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Rational Agents (rational + agent)
Selected AbstractsUniversalizability for Collective Rational Agents: A Critique of AgentrelativismPHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH, Issue 1 2005MICHAEL RIDGE This paper contends that a Kantian universalizability constraint on theories of practical reason in conjunction with the possibility of collective rational agents entails the surprisingly strong conclusion that no fully agent-relative theory of practical reason can be sound. The basic point is that a Kantian universalizability constraint, the thesis that all reasons for action are agent-relative and the possibility of collective rational agents gives rise to a contradiction. This contradiction can be avoided by either rejecting Kantian universalizability, the possibility of collective rational agents, or the tenability of a fully agent-relative theory of practical reason; we cannot have all three. [source] Modelling Rational Agents: From Interwar Economics to Early Modern Game TheoryTHE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 499 2004Philip Mirowski No abstract is available for this article. [source] What Have you Done for me Lately?THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 518 2007Release of Information, Strategic Manipulation of Memories How should a rational agent (politician/employee/advertiser) release information in order to manipulate the memory imperfections of his forgetful assessor (electorate/supervisor/consumer)? This article attempts to answer this question using a memory model based on the principles of recency, similarity and repetition. I show that the problem of a rational agent who releases information to a forgetful assessor can be modelled as a standard dynamic optimisation problem and we describe the properties of the optimal profile for releasing information. The theoretical results are applicable in a wide range of social and economic contexts, such as political campaigns, employee performance evaluations and advertising strategies. [source] The Doctrine of Triple Effect and Why a Rational Agent Need not Intend the Means to His End: Frances M. KammARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME, Issue 1 2000Frances M. Kamm In this article I am concerned with whether it could be morally significant to distinguish between doing something ,in order to bring about an effect' as opposed to ,doing something because we will bring about an effect'. For example, the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) tells us that we should not act in order to bring about evil, but even if this is true is it perhaps permissible to act only because an evil will thus occur? I discuss these questions in connection with a version of the so-called Trolley Problem known as the Loop Case. I also consider how these questions may bear on whether a rational agent must aim at an event which he believes is causally necessary to achieve an end he pursues. [source] BINGE BORROWERS OR RATIONAL CONSUMERS?ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Issue 1 2008THE FSA AND GOVERNMENT FAILURE The FSA seeks to address the putative financial incompetence of the borrowing public by improving its financial capability. The response of rational agents to asset price inflation in the UK is one indication of the competence with which many people use innovations in the financial services industry. The FSA succeeds only in shielding government failures in the money and housing markets. [source] Reasoning about emotional agentsINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS, Issue 6 2006John-Jules Ch. In this article we discuss the role of emotions in artificial agent design, and the use of logic in reasoning about the emotional or affective states an agent can reside in. We do so by extending the KARO framework for reasoning about rational agents appropriately. In particular, we formalize in this framework how emotions are related to the action monitoring capabilities of an agent. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Int J Int Syst 21: 601,619, 2006. [source] Primetime Spin: Media Bias and Belief Confirming InformationJOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 3 2008Jeremy Burke This paper develops a model of media bias in which rational agents acquire all their news from the source that is most likely to confirm their prior beliefs. Despite only wishing to make the correct decision, agents act as if they enjoy receiving news that supports their preconceptions. By exclusively gathering information from a source biased towards his prior, there is little chance an agent will be persuaded to change his mind. Moreover, it is shown that even an unbiased agent prefers to receive biased news as it is unlikely to produce conflicting reports. The media caters to the informational demands of consumers and accordingly slants its reporting. It is shown that competition may not decrease bias, but may actually enhance it. Finally, even when it increases bias, competition may improve welfare by expanding the market for news. [source] Return Dynamics when Persistence is UnobservableMATHEMATICAL FINANCE, Issue 4 2001Timothy C. Johnson This paper proposes a new theory of the sources of time-varying second (and higher) moments in financial time series. The key idea is that fully rational agents must infer the stochastic degree of persistence of fundamental shocks. Endogenous changes in their uncertainty determine the evolution of conditional moments of returns. The model accounts for the principal observed features of volatility dynamics and implies some new ones. Most strikingly, it implies a relationship between ex post trends, or momentum, and changes in volatility. [source] RESPECTING HUMAN DIGNITY: CONTRACT VERSUS CAPABILITIESMETAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 3-4 2009CYNTHIA A. STARK Abstract: There appears to be a tension between two commitments in liberalism. The first is that citizens, as rational agents possessing dignity, are owed a justification for principles of justice. The second is that members of society who do not meet the requirements of rational agency are owed justice. These notions conflict because the first commitment is often expressed through the device of the social contract, which seems to confine the scope of justice to rational agents. So, contractarianism seems to ignore the justice claims of the severely cognitively impaired. To solve this problem, Martha Nussbaum proposes the capabilities approach. The justifiability condition, on this approach, is met by the idea of overlapping consensus. This essay argues that overlapping consensus cannot meet liberalism's justifiability condition, nor is it more inclusive of the cognitively impaired. Therefore, we have reason to retain the contract device and look for another way to ensure that liberalism respects the justice claims of all. [source] Universalizability for Collective Rational Agents: A Critique of AgentrelativismPHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH, Issue 1 2005MICHAEL RIDGE This paper contends that a Kantian universalizability constraint on theories of practical reason in conjunction with the possibility of collective rational agents entails the surprisingly strong conclusion that no fully agent-relative theory of practical reason can be sound. The basic point is that a Kantian universalizability constraint, the thesis that all reasons for action are agent-relative and the possibility of collective rational agents gives rise to a contradiction. This contradiction can be avoided by either rejecting Kantian universalizability, the possibility of collective rational agents, or the tenability of a fully agent-relative theory of practical reason; we cannot have all three. [source] The Efficiency Principle in Non-Cooperative Coalitional BargainingTHE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 1 2000Akira Okada Applying the non-cooperative theory of coalitional bargaining, I examine a widely held view in economic literature that an efficient outcome can be agreed on in voluntary bargaining among rational agents in the absence of transaction costs. While this view is not always true, owing to the strategic formation of subcoalitions, I show that it can hold under the possibility of successive renegotiations of agreements. Renegotiation may, however, motivate bargainers to form a subcoalition first and to exploit the first-mover rent. This strategic behaviour in the process of renegotiation may distort the equity of an agreement. JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C78, D23, D61, D63. [source] | |||||||||||||