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Policy Leads (policy + lead)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting80%

Selected Abstracts

"[U]NITED AND ACTUATED BY SOME COMMON IMPULSE OF PASSION"1: CHALLENGING THE DISPERSAL CONSENSUS IN AMERICAN HOUSING POLICY RESEARCH

JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS, Issue 2 2008
DAVID IMBROSCIO
ABSTRACT: A large and influential group of American scholars studying urban and low-income housing policy have coalesced around the central idea that the best way to ameliorate the plague of urban poverty in the United States is to disperse (or deconcentrate) the urban poor into wealthier (usually outlying suburban) neighborhoods. This article refers to this group of scholars as the Dispersal Consensus (or DC for short). It finds that the DC's zeal to promote dispersal policies leads many of its members to engage in suspect and problematic practices, both in their research and policy prescription efforts. Such findings suggest that the DC's near hegemonic influence over the academic discourse of American urban and low-income housing policy should be challenged. This challenge will help stimulate a more open and productive debate regarding how best to ameliorate urban poverty (and related social problems) in the United States. [source]

Time Inconsistency and Free-Riding in a Monetary Union

JOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Issue 7 2008
VARADARAJAN V. CHARI
monetary regime; fixed exchange rates; dollarization; European Union; Maastricht Treaty In monetary unions, a time inconsistency problem in monetary policy leads to a novel type of free-rider problem in the setting of non-monetary policies. The free-rider problem leads union members to pursue lax non-monetary policies that induce the monetary authority to generate high inflation. Free-riding can be mitigated by imposing constraints on non-monetary policies. Without a time inconsistency problem, the union has no free-rider problem; then constraints on non-monetary policies are unnecessary and possibly harmful. This theory is here detailed and applied to several non-monetary policies: labor market policy, fiscal policy, and bank regulation. [source]

Does Monetary Policy Have Asymmetric Effects on Stock Returns?

JOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Issue 2-3 2007
SHIU-SHENG CHEN
monetary policy; stock returns; Markov-switching This paper investigates whether monetary policy has asymmetric effects on stock returns using Markov-switching models. Different measures of a monetary policy stance are adopted. Empirical evidence from monthly returns on the Standard & Poor's 500 price index suggests that monetary policy has larger effects on stock returns in bear markets. Furthermore, it is shown that a contractionary monetary policy leads to a higher probability of switching to the bear-market regime. [source]

A POST-KEYNESIAN AMENDMENT TO THE NEW CONSENSUS ON MONETARY POLICY

METROECONOMICA, Issue 2 2006
Article first published online: 24 APR 200, Marc Lavoie
ABSTRACT A common view is now pervasive in policy research at universities and central banks, which one could call the New Keynesian consensus, based on an endogenous money supply. This new consensus reproduces received wisdom: in the long run, expansionary fiscal policy leads to higher inflation rates and real interest rates, while more restrictive monetary policy only leads to lower inflation rates. The paper provides a simple four-quadrant apparatus to represent the above, and it shows that simple modifications to the new consensus model are enough to radically modify received doctrine as to the likely effects of fiscal and monetary policies. [source]

MERGERS UNDER UNCERTAINTY: THE EFFECTS OF DEBT FINANCING,

THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 5 2007
M. PILAR SOCORRO
In this paper, we consider a Cournot oligopoly with demand uncertainty, fixed costs and constant marginal costs. The demand uncertainty makes some mergers that would be unprofitable in a certain environment profitable in this model. However, socially advantageous mergers may be still unprofitable for the colluding firms, so public intervention may be needed. One possibility consists in subsidizing such mergers. However, the combination of limited liability debt financing and an appropriate antitrust policy leads to higher social welfare than subsidies. The reason is that, given the limited liability effect, merging parties compete more aggressively, so the reduction in market quantity is mitigated. [source]