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Paper I Attempt (paper + i_attempt)
Selected AbstractsLiberalism, Fundamentalism and TruthJOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, Issue 4 2006MATT SLEAT abstract One way in which we may be tempted to understand the distinction we make in practice between liberals and fundamentalists is via the issue of truth. Liberals are generally more sceptical about truth while fundamentalists tend to be more objectivist, believing not only that objective truth exists but also that they know it. I call this interpretation the ,truth interpretation'. In this paper I attempt to undermine the ,truth interpretation' by showing that it does not map on adequately to the sorts of distinctions that we actually make in practice. We will see that thinking that the distinction between liberals and fundamentalists revolves around the philosophical issue of truth, such that the ,good guys' are sceptics and the ,bad guys' objectivists, fails to connect with our practical distinctions. The second half of the paper then addresses the question of what role, if any, truth does play in distinguishing between liberals and fundamentalists, arguing that if truth does play a role we should see it as a very narrow and political, rather, than philosophical one. [source] Self-Knowledge and Self-ReferencePHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH, Issue 1 2006Robert J. Howell Self-Knowledge and Self-Reference is a defense and reconciliation of the two apparently conflicting theses that the self is peculiarly elusive and that our basic, cogito-judgments are certain. On the one hand, Descartes seems to be correct that nothing is more certain than basic statements of self-knowledge, such as "I am thinking." On the other hand, there is the compelling Humean observation that when we introspect, nothing is found except for various "impressions." The problem, then, is that the Humean and Cartesian insights are both initially appealing, yet they appear to be in tension with one another. In this paper I attempt to satisfy both intuitions by developing a roughly descriptivist account of self-reference according to which our certainty in basic beliefs stems precisely from our needing to know so little in order to have them. [source] Anima(l)s: women, nature and JungPSYCHOTHERAPY AND POLITICS INTERNATIONAL, Issue 1 2006Liz Evans Abstract In this paper I attempt to find ways in which Jungian theory can support ecofeminism in its attempt to bring about a new, non-dualistic consciousness in order to balance up the current masculine economy. I begin with an exploration of Luce Irigaray's reading of Jacques Lacan's symbolic order, which Irigaray claims has denied women subjectivity within Western culture. Her solution, shared by Hélène Cixous and contemporary ecofeminists, is for women to resubmit themselves to the symbolic via maternal geneaology and nature, with nature offering the most effective means of critiquing and subverting the masculine economy. This suggestion has engendered accusations of essentialism, which I also explore and deconstruct using the theories of ecofeminist Susan Griffin and feminist writer Diana Fuss, as well as CG Jung's theory of archetypes. I then move on to consider Jung's notion of the anima, attempting to show how this controversial concept, together with certain types of ecofeminist theory, can open up possibilities for a new symbolic order for both men and women via a more embodied, embedded connection with nature. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] WEIGHTED LOTTERIES IN LIFE AND DEATH CASESRATIO, Issue 1 2007Iwao Hirose Faced with a choice between saving one stranger and saving a group of strangers, some people endorse weighted lotteries, which give a strictly greater chance of being saved to the group of strangers than the single stranger. In this paper I attempt to criticize this view. I first consider a particular version of the weighted lotteries, Frances Kamm's procedure of proportional chances, and point out two implausible implications of her proposal. Then, I consider weighted lotteries in general, and claim (1) that the correct thing to distribute is not the chance of being saved but the good of being saved, (2) that assigning some chance to the single stranger is not the only way to give a positive (and equal) respect to the people concerned, and (3) that the weighted lottery appears to be deceptive since it would show the respect to the single stranger in a negligible way. [source] Moral Incapacity and Huckleberry FinnRATIO, Issue 1 2001Craig Taylor Bernard Williams distinguishes moral incapacities , incapacities that are themselves an expression of the moral life , from mere psychological ones in terms of deliberation. Against Williams I claim there are examples of such moral incapacity where no possible deliberation is involved , that an agent's incapacity may be a primitive feature or fact about their life. However Michael Clark argues that my claim here leaves the distinction between moral and psychological incapacity unexplained, and that an adequate understanding of the kind of examples I suggest must involve at least some implicit reference to deliberation. In this paper I attempt to meet Clark's objection and further clarify my account of primitive moral incapacities by considering an example from Mark Twain's Huckleberry Finn. What this example shows, I argue, is how our characterization of an agent's response as a moral incapacity turns not on the idea of deliberation but on the way certain primitive incapacities for action are connected to a larger pattern of response in an agent's life, a pattern of response that itself helps to constitute our conception of that agent's character and the moral life more generally. [source] | ||||||||||