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Philosophers
Kinds of Philosophers Selected AbstractsPHILOSOPHERS OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: A TAXONOMYMETAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 3-4 2009LICIA CARLSON Abstract: This essay explores various roles that philosophers occupy in relation to intellectual disability. In examining how philosophers define their object of inquiry as experts and gatekeepers, it raises critical questions concerning the nature of philosophical discourse about intellectual disability. It then goes on to consider three alternate positions, the advocate or friend, the animal, and the "intellectually disabled," each of which points to new ways of philosophizing in the face of intellectual disability. [source] PHILOSOPHERS, THEIR CONTEXT, AND THEIR RESPONSIBILITIESMETAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 5 2006WARD E. JONES Abstract: It has at various times been said, both before and since the fall of apartheid, that philosophers in South Africa are neglecting to do certain sorts of work. Behind this accusation lies a general claim that philosophers have responsibilities to their contexts. This essay is dedicated to (i) defending this claim against objections, and (ii) offering a positive argument for there being moral pressure on philosophers to increase understanding. My aim is not to accuse any philosopher or community of philosophers of neglect. It is rather to defend an understanding of both philosophy and ethical responsibilities that makes room for philosophers to have moral responsibilities. Whether or not it has ever in fact been appropriate to accuse philosophers in South Africa, or indeed anywhere else, of neglect, philosophers do indeed have responsibilities to their contexts. [source] DOES ETHICAL THEORY HAVE A PLACE IN POST-KOHLBERGIAN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY?EDUCATIONAL THEORY, Issue 2 2010Bruce Maxwell Philosophers tend to assume that theoretical frameworks in psychology suffer from conceptual confusion and that any influence that philosophy might have on psychology should be positive. Going against this grain, Dan Lapsley and Darcia Narváez attribute the Kohlbergian paradigm's current state of marginalization within psychology to Lawrence Kohlberg's use of ethical theory in his model of cognitive moral development. Post-Kohlbergian conceptions of moral psychology, they advance, should be wary of theoretical constructs derived from folk morality, refuse philosophical starting points, and seek integration with literatures in psychology, not philosophy. In this essay, Bruce Maxwell considers and rejects Lapsley and Narváez's diagnosis. The Kohlbergian paradigm's restricted conception of the moral domain is the result of a selective reading of one tendency in ethical theorizing (Kantianism). The idea that moral psychology may find shelter from normative criticism by avoiding ethics-derived models overlooks the deeper continuity between "ethical theory" and "psychological theory." The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a "young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case conceptual confusion and methods of proof.) The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by.1 [source] Objectification leads to depersonalization: The denial of mind and moral concern to objectified othersEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 5 2010Steve Loughnan Philosophers have argued that when people are objectified they are treated as if they lack the mental states and moral status associated with personhood. These aspects of objectification have been neglected by psychologists. This research investigates the role of depersonalization in objectification. In Study 1, objectified women were attributed less mind and were accorded lesser moral status than non-objectified women. In Study 2, we replicated this effect with male and female targets and extended it to include perceptions of competence and pain attribution. Further, we explored whether target and perceiver gender qualify depersonalization. Overall, this research indicates that when people are objectified they are denied personhood. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Philosophy After Hiroshima: From Power Politics to the Ethics of Nonviolence and Co-ResponsibilityAMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY, Issue 1 2009Article first published online: 18 FEB 200, Edward Demenchonok Philosophers from many different countries came to Hiroshima, Japan, in the summer of 2007 to discuss the problems of war and peace on the occasion of the Seventh World Congress of the International Society for Universal Dialogue (ISUD). The theme was After Hiroshima: Collective Memory, Philosophical Reflection and World Peace. The essays included in this volume were originally presented at that conference and reflect some of the aspects of these discussions. In the first three parts of this introductory essay, I will address ideas conveyed by discussions during the Hiroshima conference regarding an open history, as well as various aspects of violence-prone globalization and its challenges to ethics and to peace. Then, within this context, the fourth part of this introduction will provide a brief review of some of the main themes arising out of the conference and elaborated in the essays of the volume. [source] Has Wittgenstein Been Misunderstood by Wittgensteinian Philosophers of Religion?PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, Issue 1 2003Richard Amesbury The appropriate application of Wittgenstein's thought to problems in the philosophy of religion has long been debated. A body of emerging scholarship argues that the philosophers of religion who pioneered this application are guilty of having misunderstood and distorted Wittgenstein's thought. This paper seeks to counter these charges by arguing that they generally depend on either construals of Wittgenstein's thought that are themselves implausible or misreadings of the philosophers against whom they are levied. Special attention is given to accusations of fideism, quietism, expressivism, and positivism, as well as to the work of Phillips, Winch, and Rhees. [source] Constructivism about Practical Reasons,PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH, Issue 2 2007AARON JAMES Philosophers commonly wonder what a constructivist theory as applied to practical reasons might look like. For the methods or procedures of reasoning familiar from moral constructivism do not clearly apply generally, to all practical reasons. The paper argues that procedural specification is not necessary, so long as our aims are not first-order but explanatory. We can seek to explain how there could be facts of the matter about reasons for action without saying what reasons we have. Explanatory constructivism must assume constructive "norms of practical reasoning" which yield particular truths without assuming them. But philosophers often mistakenly assume that only "formal" norms of reasoning could fulfill this role. The paper describes a further possibility: norms of reasoning can be "situation-specific" and yet retain truth-independent authority. Though we might doubt whether such norms can be independently defended, we should not doubt the possibility or coherence of constructivism about practical reasons. [source] Kierkegaard's Conception of GodPHILOSOPHY COMPASS (ELECTRONIC), Issue 2 2010Paul K. Moser Philosophers have often misunderstood Kierkegaard's views on the nature and purposes of God due to a fascination with his earlier, pseudonymous works. We examine many of Kierkegaard's later works with the aim of setting forth an accurate view on this matter. The portrait of God that emerges is a personal and fiercely loving God with whom humans can and should enter into relationship. Far from advocating a fideistic faith or a cognitively unrestrained leap in the dark, we argue that Kierkegaard connects this God-relationship to (a particular kind of) evidence and even knowledge. However, such evidence and knowledge , and hence God himself , may remain hidden from many individuals due to misconceptions of God and misuses of the human will. [source] After Freud: Phantasy and Imagination in the Philosophy of ReligionPHILOSOPHY COMPASS (ELECTRONIC), Issue 1 2008Beverley Clack Philosophers of religion have tended to focus on Freud's dismissal of religion as an illusion, thus characterising his account as primarily hostile. Those who wish to engage with psychoanalytic ideas in order to understand religion in a more positive way have tended to look to later psychoanalysts for more sympathetic sources. This paper suggests that other aspects of Freud's own writings might, surprisingly, provide such tools. In particular, a more subtle understanding of the relationship between illusion and reality emerges in his theory, that itself offers a useful way of understanding the meaning and significance of religion for the human animal. By exploring these sources a view of religion emerges which connects it closely with the processes of imagination and creativity. Under this view, religion is more than just a set of hypotheses to be proved or disproved. In religion, we have access to the most deeply rooted wishes and anxieties of the human heart, and thus its investigation enables a deeper understanding of what it is to be a human being. [source] The Philosophy of Social Science: Metaphysical and EmpiricalPHILOSOPHY COMPASS (ELECTRONIC), Issue 6 2007Francesco Guala Ontological debates have always been prominent in the philosophy of social science. Philosophers have typically conceived of such debates as pre-scientific attempts to reform social scientific practice, rather than as post-scientific reflections on a firm body of scientific knowledge. Two celebrated contemporary research programs in social ontology , collective intentionality and evolutionary game theory , also follow this approach. In this paper I illustrate their central elements and criticize their weak empirical foundations. I finish by reviewing some work that combines empirical evidence with theoretical reflection, and suggest that it constitutes the way forward in the philosophy of social science. [source] Searching for the ,Popular' and the ,Art' of Popular ArtPHILOSOPHY COMPASS (ELECTRONIC), Issue 3 2007Theodore Gracyk Philosophy of art presupposes differences between art and other cultural activity. Philosophers have recently paid more attention to this excluded activity, particularly to the range of cultural production known as popular art. Three issues have dominated these discussions. First, there is debate about the basis of the distinction. Some philosophers contend that fine art is essentially different from popular art, but others hold that the distinction is entirely social in origin. Second, philosophers disagree on the degree of continuity or discontinuity that holds between fine and popular art. Third, there is controversy about the relative value of the two, and about the basis for the supposed superiority of fine art. [source] Plato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers and Sophists.THE HEYTHROP JOURNAL, Issue 3 2009By Marina McCoy, Plato, the Art of Philosophical Writing. No abstract is available for this article. [source] Reading Romans with Contemporary Philosophers and Theologians.THE HEYTHROP JOURNAL, Issue 1 2009Edited by David Odell-Scott No abstract is available for this article. [source] A New Argument for EvidentialismTHE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 225 2006Nishi Shah When we deliberate whether to believe some proposition, we feel immediately compelled to look for evidence of its truth. Philosophers have labelled this feature of doxastic deliberation ,transparency'. I argue that resolving the disagreement in the ethics of belief between evidentialists and pragmatists turns on the correct explanation of transparency. My hypothesis is that it reflects a conceptual truth about belief: a belief that p is correct if and only if p. This normative truth entails that only evidence can be a reason for belief. Although evidentialism does not follow directly from the mere psychological truth that we cannot believe for non-evidential reasons, it does follow directly from the normative conceptual truth about belief which explains why we cannot do so. [source] Shadow-Experiences and the Phenomenal Structure of ColorsDIALECTICA, Issue 2 2010René Jagnow It is a common assumption among philosophers of perception that phenomenal colors are exhaustively characterized by the three phenomenal dimensions of the color solid: hue, saturation and lightness. The hue of a color is its redness, blueness or yellowness, etc. The saturation of a color refers to the strength of its hue in relation to gray. The lightness of a color determines its relation to black and white. In this paper, I argue that the phenomenology of shadows forces us to consider illumination as an additional dimension of phenomenal colors. For this purpose, I will first introduce two different interpretations of shadow-experiences, which Chalmers has called the simple and the complex interpretations, and show that they both fail to account for important phenomenal facts about shadow-experiences. I will then introduce my own alternative interpretation based on the idea that illumination is a dimension of phenomenal colors and explain how it can account for these facts. [source] The Quest for REALITYDIALECTICA, Issue 1 2007Paul Horwich A widespread concern within philosophy has been, and continues to be, to determine which domains of discourse address real, robust, not-merely-deflationary facts, and which do not. But a threat to the legitimacy of this concern (together with the claims provoked by it) is the extreme lack of consensus amongst philosophers on the question of how to tell whether or not a given domain is oriented towards ,robust reality'. The present paper criticizes Kit Fine's attempt to settle that question. This discussion is followed by some considerations suggesting that there is no good answer to it, that (as the ,quietists' maintain) the notion of ,robust reality' is defective and ought to be abandoned. [source] Precise entities but irredeemably vague concepts?DIALECTICA, Issue 3 2002Enrique Romerales Various arguments have recently been put forward to support the existence of vague or fuzzy objects. Nevertheless, the only possibly compelling argument would support, not the existence of vague objects, but indeterminately existing objects. I argue for the non-existence of any vague entities,either particulars or properties - in the mind-independent world. Even so, many philosophers have claimed that to reduce vagueness to semantics is of no avail, since linguistic vagueness betrays semantic incoherence and this is no less a problem than is ontological incoherence. After spelling out why there are fewer essentially vague concepts than usually thought. I claim that only the linguistic competence of the whole speaking community for each word can draw the sharp boundaries for its concept, even if these are unknowable in practice and still leave a precise range of indetermination. This could explain both the existence of boundaries and our non-removable ignorance of them, fulfilling the intuitions of the epistemic theory of vagueness with the supervaluationist's indeterminacy. [source] Philosophical Arguments, Historical Contexts, and Theory of Education1EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY, Issue 1 2007Daniel Tröhler Abstract This paper argues that many philosophical arguments within the education discourse are too little embedded in their own historical contexts. Starting out from the obvious fact that philosophers of education use sources from the past, the paper asks how we can deal with the arguments that these sources contain. The general attitude within philosophy of education, which views arguments as timeless, is being challenged by the insight that arguments always depend upon their own contexts. For this reason, citing past authors, heroes, or enemies without respecting the context says more about our interest at the present time than it does about the times of the authors examined. Conversely, the contextual approach helps us to avoid believing that ,timeless truths' are to be found in different texts of different ages. However, the present contribution in no way advocates a total relativization of statements. Quite the contrary; it claims that the contextual approach helps us to understand the traditions and contexts within which we ourselves, as researchers, are positioned. And this self-awareness is believed to be the proper starting position for theoretical statements about education. [source] Foucault, Educational Research and the Issue of AutonomyEDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY, Issue 3 2005Mark Olssen Abstract This article seeks to demonstrate a particular application of Foucault's philosophical approach to a particular issue in education: that of personal autonomy. The paper surveys and extends the approach taken by James Marshall in his book Michel Foucault: Personal autonomy and education. After surveying Marshall's writing on the issue I extend Marshall's approach, critically analysing the work of Rob Reich and Meira Levinson, two contemporary philosophers who advocate models of personal autonomy as the basis for a liberal education. [source] That Which Makes the Sensation of Blue a Mental Fact: Moore on Phenomenal RelationismEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2007Benj Hellie A gift of a dollar for each article in the philosophy of perception and consciousness published since 1990 making reference, explicitly or implicitly, to Moore's discussion in the second half of Moore 19031 of an alleged ,transparency' and ,diaphanousness' pertaining to some aspect of perceptual experience would very likely cover the tab of a mid-priced dinner for two.2 Moore's poetically expressed observations have captured the imagination of contemporary philosophers of perception and consciousness, and have served as the basis of much fruitful discussion in those areas. Still, despite all the attention these observations have received, the contemporary literature lacks a close reading of the second half of Moore's paper, without which it is impossible to understand Moore's observations in the context in which they were originally expressed. It is understandable that such a close reading is lacking: the second half of Moore's paper has been rightly described by one of his most sympathetic and dedicated interpreters as ,extremely dense and opaque' (Klemke 2000: 55).3 But despite the evident difficulties of the task, I aim here, with some trepidation, to provide the missing close reading. The main points of my interpretation will be these. The centerpiece of the anti-idealist manoeuvrings of the second half of the paper is a phenomenological argument for what I will call a relational view of perceptual phenomenal character, on which, roughly, ,that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact' is a relation of conscious awareness, a view close to the opposite of the most characteristic contemporary view going under the transparency rubric.4 The discussion of transparency and diaphanousness is a sidelight, its principal purpose to shore up the main line of argumentation against criticism; in those passages all Moore argues is that the relation of conscious awareness is not transparent, while acknowledging that it can seem to be. My discussion will proceed as follows. In section 1, I will discuss some theses and elucidate some notions from the philosophy of perception and consciousness which will be central to my interpretation; having done so, I will be in a position to explain how an accurate understanding of Moore may contribute to theoretical advances in the philosophy of perception and consciousness. The next two sections contain the exegetical heart of the paper: section 2 provides an analysis of Moore's case for the relational view; section 3 attempts to explain the place of the relational view in the overall refutation of idealism. Section 4 critically discusses a pair of competing interpretations. Section 5 wraps things up, drawing concluding morals as to the campaigns on behalf of which Moore should and should not be enlisted. [source] Bodily Awareness, Imagination and the SelfEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, Issue 1 2006Joel Smith Common wisdom tells us that we have five senses: sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. These senses provide us with a means of gaining information concerning objects in the world around us, including our own bodies. But in addition to these five senses, each of us is aware of our own body in ways in which we are aware of no other thing. These ways include our awareness of the position, orientation, movement, and size of our limbs (proprioception and kinaesthesia), our sense of balance, and our awareness of bodily sensations such as pains, tickles, and sensations of pressure or temperature. We can group these together under the title ,bodily awareness'. The legitimacy of grouping together these ways of gaining information is shown by the fact that they are unified phenomenologically; they provide the subject with an awareness of his or her body ,from the inside'. Bodily awareness is an awareness of our own bodies from within. This perspective on our own bodies does not, cannot, vary. As Merleau-Ponty writes, ,my own body,is always presented to me from the same angle' (1962: 90). It has recently been claimed by a number of philosophers that, in bodily awareness, one is not simply aware of one's body as one's body, but one is aware of one's body as oneself. That is, when I attend to the object of bodily awareness I am presented not just with my body, but with my ,bodily self'. The contention of the present paper is that such a view is misguided. In the first section I clarify just what is at issue here. In the remainder of the paper I present an argument, based on two claims about the nature of the imagination, against the view that the bodily self is presented in bodily awareness. Section two defends the dependency thesis; a claim about the relation between perception and sensory imagination. Section three defends a certain view about our capacity to imagine being other people. Section four presents the main argument against the bodily self awareness view and section five addresses some objections. [source] EARLY INTELLECTUAL INFLUENCES ON D. W. MEINIG: A FORMER STUDENT'S FOND MEMORIES,GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW, Issue 3 2009BRUCE BIGELOW ABSTRACT. As an undergraduate and graduate student in the 1940s and a young professor at the University of Utah in the 1950s, D. W. Meinig was influenced by a number of scholars. They included six historians, three geographers, two anthropologists, and two philosophers. I identify the influence of the thirteen scholars on Meinig's major achievements: the culture area model, geography as an art, the historical imperative for geography, cultures and civilizations, and geopolitics and imperialism. [source] From clergymen to computers,the advent of virtual palaeontologyGEOLOGY TODAY, Issue 3 2010Russell J. Garwood Palaeontology was established as a science in the Victorian era, yet has roots that stretch deeper into the recesses of history. More than 2000 years ago, the Greek philosopher Aristotle deduced that fossil sea shells were once living organisms, and around 500 ad Xenophanes used fossils to argue that many areas of land must have previously been submarine. In 1027, the Persian scholar Avicenna suggested that organisms were fossilized by petrifying fluids; this theory was accepted by most natural philosophers up until the eighteenth century Enlightenment, and even beyond. The late 1700s were notable for the work of Georges Cuvier who established the reality of extinction. This, coupled with advances in the recognition of faunal successions made by the canal engineer William Smith, laid the framework for the discipline that would become known as palaeontology. As the nineteenth century progressed, the scientific community became increasingly well organized. Most fossil workers were gentleman scientists and members of the clergy, who self-funded their studies in a new and exciting field. Many of the techniques used to study fossils today were developed during this ,classical' period. Perhaps the most fundamental of these is to expose a fossil by splitting the rock housing it, and then conduct investigations based upon the exposed surface (Fig. 1). This approach has served the science well in the last two centuries, having been pivotal to innumerable advances in our understanding of the history of life. Nevertheless, there are many cases where splitting a rock in this way results in incomplete data recovery; those where the fossils are not flattened, but are preserved in three-dimensions. Even the ephemeral soft-tissues of organisms are occasionally preserved in a three-dimensional state, for example in the Herefordshire, La Voulte Sûr Rhone and Orsten ,Fossil Lagerstätten' (sites of exceptional fossil preservation). These rare and precious deposits provide a wealth of information about the history of life on Earth, and are perhaps our most important resource in the quest to understand the palaeobiology of extinct organisms. With the aid of twenty-first century technology, we can now make the most of these opportunities through the field of ,virtual palaeontology',computer-aided visualization of fossils. Figure 1. A split nodule showing the fossil within, in this case a cockroachoid insect. Fossil 4 cm long (From Garwood & Sutton, in press). [source] John Whitehurst (1713,1788): philosopher, geologist, horologist and engineerGEOLOGY TODAY, Issue 3 2002Trevor D. Ford Among the late 18th-century pioneers of geological science was John Whitehurst. He set the scene for the early Derbyshire geologists, White Watson and John Farey, whose books were not published until 1811, long after Whitehurst's death. But Whitehurst's ideas went beyond Derbyshire; he looked at the global situation in his book An Inquiry into the Original State & Formation of the Earth (1778, 1786). Whitehurst was a founder member of the influential Lunar Society and a close friend of many philosophers of the period. [source] A PRAGMATIST DEFENSE OF NON-RELATIVISTIC EXPLANATORY PLURALISM IN HISTORY AND SOCIAL SCIENCEHISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 2 2008JEROEN VAN BOUWEL ABSTRACT Explanatory pluralism has been defended by several philosophers of history and social science, recently, for example, by Tor Egil Førland in this journal. In this article, we provide a better argument for explanatory pluralism, based on the pragmatist idea of epistemic interests. Second, we show that there are three quite different senses in which one can be an explanatory pluralist: one can be a pluralist about questions, a pluralist about answers to questions, and a pluralist about both. We defend the last position. Finally, our third aim is to argue that pluralism should not be equated with "anything goes": we will argue for non-relativistic explanatory pluralism. This pluralism will be illustrated by examples from history and social science in which different forms of explanation (for example, structural, functional, and intentional explanations) are discussed, and the fruitfulness of our framework for understanding explanatory pluralism is shown. [source] EXPLICATION, EXPLANATION, AND HISTORYHISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 2 2008CARL HAMMER ABSTRACT To date, no satisfactory account of the connection between natural-scientific and historical explanation has been given, and philosophers seem to have largely given up on the problem. This paper is an attempt to resolve this old issue and to sort out and clarify some areas of historical explanation by developing and applying a method that will be called "pragmatic explication" involving the construction of definitions that are justified on pragmatic grounds. Explanations in general can be divided into "dynamic" and "static" explanations, which are those that essentially require relations across time and those that do not, respectively. The problem of assimilating historical explanations concerns dynamic explanation, so a general analysis of dynamic explanation that captures both the structure of natural-scientific and historical explanation is offered. This is done in three stages: In the first stage, pragmatic explication is introduced and compared to other philosophical methods of explication. In the second stage pragmatic explication is used to tie together a series of definitions that are introduced in order to establish an account of explanation. This involves an investigation of the conditions that play the role in historiography that laws and statistical regularities play in the natural sciences. The essay argues that in the natural sciences, as well as in history, the model of explanation presented represents the aims and overarching structure of actual causal explanations offered in those disciplines. In the third stage the system arrived at in the preceding stage is filled in with conditions available to and relevant for historical inquiry. Further, the nature and treatment of causes in history and everyday life are explored and related to the system being proposed. This in turn makes room for a view connecting aspects of historical explanation and what we generally take to be causal relations. [source] Historians and Moral EvaluationsHISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 4 2004RICHARD T. VANN In dem Gebiet der Geschichte liegt die ganze moralische Welt. ,Schiller ABSTRACT The reappearance of the question of moral judgments by historians makes a reappraisal of the issues timely. Almost all that has been written on the subject addresses only the propriety of moral judgments (or morally charged language) in the written texts historians produce. However, historians have to make moral choices when selecting a subject upon which to write; and they make a tacit moral commitment to write and teach honestly. Historians usually dislike making explicit moral evaluations, and have little or no training in how to do so. They can argue it's not their job; they are only finders of fact. Historians holding a determinist view of actions do not think it appropriate to blame people for doing what they couldn't help doing; for those believing there is an overall pattern to history, individual morality is beside the point. Finally, since earlier cultures had values different from ours, it seems unjust to hold them to contemporary standards. This essay modifies or rejects these arguments. Some historians have manifested ambivalence, acknowledging it is difficult or impossible to avoid making moral evaluations (and sometimes appropriate to make them). Ordinary-language philosophers, noting that historiography has no specialized vocabulary, see it as saturated by the values inherent in everyday speech and thought. I argue that the historicist argument about the inevitably time-bound limitation of all values is exaggerated. Historians who believe in the religious grounding of values (like Lord Acton) obviously disagree with it; but even on a secular level, morals are often confused with mores. If historians inevitably make moral evaluations, they should examine what philosophical ethicists,virtue ethicists, deontologists, and consequentialists,have said about how to make them; and even if they find no satisfactory grounding for their own moral attitudes, it is a brute fact that they have them. I end with an argument for "strong evaluations",neither treating them as a troublesome residue in historiography nor, having despaired of finding a solid philosophical ground for moral evaluations, concluding that they are merely matters of taste. I believe historians should embrace the role of moral commentators, but that they should be aware that their evaluations are, like all historical judgments, subject to the criticisms of their colleagues and readers. Historians run little risk of being censorious and self-righteous; the far greater danger is acquiescing in or contributing to moral confusion and timidity. [source] The Future of the Philosophy of HistoriographyHISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 1 2001Aviezer Tucker This article argues that the perception of decline among philosophers of history reflects the diffused weak academic status of the discipline, as distinct from the booming research activity and demand for philosophy of history that keeps pace with the growth rate of publications in the philosophies of science and law. This growth is justified and rational because the basic problems of the philosophy of history, concerning the nature of historiographical knowledge and the metaphysical assumptions of historiography, have maintained their relevance. Substantive philosophy of history has an assured popularity but is not likely to win intellectual respectability because of its epistemic weaknesses. I suggest focusing on problems that a study of historiography can help to understand and even solve, as distinct from problems that cannot be decided by an examination of historiography, such as the logical structure of explanation (logical positivism)and the relation between language and reality (post-structuralism). In particular, following Quine's naturalized epistemology, I suggest placing the relation between evidence and historiography at the center of the philosophy of historiography. Inspired by the philosophy of law, I suggest there are three possible relations between input (evidence)and output in historiography: determinism, indeterminism, and underdeterminism. An empirical examination of historiographical agreement, disagreement, and failure to communicate may indicate which relation holds at which parts of historiography. The historiographical community seeks consensus, but some areas are subject to disagreements and absence of communication; these are associated with historiographical schools that interpret conflicting models of history differently to fit their evidence. The reasons for this underdetermination of historiography by evidence needs to be investigated further. [source] Grieving Cosmopolitanism in Middle East StudiesHISTORY COMPASS (ELECTRONIC), Issue 5 2008Will Hanley Political philosophers and cultural theorists studying twenty-first-century globalization have found cosmopolitanism to be a productive concept. In Middle East scholarship, however, cosmopolitan has been less than effective. This review illustrates three characteristics of cosmopolitanism in Middle East historiography , elitism in formulation and content, grieving nostalgia, and the privileging of formal labels over content , with examples from nineteenth-century cities and globalized metropolises. Scholars must confront the anti-nationalist teleology and secularizing, bourgeois fantasy at the heart of cosmopolitanism as it is currently used if they are to produced more accurate accounts of diversity in Middle East societies past and present. [source] Particularity and Perspective Taking: On Feminism and Habermas's Discourse Theory of MoralityHYPATIA, Issue 4 2004Charles WrightArticle first published online: 16 DEC 200 Seyla Benhabib's critique of Jürgen Habermas's moral theory claims that his approach is not adequate for the needs of a feminist moral theory. I argue that her analysis is mistaken. I also show that Habermas's moral theory, properly understood, satisfies many of the conditions identified by feminist moral philosophers as necessary for an adequate moral theory. A discussion of the compatibility between the model of reciprocal perspective taking found in Habermas's moral theory and that found in Maria Lugones's essay "Playfulness,,World'-Travelling, and Loving Perception" reinforces the claim that his moral theory holds as yet unrecognized promise for feminist moral philosophy. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||