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Radical Proposals (radical + proposal)
Selected AbstractsRevamping Pentecostal Evangelism: Appropriating Walter J. Hollenweger's Radical ProposalINTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF MISSION, Issue 382-383 2007Tony Richie As the Christian Church endeavours to be faithful to its evangelistic mission, increasingly intense problems arise in international contexts of cultural diversity and religious plurality. Pentecostal, noted for "aggressive evangelism", are frequently at the forefront of such negative encounters. Walter J. Hollenweger offers Pentecostals a complementary paradigm of "dialogical evangelism" that is sensitive to this situation without stilling the voice of evangelism. The present project overviews Hollenweger's "radical proposal" and traditional Pentecostal evangelism and its current trends before assessing their compatibility or contradictoriness and exploring possible appropriation. [source] MORAL PERCEPTION AND THE CAUSAL OBJECTIONRATIO, Issue 3 2010Justin P. McBrayer One of the primary motivations behind moral anti-realism is a deep-rooted scepticism about moral knowledge. Moral realists attempt counter this worry by sketching a plausible moral epistemology. One of the most radical proposals in the recent literature is that we know moral facts by perception , we can literally see that an action is wrong, etc. A serious objection to moral perception is the causal objection. It is widely conceded that perception requires a causal connection between the perceived and the perceiver. But, the objection continues, we are not in appropriate causal contact with moral properties. Therefore, we cannot perceive moral properties. This papers demonstrates that the causal objection is unsound whether moral properties turn out to be secondary, natural properties; non-secondary, natural properties; or non-natural properties.1 [source] Stems, nodes, crown clades, and rank-free lists: is Linnaeus dead?BIOLOGICAL REVIEWS, Issue 4 2000MICHAEL J. BENTON ABSTRACT Recent radical proposals to overhaul the methods of biological classification are reviewed. The proposals of phylogenetic nomenclature are to translate cladistic phylogenies directly into classifications, and to define taxon names in terms of clades. The method has a number of radical consequences for biologists: taxon names must depend rigidly on the particular cladogram favoured at the moment, familiar names may be reassigned to unfamiliar groupings, Linnaean category terms (e.g. phylum, order, family) are abandoned, and the Linnaean binomen (e.g. Homo sapiens) is abandoned. The tenets of phylogenetic nomenclature have gained strong support among some vocal theoreticians, and rigid principles for legislative control of clade names and definitions have been outlined in the PhyloCode. The consequences of this semantic maelstrom have not been worked out. In practice, phylogenetic nomenclature will be disastrous, promoting confusion and instability, and it should be abandoned. It is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the difference between a phylogeny(which is real) and a classification (which is utilitarian). Under the new view, classifications are identical to phylogenies, and so the proponents of phylogenetic nomenclature will end up abandoning classifications altogether. [source] | ||||||||||