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Phenomenal Character (phenomenal + character)
Selected AbstractsThat Which Makes the Sensation of Blue a Mental Fact: Moore on Phenomenal RelationismEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2007Benj Hellie A gift of a dollar for each article in the philosophy of perception and consciousness published since 1990 making reference, explicitly or implicitly, to Moore's discussion in the second half of Moore 19031 of an alleged ,transparency' and ,diaphanousness' pertaining to some aspect of perceptual experience would very likely cover the tab of a mid-priced dinner for two.2 Moore's poetically expressed observations have captured the imagination of contemporary philosophers of perception and consciousness, and have served as the basis of much fruitful discussion in those areas. Still, despite all the attention these observations have received, the contemporary literature lacks a close reading of the second half of Moore's paper, without which it is impossible to understand Moore's observations in the context in which they were originally expressed. It is understandable that such a close reading is lacking: the second half of Moore's paper has been rightly described by one of his most sympathetic and dedicated interpreters as ,extremely dense and opaque' (Klemke 2000: 55).3 But despite the evident difficulties of the task, I aim here, with some trepidation, to provide the missing close reading. The main points of my interpretation will be these. The centerpiece of the anti-idealist manoeuvrings of the second half of the paper is a phenomenological argument for what I will call a relational view of perceptual phenomenal character, on which, roughly, ,that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact' is a relation of conscious awareness, a view close to the opposite of the most characteristic contemporary view going under the transparency rubric.4 The discussion of transparency and diaphanousness is a sidelight, its principal purpose to shore up the main line of argumentation against criticism; in those passages all Moore argues is that the relation of conscious awareness is not transparent, while acknowledging that it can seem to be. My discussion will proceed as follows. In section 1, I will discuss some theses and elucidate some notions from the philosophy of perception and consciousness which will be central to my interpretation; having done so, I will be in a position to explain how an accurate understanding of Moore may contribute to theoretical advances in the philosophy of perception and consciousness. The next two sections contain the exegetical heart of the paper: section 2 provides an analysis of Moore's case for the relational view; section 3 attempts to explain the place of the relational view in the overall refutation of idealism. Section 4 critically discusses a pair of competing interpretations. Section 5 wraps things up, drawing concluding morals as to the campaigns on behalf of which Moore should and should not be enlisted. [source] In Defence of a Doxastic Account of ExperienceMIND & LANGUAGE, Issue 3 2009KATHRIN GLÜER Today, many philosophers think that perceptual experiences are conscious mental states with representational content and phenomenal character. Subscribers to this view often go on to construe experience more precisely as a propositional attitude sui generis ascribing sensible properties to ordinary material objects. I argue that experience is better construed as a kind of belief ascribing ,phenomenal' properties to such objects. A belief theory of this kind deals as well with the traditional arguments against doxastic accounts as the sui generis view. Moreover, in contrast to sui generis views, it can quite easily account for the rational or reason providing role of experience. [source] Ambiguous Figures and the Content of ExperienceNOUS, Issue 1 2006Fiona Macpherson Representationalism is the position that the phenomenal character of an experience is either identical with, or supervenes on, the content of that experience. Many representationalists hold that the relevant content of experience is nonconceptual. I propose a counter-example to this form of representationalism that arises from the phenomenon of Gestalt switching, which occurs when viewing ambiguous figures. First, I argue that one does not need to appeal to the conceptual content of experience or to judgements to account for Gestalt switching. I then argue that experiences of certain ambiguous figures are problematic because they have different phenomenal characters but that no difference in the nonconceptual content of these experiences can be identified. I consider three solutions to this problem that have been proposed by both philosophers and psychologists and conclude that none can account for all the ambiguous figures that pose the problem. I conclude that the onus is on representationalists to specify the relevant difference in content or to abandon their position. [source] Novel Colours and the Content of ExperiencePACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2003Fiona Macpherson The counterexample is generated by experiences of novel colours reported by Crane and Piantanida. I consider various replies that a representationalist might make, including whether novel colours could be possible colours of objects and whether one can account for novel colours as one would account for binary colours or colour mixtures. I argue that none of these strategies is successful and therefore that one cannot fully explain the nature of the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences using a naturalistic conception of representation. [source] PERCEPTION AND THE REACH OF PHENOMENAL CONTENTTHE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 236 2009Tim Bayne The phenomenal character of perceptual experience involves the representation of colour, shape and motion. Does it also involve the representation of high-level categories? Is the recognition of a tomato as a tomato contained within perceptual phenomenality? Proponents of a conservative view of the reach of phenomenal content say ,No', whereas those who take a liberal view of perceptual phenomenality say ,Yes'. I clarify the debate between conservatives and liberals, and argue in favour of the liberal view that high-level content can directly inform the phenomenal character of perception. [source] Ambiguous Figures and the Content of ExperienceNOUS, Issue 1 2006Fiona Macpherson Representationalism is the position that the phenomenal character of an experience is either identical with, or supervenes on, the content of that experience. Many representationalists hold that the relevant content of experience is nonconceptual. I propose a counter-example to this form of representationalism that arises from the phenomenon of Gestalt switching, which occurs when viewing ambiguous figures. First, I argue that one does not need to appeal to the conceptual content of experience or to judgements to account for Gestalt switching. I then argue that experiences of certain ambiguous figures are problematic because they have different phenomenal characters but that no difference in the nonconceptual content of these experiences can be identified. I consider three solutions to this problem that have been proposed by both philosophers and psychologists and conclude that none can account for all the ambiguous figures that pose the problem. I conclude that the onus is on representationalists to specify the relevant difference in content or to abandon their position. [source] | ||||||||||