Home About us Contact
|
Home About us Contact | ||
|
|
||
Prudential Regulation (prudential + regulation)
Selected AbstractsCOULD TIGHTER PRUDENTIAL REGULATION HAVE SAVED THAILAND'S BANKS?THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES, Issue 3 2001Thomas HARTMANN-WENDELS First page of article [source] Prudential Regulation of Banks in Less Developed EconomiesDEVELOPMENT POLICY REVIEW, Issue 3 2002S. Mansoob Murshed This article argues that developing countries face inherent obstacles in setting up efficient financial regulation, and building up a sound banking sector: the presence of multiple tasks and multiple principals, poor institutions, lack of economies of scale in the banking sector as well as regulatory supervision, and the lack of reputation. Developing countries need a regulatory framework that rewards prudent risk-taking, but punishes misconduct. This is likely to involve a combination of input-based measures impacting on bankers' incentives, with a few direct controls on the output of the sector. The article concludes with a list of policy options whose appropriateness is judged by their ,friendliness' with local circumstances. [source] Prudential Regulation and the "Credit Crunch": Evidence from JapanJOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Issue 2-3 2007WAKO WATANABE credit crunch; capital crunch; prudential regulation; instrumental variable The underlying causes of sharp declines in bank lending during recessions in large developed economies, as exemplified by the U.S. in the early 1990s and Japan in the late 1990s, are still being debated due to the lack of any convincing identification strategy of the supply side capital,lending relationship from lending demand. Using within bank share of real estate lending in the late 1980s as an instrumental variable for bank capital, we find that Japanese banks cut back on their lending in response to a large loss of bank capital in fiscal year 1997. [source] When Insurers Go Bust: An Economic Analysis of the Role and Design of Prudential Regulation by Guillaume Plantin and Jean Charles RochetJOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE, Issue 3 2008Article first published online: 4 AUG 200 No abstract is available for this article. [source] The Regulatory State and Turkish Banking Reforms in the Age of Post-Washington ConsensusDEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE, Issue 1 2010Caner Bakir ABSTRACT The new era of the Post-Washington Consensus (PWC), promoted under the auspices of International Financial Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, centres on the need to develop sound financial regulation and strong regulatory institutions, especially in the realm of banking and finance in post-financial crisis developing countries. This article uses an examination of the Turkish banking sector experience with the PWC in the aftermath of the 2001 financial crisis to show its considerable strengths and weaknesses. The authors argue that the emergent regulatory state in the bank-based financial system has a narrow focus on strengthening prudential regulation, whilst ignoring the increased ,financialization' of the Turkish economy. They identify the positive features of the new era of the PWC in terms of prudential regulation, which has become much more robust in its ability to withstand external shocks. At the same time, however, the article highlights some of the limitations of the new era which resemble the limitations of the PWC. These include the distributional impact of the regulatory reforms within the banking sector, and notably the emergence of foreign banks as the major beneficiaries of this process; weaknesses in promoting productive bank intermediation that finance the real economy and economic growth, leading to poverty reduction via growth of employment whilst stimulating financialization within the economy; and finally, the exclusive focus on prudential regulation, whilst ignoring regulatory costs, consumer protection and competition regulation. [source] Prudential Regulation and the "Credit Crunch": Evidence from JapanJOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Issue 2-3 2007WAKO WATANABE credit crunch; capital crunch; prudential regulation; instrumental variable The underlying causes of sharp declines in bank lending during recessions in large developed economies, as exemplified by the U.S. in the early 1990s and Japan in the late 1990s, are still being debated due to the lack of any convincing identification strategy of the supply side capital,lending relationship from lending demand. Using within bank share of real estate lending in the late 1980s as an instrumental variable for bank capital, we find that Japanese banks cut back on their lending in response to a large loss of bank capital in fiscal year 1997. [source] | |||||||||||||