			Home About us Contact

Principal

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	44%
Medical Sciences	19%
Life Sciences	11%
Humanities and Social Sciences	11%
Chemistry	5%
Engineering	2%
6 Other Domains	8%

Distribution within Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting

General & Introductory Economics	34%
Public Economics	11%
General & Introductory Finance & Investments	6%
17 Other Subdomains	49%

Terms modified by Principal

principal component analysis

principal component factor analysis

principal component regression

principal concern

principal coordinate

principal coordinate analysis

principal determinant

principal factor analysis

principal investigator

principal outcome measure

Selected Abstracts

INFORMATION GATHERING BY A PRINCIPAL,

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 4 2006
Ed Nosal
In the standard principal,agent model, the information structure is fixed. In this article the principal can choose to acquire additional information about the state of the world before he contracts with an agent. In the event that the principal acquires this information, the agent never learns what the principal knows about the state of the world. I examine cases where the agent can and cannot observe whether the principal has acquired the additional information. The implications for risk sharing, information acquisition, investment, and welfare are examined for both cases. [source]

ON THE PREFERENCES OF PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS

ECONOMIC INQUIRY, Issue 2 2010
MARCO CASTILLO
One of the reasons why market economies are able to thrive is that they exploit the willingness of entrepreneurs to take risks that laborers might prefer to avoid. Markets work because they remunerate good judgment and punish mistakes. Indeed, modern contract theory is based on the assumption that principals are less risk averse than agents. We investigate if the risk preferences of entrepreneurs are different from those of laborers by implementing experiments with a random sample of the population in a fast-growing, small-manufacturing, economic cluster. As assumed by theory, we find that entrepreneurs are more likely to take risks than hired managers. These results are robust to the inclusion of a series of controls. This lends support to the idea that risk preferences is an important determinant of selection into occupations. Finally, our lotteries are good predictors of financial decisions, thus giving support to the external validity of our risk measures and experimental methods (JEL C93, D81, D86). [source]

PRIVATIZATION AND EFFICIENCY: FROM PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS TO POLITICAL ECONOMY

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS, Issue 4 2008
Alberto Cavaliere
Abstract We survey the theoretical literature on privatization and efficiency by tracing its evolution from the applications of agency theory to recent contributions in the field of political economy. The former extend the theory of regulation with incomplete information to address privatization issues, comparing state-owned enterprises with private regulated firms. The benefits of privatization may derive either from the constraints it places on malevolent agents or from the impossibility of commitment by a benevolent government because of incomplete contracts. Contributions dealing with political economy issues separate privatization from restructuring decisions. They either explore bargaining between managers and politicians or analyse the impact of privatization shaped by political preferences on efficiency. The theoretical results regarding the relation between privatization and efficiency do not lead to any definitive conclusion. Privatization may increase productive efficiency when restructuring takes place whereas its effects on allocative efficiency still remain uncertain. [source]

Fair Offers in a Repeated Principal,Agent Relationship with Hidden Actions

ECONOMICA, Issue 286 2005
François Cochard
We test a repeated principal,agent relationship with hidden actions in the laboratory. At each period, the principal offers payments to the agent in order to induce him to provide the high effort level. The agent can accept or reject the offer; if he accepts it, he can choose the high or the low effort level. We observe that offered payments are higher than predicted by the subgame-perfect equilibrium, and higher in the partners' than in the strangers' design. Furthermore, agents strategically reject inequitable offers in early rounds in order to induce principals to increase payments in the subsequent rounds. [source]

Creative ways to empower action to change the organization: Cases in point

GLOBAL BUSINESS AND ORGANIZATIONAL EXCELLENCE, Issue 2 2003
John P. Kotter
In the Winter 2002 issue, the affiliation of Dan S. Cohen, co-author of the article, "Creative Ways To Empower Action To Change the Organization: Cases in Point" was incorrect. He is a Principal with Deloitte Consulting LLC. [source]

Functional source separation applied to induced visual gamma activity

HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING, Issue 2 2008
Giulia Barbati
Abstract Objective of this work was to explore the performance of a recently introduced source extraction method, FSS (Functional Source Separation), in recovering induced oscillatory change responses from extra-cephalic magnetoencephalographic (MEG) signals. Unlike algorithms used to solve the inverse problem, FSS does not make any assumption about the underlying biophysical source model; instead, it makes use of task-related features (functional constraints) to estimate source/s of interest. FSS was compared with blind source separation (BSS) approaches such as Principal and Independent Component Analysis, PCA and ICA, which are not subject to any explicit forward solution or functional constraint, but require source uncorrelatedness (PCA), or independence (ICA). A visual MEG experiment with signals recorded from six subjects viewing a set of static horizontal black/white square-wave grating patterns at different spatial frequencies was analyzed. The beamforming technique Synthetic Aperture Magnetometry (SAM) was applied to localize task-related sources; obtained spatial filters were used to automatically select BSS and FSS components in the spatial area of interest. Source spectral properties were investigated by using Morlet-wavelet time-frequency representations and significant task-induced changes were evaluated by means of a resampling technique; the resulting spectral behaviours in the gamma frequency band of interest (20,70 Hz), as well as the spatial frequency-dependent gamma reactivity, were quantified and compared among methods. Among the tested approaches, only FSS was able to estimate the expected sustained gamma activity enhancement in primary visual cortex, throughout the whole duration of the stimulus presentation for all subjects, and to obtain sources comparable to invasively recorded data. Hum Brain Mapp 29:131,141, 2008. © 2007 Wiley-Liss, Inc. [source]

Principal-Agent Problems in Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Hazards, Adverse Selection, and the Commitment Dilemma

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 4 2009
Robert W. Rauchhaus
A number of recent studies have concluded that humanitarian intervention can produce unintended consequences that reduce or completely undermine conflict management efforts. Some analysts have argued that the incentive structure produced by third parties is a form of moral hazard. This paper evaluates the utility of moral hazard theory and a second type of principal-agent problem known as adverse selection. Whereas moral hazards occur when an insured party has an opportunity to take hidden action once a contract is in effect, adverse selection is the result of asymmetric information prior to entering into a contract. Failing to distinguish between these two types of principal-agent problems may lead to policy advice that is irrelevant or potentially harmful. Along with introducing the concept of adverse selection to the debate on humanitarian intervention, this study identifies a commitment dilemma that explains why third parties operating in weakly institutionalized environments may be unable to punish groups that take advantage of intervention. [source]

Using Principal-Agent Theory to Deal with Output Slippage in the European Union Set-Aside Policy

JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2001
Rob Fraser
This paper proposes modifications to the existing EU set-aside policy which are designed to alleviate the problem of output slippage associated with heterogeneous land quality by using "incentive-compatible" mechanisms drawn from principal-agent theory. Specifically, it is suggested that there should be differential reference yields based on land quality to discourage the "adverse selection" of lower quality land for set-aside, and that the scope of set-aside monitoring should be expanded to include both the quantity and the quality of land set-aside so as to discourage "moral hazard" problems. The potential of these modifications is illustrated using a numerical analysis, which is also used to evaluate the role of a range of factors which determine the set-aside decision. Finally, an estimate of the "benefits" from reducing slippage required to justify the costs of including these modifications is provided. [source]

An investigation into the composition, complexity and functioning of snake communities in the mangroves of south-eastern Nigeria

AFRICAN JOURNAL OF ECOLOGY, Issue 3 2002
Luca Luiselli
Abstract The structure of the snake community was studied between 1996 and 2000 on a transect in the mangrove ecological zone of southern Nigeria, West Africa. In three major habitats, both taxonomical diversity and frequency of observations in relation to sampling effort were investigated. In general terms, the complexity of the snake community appeared less than in other habitats of the same geographic region (i.e. swamp forest and forest,plantation mosaics). In fact, only eighteen species were recorded, whereas 43 species are known to inhabit neighbouring habitats. A Principal Component Analysis allowed arrangement of the various species into two main groups in relation to the habitats of capture: (1) a group of species of rainforest biota (i.e. Toxicodryas blandingii, Thelotornis kirtlandii, Thrasops flavigularis, Rhamnophis aethiopissa, Gastropyxis smaragdina, Grayia smythii, Pseudohaje goldii, Python sebae), and (2) a group of species that, at least in Niger Delta, are typically linked to altered habitats, including derived savannas, plantations and suburbia (i.e. Psammophis cf. phillipsi, Philothamnus cf. nitidus, Hapsidophrys lineatus, Crotaphopeltis hotamboeia, Boaedon lineatus, Naja nigricollis, Python regius). The community structure in terms of food habits and body sizes appeared similar to those of other snake assemblages from different habitats of southern Nigeria. The conservation implications of our results are also discussed. Résumé On a étudié entre 1996 et 2000 la structure de la communauté des serpents dans un transect de la zone écologique de mangroves du sud du Nigeria, en Afrique de l'Ouest. On a étudié, dans trois habitats importants, la diversité taxonomique et la fréquence des observations par rapport à l'importance des échantillonnages. En termes généraux, la communauté des serpents y semblait moins complexe que dans d'autres habitats de la même région géographique (c.-à-d. la forêt marécageuse et une mosaïque de plantations forestières). En fait, on n'a rapporté que 18 espèces, alors qu'on sait que 43 espèces vivent dans les habitats voisins. Une Analyse du Composant Principal a permis de ranger les différentes espèces en deux groupes principaux, liés aux habitats où se sont faites les captures : (1) un groupe avec les espèces des biotes de forêt pluviale (Toxicodryas blandingii, Thelotornis kirtlandii, Thrasops flavigularis, Rhamnophis aethiopissa, Gastropyxis smaragdina, Grayia smythii, Pseudohaje goldii, Python sebae) et (2) un groupe d'espèces qui, au moins dans le delta du Niger, sont typiquement liées à des habitats dégradés, y compris des savanes dérivées, des plantations et des faubourgs urbains (Psammophis phillipsi, Philothamnus cf. nitidus, Hapsidophrys lineatus, Crotaphopeltis hotamboeia, Boaedon lineatus, Naja nigricollis, Python regius). La structure de la communauté, en ce qui concerne les habitudes alimentaires et la taille corporelle, était semblable à celle des autres groupes de serpents dans différents habitats du sud du Nigeria. On discute de l'implication de nos résultats pour la conservation. [source]

Diabetic neuropathies: components of etiology

JOURNAL OF THE PERIPHERAL NERVOUS SYSTEM, Issue 2 2008
David R. Tomlinson
Abstract This review examines the putative role of glucose in the etiology of diabetic neuropathies. Excessive glucose generates several secondary metabolic anomalies , principally oxidative stress (via both the polyol pathway and glucoxidation) and non-enzymic glycation of macromolecules. The latter is also facilitated by glucoxidation. These metabolic deviations trigger cellular responses that are inappropriate to normal function. Principal among these are neurotrophic deficits and phosphorylation of mitogen-activated protein kinases (MAPK). Downstream of these events are aberrant ion channel function and disordered gene expression, leading to changes in cellular phenotype. This leads directly to disordered nerve conduction, a recognised early clinical sign, and indirectly, via as yet undisclosed links, to sensory loss and axonopathy. Recent work also links MAPK activation to the development of neuropathic pain. [source]

A Price Is a Signal: on Intrinsic Motivation, Crowding-out, and Crowding-in

KYKLOS INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, Issue 1 2010
Friedel Bolle
SUMMARY If a previously unpaid activity (e.g. donating blood) is paid, then we often observe that this activity is reduced. In this paper, it is hypothesized that the price offered is taken as a proxy for the "value" of the activity. Depending on how the actor valued the activity previously, crowding-out or crowding-in is implied, an effect with or without persistence after stopping the payment. The model can be adapted to a number of similar situations, including those where a high price signals high costs instead of high values. Our "naïve" explanation is confronted with Bènabou and Tirole's (2003) Principal-Agent model. A questionnaire study supports our basic hypothesis as well as some of the derived consequences, and contradicts Bènabou and Tirole's model. [source]

Principal,Principal Conflict in the Governance of the Chinese Public Corporation

MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION REVIEW, Issue 1 2008
Yiyi Su
abstract By examining the level of ownership concentration across firms, we determine how principal,principal conflict, defined as the incongruence of ownership goals among shareholder groups in a corporation, impacts agency costs of Chinese boards of directors. Based on data from Chinese companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges during 1999,2003, we found that ownership concentration had a U-shaped relationship with board compensation, board size and the presence of independent directors. These results provide corroborating evidence that principal,principal conflict can lead to high agency costs. [source]

Principal-agent relationships on the stewardship-agency axis

NONPROFIT MANAGEMENT & LEADERSHIP, Issue 1 2006
Ralf Caers
This article provides an overview of the literature on nonprofit principal-agent relationships. It depicts the nature of agency theory and stewardship theory, analyzes the origin of their struggle within the nonprofit structure, and marks directions for a conciliatory approach. We open with an introduction to agency theory and discuss the two main components of its mathematical branch. We thereby contrast it with stewardship theory and elaborate on the arguments that can affect the position of nonprofit principal-agent relationships on the stewardship-agency axis. Analysis of the existing literature points to a lack of consensus as to which theory should be applied. We argue that the division of nonprofit principalagent relationships into board-manager and manageremployee interactions may help to clarify the balance between agency theory and stewardship theory and may lead to the establishment of a strongly founded theory on nonprofit principal-agent relationships. We close with a discussion of how this article may prove valuable to nonprofit policymakers and other empirical researchers. [source]

Principal,Agent Analysis with One Agent and Two Principals: European Union Trade Negotiations with South Africa

POLITICS & POLICY, Issue 3 2007
Magdalena Frennhoff Larsén
This article explores the utility of using principal,agent analysis,both at the level of the Commission and the European Union (EU) as a whole,to explain EU decision making in the negotiations between the European Union and South Africa that led to the Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement of 1999. The article argues that the internal Commission negotiations, which are often overlooked in analyses of EU trade negotiations, need to be analyzed. It demonstrates that both the initial EU agenda and the final agreement with South Africa were heavily influenced by those Directorates-General (DGs) most affected by these policy decisions. Moreover, the EU negotiators, who had developmental interests because of their location within DG Development, were particularly influential. [source]

To Manage Is to Govern

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, Issue 5 2002
Martha S. Feldman
Governance structures constrain and enable the actions of public managers. Principal,agent theory has played a dominant role in our understanding of governance structures. This theory suggests that politicians create relatively static governance structures in a top,down fashion and hold managers accountable for mandated results. In other words, public managers are influenced by governance structures but do not affect governance structures. However, we argue that public managers do affect governance structures, and, in order to understand how this influence takes place, we need a new way of thinking about governance structures. We propose thinking about governance structures as relationships created through the interactions of people in different and reciprocal roles that are relatively dynamic. Public managers are an important source of the multiple, reciprocal, and dynamic interactions that produce governance (relationship) structures. As such, managers are accountable not only for policy outcomes, but also for the appropriateness of the relationships they create and support. [source]

A Note on Efficiency Wage Theory and Principal,Agent Theory

BULLETIN OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Issue 3 2006
Uwe Jirjahn
J41; J33; D82 Abstract Why are principal,agent models used in some circumstances and efficiency wage models in others? In this note, it is argued that efficiency wages provide incentives based on an evaluation of the agent's input, while the incentives analysed in principal,agent models rely on the agent's output. The choice between the two incentive schemes depends on the probability that the agent is caught shirking. Moreover, we demonstrate that a combination of input- and output-related elements provides stronger incentives than payment schemes based on merely one of these elements. However, the combination requires a more complex labour contract involving an increased cost of writing the contract. The interaction between this transaction cost and a hiring cost is analysed. [source]

Barriers to brand building in UK universities?

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR MARKETING, Issue 1 2007
Chris Chapleo
Branding in universities has become an increasingly topical issue with practitioners, with some institutions committing substantial financial resources to branding activities. It has, however, received only limited academic investigation, and as the particular characteristics of the sector present challenges for those seeking to build brands, it seems to be timely and appropriate to investigate potential barriers to branding. This exploratory study investigates the opinions of the ,brand guardians' of UK universities,Vice Chancellors, Principals and Rectors,on the barriers to successfully building brands and draws conclusions on their views of the key challenges facing successful branding activity in the sector. Implications for practitioners are also explored. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Follow-Up Comparisons of Intervention and Comparison Schools in a State Tobacco Prevention and Control Initiative

JOURNAL OF SCHOOL HEALTH, Issue 3 2006
Phyllis Gingiss
The intervention, which was funded through the Texas Department of State Health Services, consisted of guidance, training, technical assistance, and reimbursement of approximately $2000 per year for program expenses. Self-administered written surveys for Principals and Health Coordinators, based on the School Health Education Profile Tobacco Module, were designed for periodic assessment of the status of school programs. Surveys were sent in 2002 to intervention (n = 74) and comparison (n = 60) schools. Response to the Principal Survey was received from 109 (81%) schools, and response to the Health Coordinator Survey was received from 84 (63%) schools. Survey analysis showed that intervention schools more frequently (p , .05) reported: (1) being extremely or moderately active in student cessation support, teacher training, policy development, family involvement, and assessment of the prevention program; (2) using recommended curricula, offering more tobacco-related lessons, involving more teachers, and using more recommended teaching methods such as role-playing, simulations or practice, and peer educators; and (3) having more interest in staff development and more funding to purchase release time. Similarities across schools are provided, as well as recommendations for future planning. (J Sch Health. 2006;76(3):98-103) [source]

Principals in Practice: The Importance of Mentorship in the Early Stages of Career Development

LAW & POLICY, Issue 1 2009
FIONA M. KAY
In this article we empirically assess the benefits of mentorship across a diverse range of extrinsic and intrinsic career rewards. Using an integrated model, we investigate the ways in which characteristics of the organization, as well as characteristics of both protégés and mentors affect the outcomes of mentoring relationships. Our study includes two samples: new law school graduates and a more seasoned cohort of established lawyers. Our results reveal the unique contributions of career and psychosocial mentor functions to early and established careers, as well as the substantial rewards of informal and multiple mentors to the career paths of professionals. [source]

Principal,Agent Analysis with One Agent and Two Principals: European Union Trade Negotiations with South Africa

Creating Value Through Corporate Governance

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2002
Robert A.G. Monks
Value and governance are such familiar words that we do not often enough reflect on their meanings in a specific situation. This paper will suggest: Value is in the eye of the beholder. The appearance of governance may be preferable to the real thing. In order better to understand value, we will work with a simple question , is it appropriate for a global investor to purchase common shares in Volkswagen? There are many kinds of shareholder, each with distinctive interests that are not always compatible with the interests of the other investors. A global investor is typically the trustee of a pension plan with the simple obligation to collateralise the pension promise by maximising the long,term value of trust assets. The beneficiaries of pension funds are not rich people. Fluctuations in market values are no longer primarily a question as to whether rich people are a bit richer or poorer, they are a question as to whether pensions will be paid to the roughly half of the population of the OECD world who have interests in employee benefit plans. This makes investment a matter of social and political concern. At the end of our trip through the mythology and prospects for adding value to corporate enterprises through effective governance, we come to a very simple conclusion. I bastardise a celebrated principal of physics to conclude that both in science and in business a watched particle behaves differently than one that is not watched. "An observed board behaves differently" and is more likely to generate value for corporate owners. [source]

Supply Management Under High Goal Incongruence: An Empirical Examination of Disintermediation in the Aerospace Supply Chain

DECISION SCIENCES, Issue 3 2008
Christian L. Rossetti
ABSTRACT Aftermarket sales and profits are becoming an increasingly important part of an original equipment manufacturer's (OEM) business model. Because replacement parts often do not require further manufacturing, OEMs act as intermediaries in the aftermarket. As with any intermediary, the OEM must concern itself with suppliers disintermediating its supply chain selling replacement parts directly to the OEM's customers. We frame supply chain disintermediation (SCD) as a principal,agent contracting problem between an OEM buyer and a supplier. Hypotheses relate contract conditions, goal incongruence, supplier capabilities and contract enforcement to SCD. The data are collected from the aerospace industry using a multimethod study, combining an Internet-based survey with archival data. Causal modeling with structural equation modeling (SEM) shows general support for the hypotheses. Particularly, SCD is positively related to buyer,supplier goal incongruence. The agency model offers insights that differ from previous transaction-cost-based models of buyer,supplier relationships. OEM buyers with a lucrative aftermarket should consider aligning goals through incentives rather than relying entirely on economic hostages associated with specific assets. [source]

Channel Coordination for a Supply Chain with a Risk-Neutral Manufacturer and a Loss-Averse Retailer,

DECISION SCIENCES, Issue 3 2007
Charles X. Wang
ABSTRACT This articles considers a decentralized supply chain in which a single manufacturer is selling a perishable product to a single retailer facing uncertain demand. It differs from traditional supply chain contract models in two ways. First, while traditional supply chain models are based on risk neutrality, this article takes the viewpoint of behavioral principal,agency theory and assumes the manufacturer is risk neutral and the retailer is loss averse. Second, while gain/loss (GL) sharing is common in practice, there is a lack of analysis of GL-sharing contracts in the supply chain contract literature. This article investigates the role of a GL-sharing provision for mitigating the loss-aversion effect, which drives down the retailer order quantity and total supply chain profit. We analyze contracts that include GL-sharing-and-buyback (GLB) credit provisions as well as the special cases of GL contracts and buyback contracts. Our analytical and numerical results lend insight into how a manufacturer can design a contract to improve total supply chain, manufacturer, and retailer performance. In particular, we show that there exists a special class of distribution-free GLB contracts that can coordinate the supply chain and arbitrarily allocate the expected supply chain profit between the manufacturer and retailer; in contrast with other contracts, the parameter values for contracts in this class do not depend on the probability distribution of market demand. This feature is meaningful in practice because (i) the probability distribution of demand faced by a retailer is typically unknown by the manufacturer and (ii) a manufacturer can offer the same contract to multiple noncompeting retailers that differ by demand distribution and still coordinate the supply chains. [source]

The Politics of Service Delivery Reform

DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE, Issue 1 2004
Richard Batley
This article identifies the leaders, the supporters and the resisters of public service reform. It adopts a principal,agent framework, comparing reality with an ,ideal' situation in which citizens are the principals over political policy-makers as their agents, and policy-makers are the principals over public service officials as their agents. Reform in most developing countries is complicated by an additional set of external actors , international financial institutions and donors. In practice, international agencies and core government officials usually act as the ,principals' in the determination of reforms. The analysis identifies the interests involved in reform, indicating how the balance between them is affected by institutional and sectoral factors. Organizational reforms, particularly in the social sectors, present greater difficulties than first generation economic policy reforms. [source]

Conditional ablation of neurones in transgenic mice

DEVELOPMENTAL NEUROBIOLOGY, Issue 3 2001
Anthony R. Isles
Abstract Conditional targeted ablation of specific cell populations in living transgenic animals is a very powerful strategy to determine cell functions in vivo. This approach would be of particular value to study the functions of distinct neuronal populations; however, the transgene of choice for conditional cell ablation studies in mice, the herpes simplex virus thymidine kinase gene, cannot be used to ablate neurones as its principal mode of action relies on cell proliferation. Here we report that expression of the E.coli nitroreductase gene (Ntr) and metabolism of the prodrug CB1954 (5-aziridin-1-yl-2-4-dinitrobenzamide) to its cytotoxic derivative can be used to conditionally and acutely ablate specific neuronal populations in vivo. As proof of principal, we have ablated olfactory and vomeronasal receptor neurones by expressing Ntr under the control of the olfactory marker protein (OMP) gene promoter. We demonstrate that following CB1954 administration, olfactory and vomeronasal receptor neurones expressing the transgene were selectively eliminated from the olfactory epithelium (OE), and projections to the olfactory bulb (OB) were lost. The functional efficacy of cell ablation was demonstrated using a highly sensitive behavioural test to show that ablated mice had lost the olfactory ability to discriminate distinct odors and were consequently rendered anosmic. Targeted expression of Ntr to specific neuronal populations using conventional transgenes, as described here, or by "knock-in" gene targeting using embryonic stem cells may be of significant value to address the functions of distinct neuronal populations in vivo. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. J Neurobiol 47: 183,193, 2001 [source]

A recursive decomposition algorithm for network seismic reliability evaluation

EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING AND STRUCTURAL DYNAMICS, Issue 8 2002
Jie Li
Abstract A new probabilistic analytical approach to evaluate seismic system reliability of large lifeline systems is presented in this paper. The algorithm takes the shortest path from the source to the terminal of a node weight or edge weight network as decomposition policy, using the Boolean laws of set operation and probabilistic operation principal, a recursive decomposition process then could be constructed. For a general weight network, the modified Torrieri method (NTR/T method) is introduced to combine with the suggested algorithm. Therefore, the recursive decomposition algorithm may be applied to evaluate the seismic reliability of general lifeline systems. A series of case studies, including a practical district electric power network system and a large urban water supply system, show that the suggested algorithm supplies a useful probabilistic analysis means for the seismic reliability evaluation of large lifeline systems. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities

ECONOMETRICA, Issue 3 2003
Ilya Segal
The paper studies bilateral contracting between one principal and N agents when each agent's utility depends on the principal's unobservable contracts with other agents. We show that allowing deviations to menu contracts from which the principal chooses bounds equilibrium outcomes in a wide class of bilateral contracting games without imposing ad hoc restrictions on the agents' beliefs. This bound yields, for example, competitive convergence as N ,, in environments in which an appropriately-defined notion of competitive equilibrium exists. We also examine the additional restrictions arising in two common bilateral contracting games: the "offer game" in which the principal makes simultaneous offers to the agents, and the "bidding game" in which the agents make simultaneous offers to the principal. [source]

Regional Monopoly and Interregional and Intraregional Competition: The Parallel Trade in Coca-Cola Between Shanghai and Hangzhou in China

ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY, Issue 1 2006
Godfrey Yeung
Abstract: This article uses a "principal-agent-subagent" analytical framework and data that were collected from field surveys in China to (1) investigate the nature and causes of the parallel trade in Coca-Cola between Shanghai and Hangzhou and (2) assess the geographic and theoretical implications for the regional monopolies that have been artificially created by Coca-Cola in China. The parallel trade in Coca-Cola is sustained by its intraregional rivalry with Pepsi-Cola in Shanghai, where Coca-Cola (China) (the principal) seeks to maximize its share of the Shanghai soft-drinks market. This goal effectively supersedes the market-division strategy of Coca-Cola (China), since the gap in wholesale prices between the Shanghai and Hangzhou markets is higher than the transaction costs of engaging in parallel trade. The exclusive distributor of Coca-Cola in the Shanghai market (the subagent) makes opportunistic use of a situation in which it does not have to bear the financial consequences of the major residual claimants (the principal and other agents) and has an incentive to enter the nondesignated Coca-Cola market of Hangzhou by crossing the geographic boundary between the two regional monopolies devised by Coca-Cola. The existence of parallel trade in Coca-Cola promotes interregional competition between the Shanghai and Hangzhou bottlers (the agents). This article enhances an understanding of the economic geography of spatial equilibrium, disequilibrium, and quasi-equilibrium of a transnational corporation's distribution system and its artificially created market boundary in China. [source]

From privatized to government-administered tax collection: tax farming in eighteenth-century France1

ECONOMIC HISTORY REVIEW, Issue 4 2004
EUGENE N. WHITE
The establishment of a government bureaucracy to collect taxes is regarded as one of the essential features of a modern economy. While Britain is considered a pioneer, France has been treated as a laggard because of continued reliance on tax farming. Focusing on the largest tax farm, France's late transition from private to government tax collection is explained in a principal-agent context by the difficulties of monitoring employees and borrowing at low cost in the capital market. Tax farmers continued to earn high returns, absorbing the risk of fluctuating collections, leaving the Crown with lower revenue. [source]