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Price Reaction (price + reaction)
Kinds of Price Reaction Selected AbstractsStock Price Reactions to the Repricing of Employee Stock Options,CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 4 2005Barbara M. Grein Abstract We study whether the repricing of employee stock options is in the best interests of common shareholders by examining the excess stock returns associated with timely, noncontamin-ated repricing announcements made by Canadian firms. On the basis of three theories of why firms reprice, we develop competing predictions about the mean announcement-date excess stock return and the cross-sectional relations among excess stock returns, the estimated probability of repricing, and proxies for predictions from each theory. For a sample of 72 noncontaminated repricing announcements made by Canadian firms between November 1994 and July 2001, we find a reliably positive three-day announcement-date mean excess return of 4.9 percent. The results of our cross-sectional analyses suggest that the market responds favorably to repricings because they assist in retaining key employees even though, at the margin, they enable managers to extract rents from shareholders. We do not find sufficient statistically significant evidence to reliably conclude that repricings are done to realign employee incentives. [source] Resource Allocation Effects of Price Reactions to Disclosures,CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 3 2002Ronald A. Dye Abstract Capital market participants collectively may possess information about the valuation implications of a firm's change in strategy not known by the management of the firm proposing the change. We ask whether a firm's management can exploit the capital market's information in deciding either whether to proceed with a contemplated strategy change or whether to continue with a previously initiated strategy change. In the case of a proposed strategy change, we show that managers can extract the capital market's information by announcing a potential new strategy, and then conditioning the decision to implement the new strategy on the size of the market's price reaction to the announcement. Under this arrangement, we show that a necessary condition to implement all and only positive net present value strategy changes is that managers proceed to implement some strategies that garner negative price reactions upon their announcement. In the case of deciding whether to continue with a previously implemented strategy change, we show that it may be optimal for the firm to predicate its abandonment/continuation decision on the magnitude of the costs it has already incurred. Thus, what looks like "sunk-cost" behavior may in fact be optimal. Both demonstrations show that, in addition to performing their usual role of anticipating future cash flows generated by a manager's actions, capital market prices can also be used to direct a manager's actions. It follows that, in contrast to the usual depiction of the information flows between capital markets and firms as being one way , from firms to the capital markets , information also flows from capital markets to firms. [source] Corporate Governance, Audit Firm Reputation, Auditor Switches, and Client Stock Price Reactions: The Andersen ExperienceINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF AUDITING, Issue 3 2010Sharad C. Asthana The financial scandal surrounding the collapse of Enron caused erosion in the reputation of its auditor, Arthur Andersen, leading to concerns about Andersen's ability to continue in existence and ultimately to the firm's demise. In this paper we investigate the role of corporate governance on the timing of the auditor switch by former Andersen clients. After controlling for factors associated with switching costs, we find clients with strong corporate governance were more likely to switch early. We also find that clients switching from Andersen experienced positive abnormal returns during the three-day window surrounding the announcement of the switch. We attribute this positive response to the reduction in uncertainty associated with the cost of finding a new auditor. [source] Resource Allocation Effects of Price Reactions to Disclosures,CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 3 2002Ronald A. Dye Abstract Capital market participants collectively may possess information about the valuation implications of a firm's change in strategy not known by the management of the firm proposing the change. We ask whether a firm's management can exploit the capital market's information in deciding either whether to proceed with a contemplated strategy change or whether to continue with a previously initiated strategy change. In the case of a proposed strategy change, we show that managers can extract the capital market's information by announcing a potential new strategy, and then conditioning the decision to implement the new strategy on the size of the market's price reaction to the announcement. Under this arrangement, we show that a necessary condition to implement all and only positive net present value strategy changes is that managers proceed to implement some strategies that garner negative price reactions upon their announcement. In the case of deciding whether to continue with a previously implemented strategy change, we show that it may be optimal for the firm to predicate its abandonment/continuation decision on the magnitude of the costs it has already incurred. Thus, what looks like "sunk-cost" behavior may in fact be optimal. Both demonstrations show that, in addition to performing their usual role of anticipating future cash flows generated by a manager's actions, capital market prices can also be used to direct a manager's actions. It follows that, in contrast to the usual depiction of the information flows between capital markets and firms as being one way , from firms to the capital markets , information also flows from capital markets to firms. [source] TERRORISM AND THE RETURNS TO OILECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2009BROCK BLOMBERG The effect of terrorism on global oil prices has been largely explained through demand-side effects. We estimate an empirical model to re-examine the effect of terrorism on the price of global oil stocks across oil market regimes that reflect different supply constraints. We believe that terrorism will have larger impacts when global capacity is tight (i.e. when global demand is close to global supply). This means that any shock to capacity (say by conflict) should have the largest impact on profits before the first OPEC shock in the early 1970s. Since then, conflict shocks would not allow firms to exploit production in the same way, thus reducing the available profits that could be garnered by such production manipulation. If capacity constraints are binding when a conflict occurs, then we predict that a positive stock price reaction can be expected for oil firms from such a shock. We exploit a new panel dataset to investigate the relationship between oil profitability and conflict, using conflict data from the top 20 oil producing and exporting countries in the world. We show that in the later part of our sample, 1974,2005, as cartel behavior of OPEC member countries has diminished and as conflict has become more regular and thus the information surrounding it noisier, oil stock prices do not increase in response to conflict. However, in earlier capacity constrained eras, we find that oil stocks can in fact increase in response to conflict. In some cases, the impact of conflict may cause the return of oil stocks to increase by as much as 10 percentage points. [source] Shareholder Wealth Effects of European Domestic and Cross-border Takeover BidsEUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2004Marc Goergen G32; G34 Abstract This paper analyses the short-term wealth effects of large intra-European takeover bids. We find announcement effects of 9% for the target firms compared to a statistically significant announcement effect of only 0.7% for the bidders. The type of takeover bid has a large impact on the short-term wealth effects with hostile takeovers triggering substantially larger price reactions than friendly operations. When a UK firm is involved, the abnormal returns are higher than those of bids involving both a Continental European target and bidder. There is strong evidence that the means of payment in an offer has an impact on the share price. A high market-to-book ratio of the target leads to a higher bid premium, but triggers a negative price reaction for the bidding firm. We also investigate whether the predominant reason for takeovers is synergies, agency problems or managerial hubris. Our results suggest that synergies are the prime motivation for bids and that targets and bidders share the wealth gains. [source] On-market share buybacks, exercisable share options and earnings managementACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 1 2008Balasingham Balachandran G30; G32; M41 Abstract Chan et al. (2006b) suggest that managers might announce a share buyback to manipulate investors' perceptions and capitalize on the positive price reaction usually associated with the announcement. The incentive to do so is greater when managers have exercisable options. Prior studies document that managers engage in upwards earnings management for opportunistic reasons related to option holdings (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). We examine the association between earnings management and exercisable option holdings for buyback firms to investigate if earnings management in the pre-buyback period is greater for firms with equity incentives to increase share price. Our results, using 138 buybacks over the period 1996,2003, support our prediction. We find that buyback firms with both exercisable options that are in-the-money prior to the buyback announcement as well as options that are exercised in the buyback period have higher discretionary current accruals than buyback firms with no exercisable options, unexercised options or with out-of-the-money options. Overall, our results are consistent with buyback firms with exercisable options using earnings management and buyback announcements to maximize option payoffs, and buyback firms without exercisable options signalling undervaluation. [source] The Credibility of Voluntary Disclosure and Insider Stock TransactionsJOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 4 2007FENG GU ABSTRACT We examine stock price reaction to voluntary disclosure of innovation strategy by high-tech firms and its relation with insider stock transactions before the disclosure. We find that, despite the qualitative and subjective nature of strategy-related disclosure, there is positive stock price reaction to the disclosure. The evidence suggests that investors view the disclosure as credible good news. We also find that the disclosure is associated with more positive stock price reaction when it is preceded by insider purchase transactions. This evidence is consistent with insider purchase enhancing the credibility of the disclosure. The credibility-enhancing effect is found to be stronger for firms with higher degrees of information asymmetry (younger firms, firms with lower analyst following, loss firms, and firms with higher research and development (R&D) intensity). Our evidence also indicates that predisclosure insider purchase is associated with greater future abnormal returns, suggesting that managers are privy to good news shortly before the disclosure. [source] Are Banks Still Special?JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 1 2000New Evidence on Their Role in the Corporate Capital-Raising Process Bankers appear to play a special role in providing commitment-based financing to corporations. This type of lending is important not only for small firms that lack access to public debt markets but for large and medium-size companies as well. For such companies, commitment-based financing provides access to debt capital that becomes valuable when the firm has an immediate need for funding but interest rates in public debt markets are prohibitively high, or the firm is undervalued by the market. A good example of this was provided by the Asian crisis in the last quarter of 1998, when $10 billion of commercial paper was retired and $20 billion of net new commercial loans were booked. The authors also suggest that the fact that commitment-based financing is used by larger companies when they believe themselves to be undervalued in the market is probably the best explanation of why announcements of these types of loans elicit a positive stock price reaction. [source] The Multijurisdictional Disclosure System and Value of Equity OfferingsJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT & ACCOUNTING, Issue 1 2006Usha R. Mittoo The Canada and US multijurisdictional disclosure system (MJDS) implemented in 1991 lowered the indirect barriers for investors and issuers by easing reporting and disclosure requirements for cross-border issues. This paper examines the impact of the MJDS and related regulatory changes on Canada,US equity market segmentation using a sample of Canadian seasoned equity offerings in the 1991,1998 period. We find that the number of cross-border issues by Canadian firms increased, and the typical negative stock price reaction that accompanies seasoned equity issues declined over time, supporting increased integration between the two markets after the MJDS. We also document that cross-border issues experience about 1.4 per cent lower negative stock price reaction compared with domestic issues, consistent with Canada,US market segmentation. We find mixed support for Merton's (1987) investor recognition hypothesis. While Canadian firms cross-listed in the US experience a less adverse price reaction to their cross-border offerings compared with their non-US-listed peers, there is no significant difference between the two groups in the case of purely domestic issues. [source] Asymmetric asset price reaction to news and arbitrage riskREVIEW OF BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (ELECTRONIC), Issue 1-2 2009John A. Doukas Abstract This study documents that high book-to-market (value) and low book-to-market (glamour) stock prices react asymmetrically to both common and firm-specific information. Specifically, we find that value stock prices exhibit a considerably slow adjustment to both common and firm-specific information relative to glamour stocks. The results show that this pattern of differential price adjustment between value and glamour stocks is mainly driven by the high arbitrage risk borne by value stocks. The evidence is consistent with the arbitrage risk hypothesis, predicting that idiosyncratic risk, a major impediment to arbitrage activity, amplifies the informational loss of value stocks as a result of arbitrageurs' (informed investors) reduced participation in value stocks because of their inability to fully hedge idiosyncratic risk. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Financial Market Design and the Equity Premium: Electronic versus Floor TradingTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 6 2005PANKAJ K. JAIN ABSTRACT We assemble the announcement and actual introduction dates of electronic trading by the leading exchanges of 120 countries to examine the impact of automation, controlling for risk factors and economic conditions. Dividend growth models and international CAPM suggest a significant decline in the equity premium, especially in emerging markets. Consistent with this reduction in the equity premium in the long run, there is a positive short-term price reaction to the switch. Further analysis of trading turnover supports the notion that electronic trading enhances the liquidity and informativeness of stock markets, leading to a reduction in the cost of capital. [source] Price Pressure around MergersTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 1 2004Mark Mitchell ABSTRACT This paper examines the trading behavior of professional investors around 2,130 mergers announced between 1994 and 2000. We find considerable support for the existence of price pressure around mergers caused by uninformed shifts in excess demand, but that these effects are short-lived, consistent with the notion that short-run demand curves for stocks are not perfectly elastic. We estimate that nearly half of the negative announcement period stock price reaction for acquirers in stock-financed mergers reflects downward price pressure caused by merger arbitrage short selling, suggesting that previous estimates of merger wealth effects are biased downward. [source] DO TRACKING STOCKS REDUCE INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES?THE JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, Issue 2 2005AN ANALYSIS OF LIQUIDITY AND ADVERSE SELECTION Abstract A firm's announcement that it intends to restructure based on tracking stock is usually associated with a positive stock price reaction, at least in the short run. Typically, this reaction is attributed to expected reductions in a diversification discount, through reduced agency costs or information asymmetries. We reinvestigate this latter hypothesis by focusing on the liquidity provided by market makers before and after a firm issues a tracking stock. Our results suggest that such restructurings are not effective at reducing information asymmetries. Rather, firms that issue tracking stocks exhibit less liquidity and greater adverse selection than comparable control firms. [source] A FURTHER EXAMINATION OF THE PRICE AND VOLATILITY IMPACT OF STOCK DIVIDENDS AT EX-DATES,AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 3 2005BALASINGHAM BALACHANDRAN We examine the price and volatility reaction around stock dividend ex-dates for an Australian sample, over the period January 1992 to December 2000. We find that price reaction around stock dividend ex-dates provides positive abnormal returns both prior, and subsequent, to the abolishment of par value of shares in July 1998. When we partitioned the sample into financial, industrial non-financial and mining firms, the price reaction is found to be positive and significant only for industrial non-financial companies. Volatility of daily returns for periods subsequent to ex-dates is significantly greater than corresponding periods prior to announcement dates, while cumulative raw returns subsequent to ex-dates are significantly lower than periods prior to announcement dates for industrial non-financial companies. The magnitude of the price reaction is statistically significantly related to an increase in the volatility of daily returns and to a reduction in cumulative raw returns subsequent to the ex-dates, for industrial non-financial companies. These findings support buying pressure hypothesis suggested by Dhatt et al. (1994, 1996). [source] Resource Allocation Effects of Price Reactions to Disclosures,CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 3 2002Ronald A. Dye Abstract Capital market participants collectively may possess information about the valuation implications of a firm's change in strategy not known by the management of the firm proposing the change. We ask whether a firm's management can exploit the capital market's information in deciding either whether to proceed with a contemplated strategy change or whether to continue with a previously initiated strategy change. In the case of a proposed strategy change, we show that managers can extract the capital market's information by announcing a potential new strategy, and then conditioning the decision to implement the new strategy on the size of the market's price reaction to the announcement. Under this arrangement, we show that a necessary condition to implement all and only positive net present value strategy changes is that managers proceed to implement some strategies that garner negative price reactions upon their announcement. In the case of deciding whether to continue with a previously implemented strategy change, we show that it may be optimal for the firm to predicate its abandonment/continuation decision on the magnitude of the costs it has already incurred. Thus, what looks like "sunk-cost" behavior may in fact be optimal. Both demonstrations show that, in addition to performing their usual role of anticipating future cash flows generated by a manager's actions, capital market prices can also be used to direct a manager's actions. It follows that, in contrast to the usual depiction of the information flows between capital markets and firms as being one way , from firms to the capital markets , information also flows from capital markets to firms. [source] Shareholder Wealth Effects of European Domestic and Cross-border Takeover BidsEUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2004Marc Goergen G32; G34 Abstract This paper analyses the short-term wealth effects of large intra-European takeover bids. We find announcement effects of 9% for the target firms compared to a statistically significant announcement effect of only 0.7% for the bidders. The type of takeover bid has a large impact on the short-term wealth effects with hostile takeovers triggering substantially larger price reactions than friendly operations. When a UK firm is involved, the abnormal returns are higher than those of bids involving both a Continental European target and bidder. There is strong evidence that the means of payment in an offer has an impact on the share price. A high market-to-book ratio of the target leads to a higher bid premium, but triggers a negative price reaction for the bidding firm. We also investigate whether the predominant reason for takeovers is synergies, agency problems or managerial hubris. Our results suggest that synergies are the prime motivation for bids and that targets and bidders share the wealth gains. [source] The Importance of Board Quality in the Event of a CEO DeathFINANCIAL REVIEW, Issue 3 2006Kenneth A. Borokhovich G34 Abstract We examine board quality and executive replacement decisions around deaths of senior executives. Stock price reactions to executive deaths are positively related to board independence. Controlling for such factors as the deceased's stockholdings, outside blockholdings, board size, and whether the deceased was a founder, board independence is the most significant factor explaining abnormal returns. Board independence is particularly important when there is no apparent successor and firm performance is poor. The results are consistent with independent boards being reluctant to discipline poorly performing incumbent managers, but nevertheless using the opportunity of an executive death to improve the quality of management. [source] Event study concerning international bond price effects of credit rating actionsINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2001Manfred Steiner Abstract The influence of credit ratings on eurobond prices has been neglected for a long time. It is questionable whether non-US investors relate their investment decisions on US ratings and whether ratings from US agencies are relevant information sources for international capital markets. This paper examines daily excess eurobond returns associated with announcements of watchlistings and rating changes by Standard & Poor's and Moody's. Significant bond price reactions are observed for announcements of downgradings and negative watchlistings while upgradings and positive watchlistings do not cause announcement effects. Distinct from the results on national capital markets the international evidence shows that besides actual yield level and issuer type the issuer nationality is a key factor that determines the intensity of price reactions after downgrades. The price reaction is also significantly stronger for downgrades into speculative grade. This indicates, that the announcement effects can in part be explained by price pressure effects due to regulatory constraints rather than original information content of rating changes. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Share price reactions to advertising announcements and broadcast of media eventsMANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2009Greg Filbeck Over the last two decades, marketers have gravitated toward placing their ads in specific television programs such as the Super Bowl, Academy Awards, and the last episodes of sitcoms. While anecdotal evidence of positive outcomes in the form of increased sales, phone inquiries, and hits on the web sites of advertisers, there has not been any credible measurement of investor returns in this expensive strategy. We find that firms advertising for the first time, with greater advertising expenditures relative to sales, and with more effective/creative campaigns fare better in terms of the market reaction to their campaigns. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Presidential Address: Asset Price Dynamics with Slow-Moving CapitalTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 4 2010DARRELL DUFFIE ABSTRACT I describe asset price dynamics caused by the slow movement of investment capital to trading opportunities. The pattern of price responses to supply or demand shocks typically involves a sharp reaction to the shock and a subsequent and more extended reversal. The amplitude of the immediate price impact and the pattern of the subsequent recovery can reflect institutional impediments to immediate trade, such as search costs for trading counterparties or time to raise capital by intermediaries. I discuss special impediments to capital formation during the recent financial crisis that caused asset price distortions, which subsided afterward. After presenting examples of price reactions to supply shocks in normal market settings, I offer a simple illustrative model of price dynamics associated with slow-moving capital due to the presence of inattentive investors. [source] The Information Value of Bond RatingsTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 6 2000Doron Kliger We test whether bond ratings contain pricing-relevant information by examining security price reactions to Moody's refinement of its rating system, which was not accompanied by any fundamental change in issuers' risks, was not preceded by any announcement, and was carried simultaneously for all bonds. We find that rating information does not affect firm value, but that debt value increases (decreases) and equity value falls (rises) when Moody's announces better- (worse-) than-expected ratings. We also find that when Moody's announces better- (worse-) than-expected ratings, the volatilities implied by prices of options on the fine-rated issuers' shares decline (rise). [source] Stock Returns and Operating Performance of Securities IssuersTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, Issue 3 2002Gil S. Bae Abstract We examine long-run stock returns and operating performance around firms' offerings of common stock, convertible debt, and straight debt from 1985 to 1990. We find that pre-issue abnormal returns are positive and significant for stock issuers, but not for convertible and straight debt issuers. The post-issue mean returns show that common stock and convertible debt issuers experience underperformance during the post-issue periods, but straight debt issuers do not. Consistent with these results, common stock issuers experience the best pre-issue operating performance among all three types of issuers, and operating performance declines during the post-issue periods for common stock and convertible debt issuers. Using a new approach in linear model estimations to correct heteroskedasticity and to adjust for finite sample, we find a positive relation between post-issue operating performance and issue-period stock price reactions. The results suggest that future operating performance is anticipated at the issue and that securities issues provide information on issuers' future performance. [source] Financial Reporting by Business Groups and the Market's Ex ante Valuation of Tunneling: Evidence from Korean Chaebols,ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, Issue 4 2009Kwon-Jung Kim Abstract This study examines how the Korean stock market reacts to the release of group-level financial statements by Korean business groups (chaebols). I find that chaebol firms that perform relatively well (measured by ROE) within their group but whose controlling shareholders have low levels of cash-flow rights experience negative price reactions particularly when their group ROE is low. In contrast, chaebol firms whose controlling shareholders have high levels of cash-flow rights do not experience negative price reactions even when their group ROE is negative. These findings are consistent with the market anticipating that "tunneling" will occur in low-cash-flow-right firms, but not in high-cash-flow-right firms, to provide support to poorly performing firms. To corroborate these results, I also examine whether tunneling actually occurs within one year after the group-earnings announcements. I find that in many cases, resources of low-cash-flow-right firms with relatively good performance are actually transferred to poorly performing firms (mostly, unlisted firms) through purchasing new equity of poorly performing firms. Moreover, the magnitude of negative price reactions at the time of group-earnings announcements is significantly related to the magnitude of resources transferred to poorly performing firms. [source] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||