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Positive Arguments (positive + argument)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Humanities and Social Sciences100%

Selected Abstracts

PHILOSOPHERS, THEIR CONTEXT, AND THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES

METAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 5 2006
WARD E. JONES
Abstract: It has at various times been said, both before and since the fall of apartheid, that philosophers in South Africa are neglecting to do certain sorts of work. Behind this accusation lies a general claim that philosophers have responsibilities to their contexts. This essay is dedicated to (i) defending this claim against objections, and (ii) offering a positive argument for there being moral pressure on philosophers to increase understanding. My aim is not to accuse any philosopher or community of philosophers of neglect. It is rather to defend an understanding of both philosophy and ethical responsibilities that makes room for philosophers to have moral responsibilities. Whether or not it has ever in fact been appropriate to accuse philosophers in South Africa, or indeed anywhere else, of neglect, philosophers do indeed have responsibilities to their contexts. [source]

I,Must a Semantic Minimalist be a Semantic Internalist?

ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME, Issue 1 2009
Emma Borg
I aim to show that a semantic minimalist need not also be a semantic internalist. §I introduces minimalism and internalism and argues that there is a prima facie case for a minimalist being an internalist. §II sketches some positive arguments for internalism which, if successful, show that a minimalist must be an internalist. §III goes on to reject these arguments and contends that the prima facie case for uniting minimalism and internalism is also not compelling. §IV returns to an objection from §I and argues for a way to meet it which does not depend on giving up semantic externalism. [source]

PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE: A NEW LOOK AT THE ARGUMENTS

BIOETHICS, Issue 3 2007
J.M. DIETERLE
ABSTRACT In this paper, I examine the arguments against physician assisted suicide (PAS). Many of these arguments are consequentialist. Consequentialist arguments rely on empirical claims about the future and thus their strength depends on how likely it is that the predictions will be realized. I discuss these predictions against the backdrop of Oregon's Death with Dignity Act and the practice of PAS in the Netherlands. I then turn to a specific consequentialist argument against PAS , Susan M. Wolf's feminist critique of the practice. Finally, I examine the two most prominent deontological arguments against PAS. Ultimately, I conclude that no anti-PAS argument has merit. Although I do not provide positive arguments for PAS, if none of the arguments against it are strong, we have no reason not to legalize it. [source]

Toward a Pluralist Account of Parenthood

BIOETHICS, Issue 3 2003
Tim Bayne
What is it that makes someone a parent? Many writers , call them ,monists', claim that parenthood is grounded solely in one essential feature that is both necessary and sufficient for someone's being a parent. We reject not only monism but also ,necessity' views, in which some specific feature is necessary but not also sufficient for parenthood. Our argument supports what we call ,pluralism', the view that any one of several kinds of relationship is sufficient for parenthood. We begin by challenging monistic versions of gestationalism, the view that gestation uniquely grounds parenthood. Monistic and necessity gestationalism are implausible. First, we raise the ,paternity problem', necessity gestationalists lack an adequate account of how men become fathers. Second, the positive arguments that necessity gestationalists give are not compelling. However, although gestation may not be a necessary condition for parenthood, there is good reason to think that it is sufficient. After further rebutting an ,intentionalist' account of parenthood, in which having and acting on intentions to procreate and rear is necessary for parenthood, we end by sketching a pluralist picture of the nature of parenthood, rooted in causation, on which gestation, direct genetic derivation, extended custody, and even, sometimes, intentions, may be individually sufficient for parenthood. [source]