Property Rights Protection (property + right_protection)

Distribution by Scientific Domains


Selected Abstracts


Property Rights Protection of Biotechnology Innovations

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 4 2005
Diana M. Burton
Protection of intellectual property embedded in self-replicating biological innovations, such as genetically modified seed, presents two problems for the innovator: the need for copy protection of intellectual property and price competition between new seed and reproduced seed. We consider three regimes in two periods with asymmetric information: short-term contracts, biotechnological protection, and long-term contracts. We find that piracy imposes more intense competition for seed sales than does durability alone. Technology protection systems yield highest firm profit and long-term contracts outperform short-term contracts. Farmers prefer, in order, long-term, short-term, and biotechnical protection. Depending on monitoring cost, long-term contracts may be socially preferred to short-term contracts, with both preferred to biotechnical protection. [source]


Property rights protection and access to bank loans

THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION, Issue 4 2006
Evidence from private enterprises in China
D23; O16 and P23 Abstract Poor protection of private property has limited the access to bank loans by private enterprises in developing and transition economies. Under those circumstances, private entrepreneurs have resorted to various ways of enhancing the de facto protection of private property. Using a dataset of 3,073 private enterprises in China, this paper empirically investigates the impact of political participation and philanthropic activities , informal substitutes for the lack of formal protection of private property , on the access to bank loans. [source]


The influence of foreign direct investment on contracting confidence in developing countries

REGULATION & GOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2008
John S. Ahlquist
Abstract This paper examines whether foreign direct investment (FDI) influences confidence in commercial contracts in developing countries. While the research on how host countries' policy environments encourage FDI inflows has flourished, scholars have paid less attention to how the policy environment and local actors' beliefs might, in turn, be affected by FDI. This is surprising because multinational enterprises are well-recognized political and economic actors across the world. We expect that their increasing economic salience will influence the policy environments in which they function. By employing an innovative measure of property rights protection , contract-intensive money , we examine how foreign direct investment influences host countries' contract-intensive money ratio in a large panel time series of both developed and developing countries from 1980 to 2002. Our analysis suggests that higher levels of FDI inflows are associated with greater confidence in commercial contracts and, by extension, the protection of property rights in developing countries. [source]


ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES: A HOBBESIAN SOCIAL CONTRACT APPROACH

DEVELOPING WORLD BIOETHICS, Issue 2 2005
RICHARD E. ASHCROFT
ABSTRACT Medicines that are vital for the saving and preserving of life in conditions of public health emergency or endemic serious disease are known as essential medicines. In many developing world settings such medicines may be unavailable, or unaffordably expensive for the majority of those in need of them. Furthermore, for many serious diseases (such as HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis) these essential medicines are protected by patents that permit the patent-holder to operate a monopoly on their manufacture and supply, and to price these medicines well above marginal cost. Recent international legal doctrine has placed great stress on the need to globalise intellectual property rights protections, and on the rights of intellectual property rights holders to have their property rights enforced. Although international intellectual property rights law does permit compulsory licensing of protected inventions in the interests of public health, the use of this right by sovereign states has proved highly controversial. In this paper I give an argument in support of states' sovereign right to expropriate private intellectual property in conditions of public health emergency. This argument turns on a social contract argument for the legitimacy of states. The argument shows, further, that under some circumstances states are not merely permitted compulsory to license inventions, but are actually obliged to do so, on pain of failure of their legitimacy as sovereign states. The argument draws freely on a loose interpretation of Thomas Hobbes's arguments in his Leviathan, and on an analogy between his state of War and the situation of public health disasters. [source]