Home About us Contact
|
Home About us Contact | ||
|
|
||
Prisoner's Dilemma (prisoner + dilemma)
Terms modified by Prisoner's Dilemma Selected AbstractsEffects of trait anger and anger expression style on competitive attack responses in a wartime prisoner's dilemma gameAGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR, Issue 2 2002Howard Kassinove Abstract We assessed the role of trait anger and anger expression style on competitive/aggressive decision making and responding. In a 100-trial iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), with instructions to simulate wartime interactions, competition/aggression was defined as "attacking the opponent," and "waiting for troop reinforcements" was the noncompetitive alternative response. Prior to play, 92 university student players completed the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory. They were then paired to play the IPD against partners of similar or dissimilar trait anger levels. At postplay, the State Anger scale was readministered. Results showed significant preplay to postplay increases in state anger, with greater increases shown by high trait anger players. Thus, high trait anger players were especially subject to arousal. Players in the high trait anger group made more competitive/attack responses, and they were more likely to do so when paired with a high trait anger partner. As a result of the high level of competitive/aggressive play, both groups ended with a negative troop count. Trait anger as a general personality temperament was predictive of state anger, competitive/attack responses, and the number of trials before a retaliation was made. The expressive style of anger-control was also related to manner of play. Trait anger had strong direct and indirect effects through anger control on the number of competitive attack responses. It was concluded that trait anger, especially trait anger/temperament, and anger control difficulties may be toxic personality factors in decision making and competitive behavior. Aggr. Behav. 28:117,125, 2002. © 2002 Wiley-Liss, Inc. [source] Cooperation and cheating in microbial exoenzyme production , Theoretical analysis for biotechnological applicationsBIOTECHNOLOGY JOURNAL, Issue 7 2010Stefan Schuster Abstract The engineering of microorganisms to produce a variety of extracellular enzymes (exoenzymes), for example for producing renewable fuels and in biodegradation of xenobiotics, has recently attracted increasing interest. Productivity is often reduced by "cheater" mutants, which are deficient in exoenzyme production and benefit from the product provided by the "cooperating" cells. We present a game-theoretical model to analyze population structure and exoenzyme productivity in terms of biotechnologically relevant parameters. For any given population density, three distinct regimes are predicted: when the metabolic effort for exoenzyme production and secretion is low, all cells cooperate; at intermediate metabolic costs, cooperators and cheaters coexist; while at high costs, all cells use the cheating strategy. These regimes correspond to the harmony game, snowdrift game, and Prisoner's Dilemma, respectively. Thus, our results indicate that microbial strains engineered for exoenzyme production will not, under appropriate conditions, be outcompeted by cheater mutants. We also analyze the dependence of the population structure on cell density. At low costs, the fraction of cooperating cells increases with decreasing cell density and reaches unity at a critical threshold. Our model provides an estimate of the cell density maximizing exoenzyme production. [source] Game Theory: Pitfalls and Opportunities in Applying It to International RelationsINTERNATIONAL STUDIES PERSPECTIVES, Issue 3 2000Steven J. Brams Four problems plague game-theoretic models in international relations (IR): (1) misspecifying the rules, (2) confusing goals and rational choice, (3) arbitrarily reducing the multiplicity of equilibria, and (4) forsaking backward induction. An alternative approach, theory of moves (TOM), is discussed and applied to Prisoners' Dilemma and then, more prescriptively, to the Iran hostage crisis of 1979,80. TOM incorporates into the framework of game theory an initial state in a payoff matrix, the moves and countermoves required to reach a "nonmyopic equilibrium," and threat, moving, and order power that reflect asymmetries in the capabilities of the players. It also allows for incomplete information, which in the Iran hostage crisis led to misperceptions and flawed play. Two general lessons come out of the U.S. foreign-policy failure in the Iran hostage crisis: (1) know the game you are playing, and (2) make threats only if they are likely to be credible. In specific games, TOM provides detailed prescriptions for optimal play, depending on where play starts and the powers of the players, that could aid foreign-policy makers, especially in crises. [source] Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated GamesECONOMETRICA, Issue 2 2005Jeffrey C. Ely We introduce a class of strategies that generalizes examples constructed in two-player games under imperfect private monitoring. A sequential equilibrium is belief-free if, after every private history, each player's continuation strategy is optimal independently of his belief about his opponents' private histories. We provide a simple and sharp characterization of equilibrium payoffs using those strategies. While such strategies support a large set of payoffs, they are not rich enough to generate a folk theorem in most games besides the prisoner's dilemma, even when noise vanishes. [source] Blushing after a moral transgression in a prisoner's dilemma game: appeasing or revealing?EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 5 2002Peter J. de Jong This study investigated the alleged remedial effects of blushing in the context of real-time interactions. Therefore, 30 pairs of prosocial individuals participated in a prisoner's dilemma ,game'. The experiment was framed as an objective test of moral behaviour. To elicit a shameful moral transgression, one individual of each pair was instructed to select the non-habitual cheat-option on a pre-defined target trial. Supporting the idea that violation of shared rules elicits blushing, the defectors displayed a blush on the target trial. Yet, unexpectedly, there was a negative relationship between the observed blush intensity and the trustworthiness attributed to the defectors. One explanation might be that the ,victims' used the blush response to deduce and interpret the defector's motive. As the antecedent behaviour involved in the present context was not completely unambiguous with respect to the perpetrators' motive (e.g. innocent playing around vs. maximizing outcomes) the observers might have interpreted blushing as signaling that the situation should be interpreted as an intentional violation of a social standard. Together the available evidence suggests that only in the context of unambiguous antecedent behaviours blushing has remedial effects, whereas in ambiguous situations blushing has undesirable revealing effects. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Cooperation in social dilemmas and allocentrism: a social values approachEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 6 2001Lorne G. Hulbert Research examining the relationship between the allocentrism,ideocentrism cultural variable and cooperation in social dilemmas is inconsistent. This relationship is considered in the context of social values within the prisoner's dilemma (PDG) in two studies. We hypothesised that allocentrics (relative to ideocentrics) would more likely express the social value of minimising differences rather than maximising joint outcomes. In Study 1 the hypothesis was supported. Study 2, including British and Malaysian respondents, replicated and extended these results to rankings of PDG outcomes. These findings are integrated with previous research, in particular to explain mixed results concerning allocentrism and cooperation. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Empathy-induced altruism in a prisoner's dilemma II: what if the target of empathy has defected?EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 1 2001C. Daniel Batson What if participants in a one-trial prisoner's dilemma know before making their decision that the other person has already defected? From the perspective of classic game theory, a dilemma no longer exists. It is clearly in their best interest to defect too. The empathy-altruism hypothesis predicts, however, that if they feel empathy for the other, then a dilemma remains: self-interest counsels defection; empathy-induced altruism counsels not. This motivational conflict should lead at least some empathically aroused individuals not to defect. To test this prediction, we placed 60 undergraduate women in a one-trial prisoner's dilemma in which they knew the other had already defected. Among those not induced to feel empathy, very few (0.05) did not defect in return. Among those induced to feel empathy for the other, almost half (0.45) did not defect. These results underscore the power of empathy-induced altruism to affect responses in a prisoner's dilemma. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] ASSORTMENT AND THE EVOLUTION OF GENERALIZED RECIPROCITYEVOLUTION, Issue 7 2009Daniel J. Rankin Reciprocity is often invoked to explain cooperation. Reciprocity is cognitively demanding, and both direct and indirect reciprocity require that individuals store information about the propensity of their partners to cooperate. By contrast, generalized reciprocity, wherein individuals help on the condition that they received help previously, only relies on whether an individual received help in a previous encounter. Such anonymous information makes generalized reciprocity hard to evolve in a well-mixed population, as the strategy will lose out to pure defectors. Here we analyze a model for the evolution of generalized reciprocity, incorporating assortment of encounters, to investigate the conditions under which it will evolve. We show that, in a well-mixed population, generalized reciprocity cannot evolve. However, incorporating assortment of encounters can favor the evolution of generalized reciprocity in which indiscriminate cooperation and defection are both unstable. We show that generalized reciprocity can evolve under both the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game. [source] Exercising power in a prisoner's dilemma: transnational collective bargaining in an era of corporate globalisation?INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS JOURNAL, Issue 4 2005William N. CookeArticle first published online: 21 JUN 200 ABSTRACT The extraordinary growth in foreign direct investment coupled with the widespread declination of union penetration has increasingly allowed multinationals to pit unions across borders as competitors for investment and jobs. Based on a theoretical analysis of the exercise of power in a prisoner's dilemma game, the essential conditions and incentives for cooperation among unions across borders for the purpose of collective bargaining with multinationals are identified and practical, strategic-level implications for transnational interunion partnerships are addressed. [source] Supply Chain Coordination in a Market with Customer Service CompetitionPRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2004Tamer Boyaci We consider a market with two competing supply chains, each consisting of one wholesaler and one retailer. We assume that the business environment forces supply chains to charge similar prices and to compete strictly on the basis of customer service. We model customer service competition using game-theoretical concepts. We consider three competition scenarios between the supply chains. In the uncoordinated scenario, individual members of both supply chains maximize their own profits by individually selecting their service and inventory policies. In the coordinated scenario, wholesalers and retailers of each supply chain coordinate their service and inventory policy decisions to maximize supply chain profits. In the hybrid scenario, competition is between one coordinated and one uncoordinated supply chain. We discuss the derivation of the equilibrium service strategies, resulting inventory policies, and profits for each scenario, and compare the equilibria in a numerical study. We find that coordination is a dominant strategy for both supply chains, but as in the prisoner's dilemma, both supply chains are often worse off under the coordinated scenario relative to the uncoordinated scenario. The consumers are the only guaranteed beneficiaries of coordination. [source] The Interlocutor's Dilemma: The Place of Strategy in Dialogic TheoryCOMMUNICATION THEORY, Issue 1 2008William J. White This essay discusses the implications of a concept of strategy for dialogical perspectives on communication. It begins by locating in the dialogical perspective a "longing for the other" that equates communication with communion or mutuality. It draws from the theory of communicative action of Jürgen Habermas to discuss strategy as the "other" of communication and explores the paradox of Habermas's idea of communicative rationality in terms of the prisoner's dilemma of game theory. The essay considers the extent to which the strategic and the dialogic are woven together in communication and argues that the communicative orientations of interlocutors at any given instance are rightfully regarded as the product of situational logics conditioned by social and cultural commitments extant in that instance. Given that the impetus for strategy stems in part from concerns about social solidarity in the face of the exigences of everyday life, the essay concludes by directing attention to the interplay of the management of social fears and the expression of otherness in shaping the course of communicative encounters. Résumé Le dilemme de l,interlocuteur : La place de la stratégie dans la théorie dialogique Cet article commente les implications d'un concept de stratégie pour des perspectives dialogiques sur la communication. Il localise d,abord dans la perspective dialogique un « grand désir pour l'autre » qui compare la communication à la communion ou l,interdépendance. Il s'inspire de l,ouvrage Theory of Communicative Action de Jürgen Habermas pour traiter la stratégie comme étant « l'autre » de la communication, et il explore le paradoxe de l,idée habermassienne de la rationalité communicationnelle en lien avec le dilemme du prisonnier de la théorie des jeux. L'article explore à quel point le stratégique et le dialogique sont liés dans la communication, et soumet que les orientations communicationnelles des interlocuteurs dans un cas donné sont légitimement perçues comme étant le produit d,une logique situationnelle conditionnée par des engagements sociaux et culturels existants dans ce cas. Puisque l'impulsion pour la stratégie provient en partie de préoccupations envers la solidarité sociale en dépit des exigences de la vie quotidienne, l,article conclut en se concentrant sur l'interaction entre la gestion des peurs sociales et l,expression de l'altérité dans l'influence de l'évolution des rencontres communicationnelles. Abstract Das Dilemma des Gesprächspartnern: Ein Platz für Strategie in der Dialogtheorie Dieser Aufsatz diskutiert die Implikationen eines Konzepts der Strategie für dialogische Perspektiven in der Kommunikation. Es beginnt mit der Verortung innerhalb der dialogischen Perspektive eines "Ersehnen des Anderen", welches Kommunikation gleichsetzt mit Kommunion oder Gegenseitigkeit. Das Konzept, basierend auf der Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns von Jürgen Habermas, diskutiert Strategie als das "andere" der Kommunikation und untersucht das Paradox der Habermasschen Idee einer Kommunikativen Rationalität im Sinne des Gefangenendilemma der Spieltheorie. Dieser Aufsatz berücksichtigt das Ausmaß zu welchem das Strategische und das Dialogische in der Kommunikation miteinander verbunden sind und argumentiert, dass kommunikative Orientierungen von Gesprächspartnern bei jeder Gelegenheit als ein Produkt der situationalen Logik, beeinflusst durch spezifische soziale und kulturelle Verpflichtungen dieser Gelegenheit, gesehen werden müssen. Unter der Annahme, dass der Impetus für Strategie teilweise aus den Bedenken hinsichtlich sozialer Solidarität im Angesicht der Notwendigkeiten des täglichen Lebens stammt, lenkt dieser Aufsatz am Ende die Aufmerksamkeit auf das Spiel zwischen dem Management sozialer Ängste und dem Ausdruck des Anderssein im Gestalten kommunikativer Begegnungen. Resumen El Dilema del Interlocutor: El Espacio de la Estrategia en la Teoría Dialógica Este ensayo discute las implicancias de un concepto de estrategia para las perspectivas dialógicas en la comunicación. Comienza localizando la perspectiva dialógica como una "nostalgia por el otro" que equipara a la comunicación con la comunión ó la mutualidad. Recurre a la Teoría de la Acción Comunicativa de Jürgen Habermas para discutir la estrategia del "otro" de la comunicación, y explora la paradoja de la idea de racionalidad comunicativa de Habermas en términos del dilema del prisionero de la teoría del juego. El ensayo considera hasta qué punto la estratégica y la dialógica están entretejidas juntas en la comunicación, y arguye que las orientaciones comunicativas de los interlocutores en una instancia dada son percibidas justamente como el producto de lógicas situacionales condicionadas por los compromisos sociales y culturales existentes en esa instancia. Dado que el ímpetu por la estrategia implica en parte una preocupación por la solidaridad social en la cara de las exigencias cotidianas, el ensayo concluye direccionando la atención hacia la relación entre el manejo de los miedos sociales y la expresión del otro que da forma al curso de los encuentros comunicativos. ZhaiYao Yo yak [source] Personal view: victim blaming as management strategy for the gastroenterologist , a game theoretical approachALIMENTARY PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS, Issue 10 2005A. Sonnenberg Summary Background :,A multitude of digestive diseases elude simple management strategies. Rather than admit failure of disease management, a gastroenterologist could resort to blaming patients for their own medical conditions. Blaming the patient constitutes an easy exit strategy for otherwise unsolvable disease conditions. Aim :,To shed light on the problem of patient blaming in gastroenterology and provide means for its resolution. Methods :,The interaction between physician and patient can be formulated in terms of a non-zero-sum game between two adversaries. The outcomes associated with two behavioural strategies available to both adversaries are arranged in a two-by-two game matrix. Results :,Blaming the patient is characterized by the general game pattern of the ,prisoner's dilemma'. If the physician,patient interaction is restricted to one single event, patient blaming represents the management strategy of choice with the highest expected payoff under all foreseeable circumstances. If there is a high probability for repeated physician,patient interactions, however, a physician admitting and a patient accepting the limits of medical performance yield a dominant strategy. Conclusion :,Only for single physician,patient encounters does a non-cooperative strategy of blaming one's adversary for a poor medical outcome yield the highest expected outcome. In the long run, the strategy of shifting blame becomes unproductive for both sides alike. [source] Learning to Cooperate: Learning Networks and the Problem of AltruismAMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 3 2009John T. Scholz We explore how two populations learn to cooperate with each other in the absence of institutional support. Individuals play iterated prisoner's dilemmas with the other population, but learn about successful strategies from their own population. Our agent-based evolutionary models reconfirm that cooperation can emerge rapidly as long as payoffs provide a selective advantage for nice, retaliatory strategies like tit-for-tat, although attainable levels of cooperation are limited by the persistence of nonretaliatory altruists. Learning processes that adopt the current best response strategy do well only when initial conditions are very favorable to cooperation, while more adaptive learning processes can achieve high levels of cooperation under a wider range of initial conditions. When combined with adaptive learning, populations having larger, better connected learning relationships outperform populations with smaller, less connected ones. Clustered relationships can also enhance cooperation, particularly in these smaller, less connected populations. [source] | |||||||||||||||||||