PERMIT PROGRAM AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY OWNERSAMERICAN BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL, Issue 2 2000RANDALL S. GUTTERY First page of article [source] EMOTION REGULATION AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN THE DEVELOPING CHILDPSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY, Issue 2008Article first published online: 12 AUG 200 No abstract is available for this article. [source] NEURAL MECHANISMS OF EMOTION ELICITATION AND REGULATIONPSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY, Issue S1 2005Article first published online: 15 AUG 200 No abstract is available for this article. [source] BETTER REGULATION IN EUROPE: BETWEEN PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND REGULATORY REFORMPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Issue 3 2009CLAUDIO M. RADAELLI Can the European regulatory state be managed? The European Union (EU) and its member states have looked at better regulation as a possible answer to this difficult question. This emerging public policy presents challenges to scholars of public management and administrative reforms, but also opportunities. In this conceptual article, we start from the problems created by the value-laden discourse used by policy-makers in this area, and provide a definition and a framework that are suitable for empirical/explanatory research. We then show how public administration scholars could usefully bring better regulation into their research agendas. To be more specific, we situate better regulation in the context of the academic debates on the New Public Management, the political control of bureaucracies, evidence-based policy, and the regulatory state in Europe. [source] COULD TIGHTER PRUDENTIAL REGULATION HAVE SAVED THAILAND'S BANKS?THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES, Issue 3 2001Thomas HARTMANN-WENDELS First page of article [source] INSIDER TRADING, REGULATION, AND THE COMPONENTS OF THE BID,ASK SPREADTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, Issue 3 2008Bart Frijns Abstract In this article we investigate the relation between insider trading regulations and the bid,ask spread. We decompose the spread into its components before and after the enactment of strict new insider trading rules in New Zealand. We find that the enactment led to a significant decrease in the information asymmetry component of the spread, which is observed mainly in illiquid and high prechange information asymmetry companies. These findings are robust to model specification. In addition, we find a decrease in the contribution of information asymmetry to price volatility. [source] THE ADOPTION OF STATE ELECTRICITY REGULATION: THE ROLE OF INTEREST GROUPS,THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2006CHRISTOPHER R. KNITTEL This paper examines the adoption of state electricity regulation around the beginning of the 20th century. I model this decision as a hazard rate to determine what influenced the adoption of state regulation. I find that adoption is positively correlated with capacity shortages, greater wealth and lower residential electricity penetration rates. These results suggest that state regulation responded to regulatory inefficiencies and residential consumer interests. In addition, adoption rates were higher in states that had a strong industrial and coal mining presence. These results are consistent with the interest group and contracting theories of regulation. [source] STRUCTURE REGULATION, PRICE STRUCTURE, CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION AND MARGINAL COST OF PUBLIC FUNDS,THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 6 2009MING CHUNG CHANG In this paper we study the social desirability of the structure regulation which transforms a single multi-product monopoly into an oligopoly where the industry produces differentiated complementary goods. In particular, we pay special attention to the cross-subsidization which will be eliminated by the structure regulation. It is established that if horizontal externalities between the goods are not too strong, then the monopoly has a socially optimal price structure. In contrast, the oligopoly always distorts the price structure. We also demonstrate that the monopoly will cross-subsidize a product if and only if this product has a relatively low absolute advantage. [source] INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE MECHANISM DESIGN AND FIRM GROWTH: EXPERIENCES FROM TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR REGULATIONANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2010Sumit K. Majumdar ABSTRACT**:,This article evaluates the impact of the introduction of incentive regulation on firm growth among the population of local exchange carriers in the US telecommunications industry between 1988 and 2001. The results show that the rate of return method and other intermediate incentive schemes have had a negative impact on firm growth. Conversely, the introduction of pure price caps schemes had a positive and significant impact on firms' growth. These results highlight the importance of proper and appropriate incentive compatible mechanism design in motivating firms to strive for superior performance. [source] LIMITS TO COMPETITION AND REGULATION IN PRIVATIZED ELECTRICITY MARKETSANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2009Hulya Dagdeviren ABSTRACT,:,Privatization of electricity has been extensive both in the developed and the developing world. Failures in various areas have led to the emergence of a new consensus which regards competitive pressures and regulation as crucial for utility privatizations to work. This review paper presents a critical evaluation of this newly found wisdom with reference to the developing economies. The experience in the developed world, especially in the USA and the UK, has been used to draw conclusions for the developing economies. Overall, the paper highlights the problems associated with the ,competitive model' both in the developed and developing world and points to the potential instability in private competitive power supply systems. It also examines the degree to which regulation can be a panacea for market failures and structural problems under private provision. [source] RETAIL PRICE REGULATION AND THE OPTION TO DELAYANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2009Fernando T. Camacho ABSTRACT,:,This paper examines a two-period model of an investment decision in a network industry characterized by demand uncertainty, economies of scale and sunk costs. In the absence of regulation we identify the market conditions under which a monopolist decides to invest early as well as the underlying overall welfare output. In a regulated environment, we consider a monopolist who faces no downstream (final good) competition but is subject to retail price regulation. We identify the welfare-maximizing regulated prices when the unregulated market outcome is set as the benchmark. We show that if the regulator can commit to ex post regulation , that is, regulated prices that are contingent to future demand realization , then regulated prices that allow the firm to recover its total costs of production are welfare-maximizing. Thus, under ex post price regulation there is no need to compensate the regulated firm for the option to delay that it foregoes when investing today. We argue, however, that regulators cannot make this type of commitment and, therefore, price regulation is often ex ante , that is, regulated prices are not contingent to future demand. We show that the optimal ex ante regulation, and the extent to which regulated prices need to incorporate an option to delay, depend on the nature of demand uncertainty. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||