Auction Mechanism (auction + mechanism)

Distribution by Scientific Domains


Selected Abstracts


DESIGN OF AN ITERATIVE MULTI-ITEM DOUBLE-AUCTION MECHANISM

COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, Issue 1 2008
Dong H. Roh
There have been many multi-item auction mechanisms. As it is not allowed for both sellers and buyers to submit bids and offers in nearly all existing multi-item auction mechanisms, the impartial profit distribution for both sellers and buyers cannot be realized in those mechanisms. Although it is possible for both sellers and buyers to submit bids and offers in a combinatorial exchange, the impartial profit distribution for all individual participants cannot be realized due to its pricing mechanism that focuses only on enforcing budget balance. This paper proposes an iterative multi-item unit-demand and unit-supply double-auction mechanism with a new winner determination and pricing mechanism for distributing profit impartially from the viewpoints of individual participants regardless of whether they are buyers or sellers. It also analyzes the theoretical features of the proposed auction mechanism, including those related to its strategic behavior and efficiency. [source]


Optimal Design of the Online Auction Channel: Analytical, Empirical, and Computational Insights,

DECISION SCIENCES, Issue 4 2002
Ravi Bapna
ABSTRACT The focus of this study is on business-to-consumer (B2C) online auctions made possible by the advent of electronic commerce over an open-source, ubiquitous Internet Protocol (IP) computer network. This work presents an analytical model that characterizes the revenue generation process for a popular B2C online auction, namely, Yankee auctions. Such auctions sell multiple identical units of a good to multiple buyers using an ascending and open auction mechanism. The methodologies used to validate the analytical model range from empirical analysis to simulation. A key contribution of this study is the design of a partitioning scheme of the discrete valuation space of the bidders such that equilibrium points with higher revenue structures become identifiable and feasible. Our analysis indicates that the auctioneers are, most of the time, far away from the optimal choice of key control factors such as the bid increment, resulting in substantial losses in a market with already tight margins. With this in mind, we put forward a portfolio of tools, varying in their level of abstraction and information intensity requirements, which help auctioneers maximize their revenues. [source]


FIXED REVENUE AUCTIONS: THEORY AND BEHAVIOR

ECONOMIC INQUIRY, Issue 3 2008
CARY A. DECK
In this paper, we study auctions in which the revenue is fixed but the quantity is determined by the auction mechanism. Specifically, we investigate the theory and behavior of English quantity clock, Dutch quantity clock, last-quantity sealed bid, and penultimate-quantity sealed bid auctions. For theoretically equivalent fixed quantity and fixed revenue auctions, we find that fixed revenue auctions are robust to all the previously observed empirical regularities in fixed quantity auctions. (JEL C9, D4, L2) [source]


Resource Allocation Auctions within Firms

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 5 2007
STANLEY BAIMAN
ABSTRACT There is growing interest in the use of markets within firms. Proponents have noted that markets are a simple and efficient mechanism for allocating resources in economies in which information is dispersed. In contrast to the use of markets in the broader economy, the efficiency of an internal market is determined in large part by the endogenous contractual incentives provided to the participating, privately informed agents. In this paper, we study the optimal design of managerial incentives when resources are allocated by an internal auction market, as well as the efficiency of the resulting resource allocations. We show that the internal auction market can achieve first-best resource allocations and decisions, but only at an excessive cost in compensation payments. We then identify conditions under which the internal auction market and associated optimal incentive contracts achieve the benchmark second-best outcome as determined using a direct revelation mechanism. The advantage of the auction is that it is easier to implement than the direct revelation mechanism. When the internal auction mechanism is unable to achieve second-best, we characterize the factors that determine the magnitude of the shortfall. Overall, our results speak to the robust performance of relatively simple market mechanisms and associated incentive systems in resolving resource allocation problems within firms. [source]


The Double-Auction Gambling Market: An Experimental Examination

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY, Issue 3 2007
Kyle W. Hampton
I examine a new sports wagering mechanism that utilizes a double auction rather than the traditional wager matching bookmaker. Laboratory experiments were performed that modeled the two institutions in an attempt to compare the efficiency and volatility of the new mechanism versus the status quo. The new proposed double auction institution was less efficient and more volatile than the matching mechanism. However, the relative performance of the double auction mechanism was significantly improved by an increase in the size of the market. [source]


DESIGNING A MARKET STRUCTURE WHEN FIRMS COMPETE FOR THE RIGHT TO SERVE THE MARKET,

THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2005
Michel Mougeot
In many industries, a regulator designs an auction to select ex-ante the firms that compete ex-post on the product market. This paper considers the optimal market structure when firms incur sunk costs before entering the market and when the government is not able to regulate firms in the market. We prove that a free entry equilibrium results in an excessive entry when the entry costs are private information. Then, we consider an auction mechanism selecting the firms allowed to serve the market and show that the optimal number of licences results in the socially optimal market structure. When all the potential candidates are actual bidders, the optimal number of firms in the market increases with the number of candidates and decreases with the social cost of public funds. When the market size is small, as the net profit in the market decreases with the number of selected firms, entry is endogenous. As increasing competition in the market reduces competition for the market, the optimal structure is more concentrated than in the previous case. [source]


DESIGN OF AN ITERATIVE MULTI-ITEM DOUBLE-AUCTION MECHANISM

COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, Issue 1 2008
Dong H. Roh
There have been many multi-item auction mechanisms. As it is not allowed for both sellers and buyers to submit bids and offers in nearly all existing multi-item auction mechanisms, the impartial profit distribution for both sellers and buyers cannot be realized in those mechanisms. Although it is possible for both sellers and buyers to submit bids and offers in a combinatorial exchange, the impartial profit distribution for all individual participants cannot be realized due to its pricing mechanism that focuses only on enforcing budget balance. This paper proposes an iterative multi-item unit-demand and unit-supply double-auction mechanism with a new winner determination and pricing mechanism for distributing profit impartially from the viewpoints of individual participants regardless of whether they are buyers or sellers. It also analyzes the theoretical features of the proposed auction mechanism, including those related to its strategic behavior and efficiency. [source]


Risk attitude in lotteries offering real products and monetary outcomes

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 2 2010
Shavit Tal
C91; D44; D81 Using two auction mechanisms, the second price auction and the Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak mechanism, we examined individuals' buying and selling bidding patterns in three types of binary lotteries: a lottery offering only real products, a lottery offering only monetary outcomes and mixed lotteries offering both real products and monetary value outcomes. Participants' willingness to pay and willingness to accept for the product lottery suggest risk neutrality. In contrast, participants' bidding prices for the monetary and mixed lotteries suggest risk aversion. These findings suggest that an individual's risk attitude depends upon the type of lottery, perhaps indicating a "product illusion." [source]