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Philosophical Assumptions (philosophical + assumption)
Selected AbstractsPhilosophical assumptions in Freud, Jung and Bion: questions of causalityTHE JOURNAL OF ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 1 2000Michael Horne The historical development of concepts of causality in philosophy is described. Since the Enlightenment and the growth of science, exponents of the two most important concepts, determinism and teleology, have been in conflict. At the inception of psychoanalysis at the end of the nineteenth century this conflict was particularly intense. It was the cause of the first major schism in psychoanalysis between Jung and Freud. Psychoanalytic theorists have continued to disagree over this issue. Post-modernist philosophy has abolished all metaphysics and therefore called into question concepts of psychic causality. Parallel to, but uninfluenced by this development, Bion has developed a psychoanalytic conceptualization which may be seen as transcending causality. The clinical and theoretical implications of these developments are described. [source] Evaluating qualitative management research: Towards a contingent criteriologyINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT REVIEWS, Issue 3 2006Phil Johnson The term qualitative management research embraces an array of non-statistical research practices. Here it is argued that this diversity is an outcome of competing philosophical assumptions which produce distinctive research perspectives and legitimate the appropriation of different sets of evaluation criteria. Some confusion can arise when evaluation criteria constituted by particular philosophical conventions are universally applied to this heterogeneous management field. In order to avoid such misappropriation, this paper presents a first step towards a contingent criteriology located in a metatheoretical analysis of three modes of qualitative management research which are compared with the positivist mainstream to elaborate different forms of evaluation. It is argued that once armed with criteria that vary accordingly, evaluation can reflexively focus upon the extent to which any management research consistently embraces the particular methodological principles that are sanctioned by its a priori philosophical commitments. [source] Is there a problem with mathematical psychology in the eighteenth century?JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES, Issue 4 2006A fresh look at Kant's old argument Common opinion ascribes to Immanuel Kant the view that psychology cannot become a science properly so called, because it cannot be mathematized. It is equally common to claim that this reflects the state of the art of his times; that the quantification of the mind was not achieved during the eighteenth century, while it was so during the nineteenth century; or that Kant's so-called "impossibility claim" was refuted by nineteenth-century developments, which in turn opened one path for psychology to become properly scientific. These opinions are often connected, but they are misguided nevertheless. In Part I, I show how the issue of a quantification of the mind was discussed before Kant, and I analyze the philosophical considerations both of pessimistic and optimistic authors. This debate reveals a certain progress, although it remains ultimately undecided. In Part II, I present actual examples of measuring the mind in the eighteenth century and analyze their presuppositions. Although these examples are limited in certain ways, the common view that there was no such measurement is wrong. In Part III, I show how Kant's notorious " impossibility claim" has to be viewed against its historical background. He not only accepts actual examples of a quantitative treatment of the mind, but also takes steps toward an explanation of their possibility. Thus, he does not advance the claim that the mind as such cannot be mathematized. His claim is directed against certain philosophical assumptions about the mind, assumptions shared by a then-dominating, strongly introspectionist conception of psychology. This conception did and could not provide an explanation of the possibility of quantifying the mind. In concluding, I reflect on how this case study helps to improve the dispute over when and why psychology became a science. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [source] How Do Instructional-Design Practitioners Make Instructional-Strategy Decisions?PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2004Trudy K. Christensen ABSTRACT Many theories have been proposed to help instructional designers make instructional-strategy decisions, yet it is not clear if these theories are actually used by ID practitioners. This study used a web-survey to examine the design strategies of 113 ID practitioners. The survey asked respondents to rate how frequently they used learning or ID theories as well as 10 other design strategies, to help make instructional-strategy decisions. Respondents were also asked how often they used different information sources to learn about new theories, trends, and strategies, and to respond to a set of contrasting statements depicting objectivist vs. construc-tivist assumptions. The results indicate that ID practitioners most often rely on interaction with others both as a means of making instructional-strategy decisions and of learning about new theories, trends, and strategies. Only fifty percent of the respondents said they regularly use theories when making instructional-strategy decisions, using other design strategies more frequently instead; and most practitioners are eclectic in their underlying philosophical assumptions. Based on these results, we discuss implications for training and ongoing support of instructional designers. [source] Tensions and Paradoxes in Electronic Patient Record Research: A Systematic Literature Review Using the Meta-narrative MethodTHE MILBANK QUARTERLY, Issue 4 2009TRISHA GREENHALGH Context: The extensive research literature on electronic patient records (EPRs) presents challenges to systematic reviewers because it covers multiple research traditions with different underlying philosophical assumptions and methodological approaches. Methods: Using the meta-narrative method and searching beyond the Medline-indexed literature, this review used "conflicting" findings to address higher-order questions about how researchers had differently conceptualized and studied the EPR and its implementation. Findings: Twenty-four previous systematic reviews and ninety-four further primary studies were considered. Key tensions in the literature centered on (1) the EPR ("container" or "itinerary"); (2) the EPR user ("information-processer" or "member of socio-technical network"); (3) organizational context ("the setting within which the EPR is implemented" or "the EPR-in-use"); (4) clinical work ("decision making" or "situated practice"); (5) the process of change ("the logic of determinism" or "the logic of opposition"); (6) implementation success ("objectively defined" or "socially negotiated"); and (7) complexity and scale ("the bigger the better" or "small is beautiful"). Conclusions: The findings suggest that EPR use will always require human input to recontextualize knowledge; that even though secondary work (audit, research, billing) may be made more efficient by the EPR, primary clinical work may be made less efficient; that paper may offer a unique degree of ecological flexibility; and that smaller EPR systems may sometimes be more efficient and effective than larger ones. We suggest an agenda for further research. [source] Wörter und Bilder in der österreichisch-ungarischen Philosophie: Von Palágyi zu Wittgenstein,BERICHTE ZUR WISSENSCHAFTSGESCHICHTE, Issue 3 2001Prof. Dr. Kristóf Nyíri Abstract The thesis according to which technologies of communication have implications not just for the form, but also for the content and indeed for the overall logic of what is being communicated rests on a set of general philosophical assumptions as regards the relation between thought and its medium. The paper shows that formulating these assumptions, and elaborating them, has been a characteristic concern of Austro-Hungarian philosophy; that between the philosophers who played a role in the relevant endeavours there obtained significant, sometimes mutual, influences; and that Austro-Hungarian realities - basically, the phenomenon of disturbed communication within the Habsburg Empire - had a marked effect on their thought. [source] | |||||||||||||