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Private Market (private + market)
Selected AbstractsECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SMOKING BANS ON RESTAURANTS AND PUBSECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Issue 4 2008Barrie Craven The United Kingdom has recently enacted smoking bans in public places such as restaurants and pubs. Public health advocates argue that bans are necessary because non-smokers need protection from second-hand smoke. Advocates also claim that bans do not exert harm on owners because of a vast empirical literature showing that restaurants and bars in the United States never suffer harm following bans. This paper examines whether these claims are true by developing a model within the Coasian framework whereby owners of businesses have incentives to deal with smoking disputes between smokers and non-smokers. Our model demonstrates that it is incorrect to argue that smoking bans are necessary because the private market has no method of attempting to solve smoking problems. It also predicts that bans exert different effects on different businesses: some will be unaffected while others will experience losses or gains. Our literature review reveals that predictions of differential effects are consistent with the empirical evidence. [source] The Private Market for Long-Term Care Insurance in the United States: A Review of the EvidenceJOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE, Issue 1 2009Jeffrey R. Brown This article reviews the growing literature on the market for private long-term care insurance, a market notable for its small size despite the fact that long-term care expenses are potentially large and highly uncertain. After summarizing long-term care utilization and insurance coverage in the United States, the article reviews research on the supply of and the demand for private long-term care insurance. It concludes that demand-side factors impose important limits on the size of the private market and that we currently have a limited understanding of how public policies could be designed to encourage the growth of this market. [source] The Marketization of the Nonprofit Sector: Civil Society at Risk?PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, Issue 2 2004Angela M. Eikenberry The public sector has increasingly adopted the methods and values of the market to guide policy creation and management. Several public administration scholars in the United States have pointed out the problems with this, especially in relation to the impact on democracy and citizenship. Similarly, nonprofit organizations are adopting the approaches and values of the private market, which may harm democracy and citizenship because of its impact on nonprofit organizations' ability to create and maintain a strong civil society. This article reviews the major marketization trends occurring within the nonprofit sector,commercial revenue generation, contract competition, the influence of new and emerging donors, and social entrepreneurship,and surveys research on their potential impact on nonprofit organizations' contributions to civil society. The article ends with a discussion of the significance of marketization in the nonprofit sector for public administration scholars and public managers. [source] The Politics of Choice and Competition in Public ServicesTHE POLITICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 2 2007JULIAN LE GRAND The politics of choice and competition in public services are complex. Only public service users seem basically to want choice. Providers prefer alternative models of service delivery especially those that rely upon trust. Social democrats prefer voice and trust; conservatives want choice and competition to be exercised in the context of a full private market. Yet, so long as they are properly designed, policies aimed at promoting choice and competition can serve the interests of all these groups better than the alternatives. [source] Moonlighting: public service and private practiceTHE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2007Gary Biglaiser We study job incentives in moonlighting, when public-service physicians may refer patients to their private practices. Some doctors in the public system are dedicated, and behave sincerely, but others,the moonlighters,are utility maximizers. Allowing moonlighting always enhances aggregate consumer welfare, but equilibrium public-care quality may increase or decrease; if quality increases, moonlighting improves each consumer's expected utility. Unregulated moonlighting may reduce consumer welfare as a result of adverse behavioral reactions, such as moonlighters shirking more and dedicated doctors abandoning their sincere behavior. Price regulation in the private market limits such adverse behaviors in the public system and improves consumer welfare. [source] | ||||||||||