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Prisoner's Dilemma Game (prisoner + dilemma_game)
Selected AbstractsComparisons of Australians and Japanese on group-based cooperationASIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 2 2005Toshio Yamagishi A cross-societal experiment with 49 Australian and 56 Japanese participants examined if the group heuristic account of ingroup-favoring behavior in a Prisoner's Dilemma game can be extended beyond the minimal group situation to a situation involving an enduring social category (i.e. participant's nationality). Participants played a Prisoner's Dilemma game five times, each time with a different partner. Two of the five partners were ingroup members, two were outgroup members, and the nationality of one partner was not known. Furthermore, one of the two ingroup (or outgroup) partners knew that the participant was a member of the same (or the other) nationality, and the other did not know it. The results indicated that the knowledge that the partner had about the nationality of the participant exerted an effect only when the partner was an ingroup member. No major difference was found between Australian and Japanese participants. An outgroup-favoring cooperation pattern was observed, but that pattern was shown to be a result of fairness concerns among Australian participants and of positive stereotypes of Australians among Japanese participants. [source] Blushing after a moral transgression in a prisoner's dilemma game: appeasing or revealing?EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 5 2002Peter J. de Jong This study investigated the alleged remedial effects of blushing in the context of real-time interactions. Therefore, 30 pairs of prosocial individuals participated in a prisoner's dilemma ,game'. The experiment was framed as an objective test of moral behaviour. To elicit a shameful moral transgression, one individual of each pair was instructed to select the non-habitual cheat-option on a pre-defined target trial. Supporting the idea that violation of shared rules elicits blushing, the defectors displayed a blush on the target trial. Yet, unexpectedly, there was a negative relationship between the observed blush intensity and the trustworthiness attributed to the defectors. One explanation might be that the ,victims' used the blush response to deduce and interpret the defector's motive. As the antecedent behaviour involved in the present context was not completely unambiguous with respect to the perpetrators' motive (e.g. innocent playing around vs. maximizing outcomes) the observers might have interpreted blushing as signaling that the situation should be interpreted as an intentional violation of a social standard. Together the available evidence suggests that only in the context of unambiguous antecedent behaviours blushing has remedial effects, whereas in ambiguous situations blushing has undesirable revealing effects. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Exercising power in a prisoner's dilemma: transnational collective bargaining in an era of corporate globalisation?INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS JOURNAL, Issue 4 2005William N. CookeArticle first published online: 21 JUN 200 ABSTRACT The extraordinary growth in foreign direct investment coupled with the widespread declination of union penetration has increasingly allowed multinationals to pit unions across borders as competitors for investment and jobs. Based on a theoretical analysis of the exercise of power in a prisoner's dilemma game, the essential conditions and incentives for cooperation among unions across borders for the purpose of collective bargaining with multinationals are identified and practical, strategic-level implications for transnational interunion partnerships are addressed. [source] Effects of trait anger and anger expression style on competitive attack responses in a wartime prisoner's dilemma gameAGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR, Issue 2 2002Howard Kassinove Abstract We assessed the role of trait anger and anger expression style on competitive/aggressive decision making and responding. In a 100-trial iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), with instructions to simulate wartime interactions, competition/aggression was defined as "attacking the opponent," and "waiting for troop reinforcements" was the noncompetitive alternative response. Prior to play, 92 university student players completed the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory. They were then paired to play the IPD against partners of similar or dissimilar trait anger levels. At postplay, the State Anger scale was readministered. Results showed significant preplay to postplay increases in state anger, with greater increases shown by high trait anger players. Thus, high trait anger players were especially subject to arousal. Players in the high trait anger group made more competitive/attack responses, and they were more likely to do so when paired with a high trait anger partner. As a result of the high level of competitive/aggressive play, both groups ended with a negative troop count. Trait anger as a general personality temperament was predictive of state anger, competitive/attack responses, and the number of trials before a retaliation was made. The expressive style of anger-control was also related to manner of play. Trait anger had strong direct and indirect effects through anger control on the number of competitive attack responses. It was concluded that trait anger, especially trait anger/temperament, and anger control difficulties may be toxic personality factors in decision making and competitive behavior. Aggr. Behav. 28:117,125, 2002. © 2002 Wiley-Liss, Inc. [source] Exchanges of group-based favours: Ingroup bias in the prisoner's dilemma game with minimal groups in Japan and New ZealandASIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 3 2008Toshio Yamagishi Japanese (N = 48) and New Zealander (N = 55) participants were first assigned to one of two minimal groups, and then played a prisoner's dilemma game twice with an ingroup member and twice with an outgroup member. In one of the two games they played with an ingroup (or outgroup) member, participants and their partner knew one another's group memberships (mutual-knowledge condition). In the unilateral-knowledge condition, only the participants knew the group membership of their partner, but the partner did not know the group membership of the participant. Ingroup bias in cooperation emerged only in the mutual-knowledge condition in both countries; in the unilateral-knowledge condition no ingroup bias emerged. Mediational analyses found that, in accord with predictions, cooperation in the mutual-knowledge condition is mediated by expectation of the partner's cooperation. Ingroup bias in the mutual-knowledge condition emerged only among those who identified with the ingroup. Results provide support for a group heuristics account of ingroup favouritism in the minimal group. According to this account, participants who face minimal groups activate an ecologically adaptive heuristic of unilaterally cooperating with members of the same group, expecting indirect repayment from others in the same group. [source] | ||||||||||