Product Liability (product + liability)

Distribution by Scientific Domains


Selected Abstracts


Product Liability: Beyond Class Action

AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 4 2000
Dan Sasaki
Can punitive product liability enhance economic efficiency? A very simple economic theory, assuming that the probability and the degree of product dissatisfaction are functions only of the producer's not of the consumer's effort, is modelled and analysed in this paper. The qualitative conclusion hinges critically upon whether the legal liability is reflected on price determination. If the price of the product is insensitive to product liability legislation, then punitive liability beyond the class action (i.e., compensatory payments more than proportional representation of potentially dissatisfied consumers) can induce socially desirable levels of effort exerted by the producer firm. This affirmative effect disappears if the price fully reflects all the expected legal liabilities, whereby punitive liability tends to reduce economic efficiency by encouraging costly lawsuit. [source]


Policy interventions to reduce the harm from smoking

ADDICTION, Issue 1s1 2000
Peter Anderson
The other papers in this series on reduced smoking discuss interventions focused on individuals. This paper illustrates possible smoking reduction interventions focused on policies rather than individuals. Target 12 of the new WHO Health For All Policy aims to significantly reduce the harm from addictive substances, including tobacco, in all member states by 2015, and the WHO Third Action Plan for Tobacco-Free Europe focuses on reducing the harm from tobacco. These documents recommend five key policy strategies: market regulation, product liability, smoke-free environments, support for smoking cessation and education, public information and public opinion. Interventions such as price increases, restricting availability, advertising bans and product control could all be used to achieve harm reduction. Research on reducing the harm of smoking needs to include policy as well as treatment research. [source]


Characterized by conciliation: Here's how business can use apology to diffuse litigation

ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGATION, Issue 7 2008
Michael B. Rainey
In Part II of their update on the use of apology in ADR, Michael B. Rainey, of Malibu, Calif., Kit Chan, of Montebello, Calif., and Judith Begin, of Los Angeles, look at specific business examples in health care, product liability, and pharmaceuticals [source]


Improving product instruction compliance: "If you tell me why, I might comply"

PSYCHOLOGY & MARKETING, Issue 3 2004
Valerie A. Taylor
Although prior research into product instructions has been limited to investigating the effect of warnings such that people might avoid possible product dangers by heeding warnings, this research considers methods of improving consumer product instruction compliance when noncompliance with a product instruction does not necessarily lead to a hazardous situation. In particular, this research investigates the impact of providing instructions that specify the process by which compliance with the instructions will lead to the desired end state (e.g., product outcome), called process-cause information. The results of a first field experiment indicate that intention to comply with product instructions is enhanced when people are told how compliance with the instructions will lead to the desired outcome (i.e., when process-cause information is included in a product instruction). This finding is substantiated by results of a follow-up laboratory experiment where subject compliance with an instruction-based behavior was observed. The importance of the present research is discussed in terms of the potential impacts on customer satisfaction, service recovery, product returns, product liability, and warranties. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals. [source]


Product Liability: Beyond Class Action

AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 4 2000
Dan Sasaki
Can punitive product liability enhance economic efficiency? A very simple economic theory, assuming that the probability and the degree of product dissatisfaction are functions only of the producer's not of the consumer's effort, is modelled and analysed in this paper. The qualitative conclusion hinges critically upon whether the legal liability is reflected on price determination. If the price of the product is insensitive to product liability legislation, then punitive liability beyond the class action (i.e., compensatory payments more than proportional representation of potentially dissatisfied consumers) can induce socially desirable levels of effort exerted by the producer firm. This affirmative effect disappears if the price fully reflects all the expected legal liabilities, whereby punitive liability tends to reduce economic efficiency by encouraging costly lawsuit. [source]