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Output Market (output + market)
Selected AbstractsModeling Agglomeration and Dispersion in City and Country: Gunnar Myrdal, François Perroux, and the New Economic GeographyAMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY, Issue 1 2001Stephen J. MeardonArticle first published online: 28 JUN 200 The "new economic geography" is a recent body of literature that seeks to explain how resources and production come to be concentrated spatially for reasons other than the standard "geographic" ones. Unlike alternative explanations of the geographic distribution of industry, the literature is not interdisciplinary. The new economic geography lies well within economics proper: it is an offspring of international trade theory, with models characterized by increasing returns, factor mobility, and transportation costs. The models explain the distribution of industry in terms of the opposition of an agglomerating force, the interaction of transportation costs and increasing returns to scale, with a dispersing force, commonly the interaction of transportation costs and a partially fixed input or output market. Some authors outside the new economic geography (e.g., Martin 1999) have criticized it as simplistic, irrelevant, or passé. They claim it employs overly abstract analysis, prioritizes mathematical technique over realistic explanation, and is reminiscent of the much earlier works of Gunnar Myrdal and François Perroux,in comparison to which, however, it falls short. This paper investigates the similarities and differences between the new economic geography and the work of Myrdal and Perroux, who in the previous special issue of this journal were ranked by Zafirovsky (1999, pp. 596, 598) as among the leading twentieth century economic sociologists. I examine how the techniques of analysis and intuitive explanations of agglomeration compare between these economic sociologists and the new economic geographers. The paper highlights what has been gained and what has been lost by the new economic geographers, who generally eschew interdisciplinary study. [source] Why Do Suppliers Charge Larger Buyers Lower Prices?THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2001Rajeev K. Tyagi The phenomenon of input suppliers charging larger buyer firms, relative to smaller buyer firms, lower prices is commonly explained in terms of supplier economies of scale, supplier competition for larger buyers, and the larger bargaining power of larger buyers. This paper provides an alternative explanation, and shows that the observed direction of differential pricing can benefit the supplier by lowering the level of tacit collusion its buyers can sustain in their output market. This result also provides a new mechanism through which a ban on price discrimination by input suppliers may lower consumer welfare. [source] LICENSING CONTRACT IN A STACKELBERG MODEL,THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 5 2005LUIGI FILIPPINI We study optimal linear licensing and its social welfare implications when the innovator (patentee) is an insider that can make capacity/output commitment so as to act as a Stackelberg leader in the output market. We show that (i) the patentee's profit-maximizing licensing contract is a royalty; (ii) the optimal royalty rate is greater than the cost reduction attained by the licensed technology and is increasing in the number of competitors; (iii) optimal licensing maximizes the likelihood of technology transfer, may reduce social welfare and always makes consumers worse off; and (iv) the innovator benefits from capacity commitment, and the more competitive the output market, the greater the gains it makes by licensing. The opposite holds for consumers. [source] Growth and Poverty Reduction in Uganda, 1999,2000: Panel Data EvidenceDEVELOPMENT POLICY REVIEW, Issue 4 2003Klaus Deininger To explore factors underlying growth and poverty reduction in Africa while overcoming some of the limitations of cross-country analysis, this article uses micro-level survey and panel-data evidence from Uganda spanning 1992,2000. The high elasticity of both income growth and poverty reduction with respect to agricultural output (coffee) prices confirms the benefits from Uganda's decisive liberalisation of output markets. It also suggests the importance of product diversification to protect the poor against price shocks and the potential of cotton-market improvements in tackling persistent poverty in the North. The importance of improving access to basic education and health care emerges more clearly than in cross-country analysis, but benefits depend on complementary investments in electricity and other infrastructure, and reductions in civil strife. [source] Testing for market power in the Australian grains and oilseeds industriesAGRIBUSINESS : AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, Issue 3 2007Christopher J. O'Donnell We formally assess competitive buying and selling behavior in the Australian grains and oilseeds industries using a more realistic empirical model and a less aggregated data set than previously available. We specify a duality model of profit maximization that allows for imperfect competition in both input and output markets and for variable-proportions technologies. Aggregate input-output data are used to define the structure of the relevant industries, and time series data are then used to implement the model for 13 grains and oilseeds products handled by seven groups of agents. The model is estimated in a Bayesian econometrics framework. We find evidence of flour and cereal food product manufacturers exerting market power when purchasing wheat, barley, oats and triticale; beer and malt manufacturers exerting market power when purchasing wheat and barley; and other food product manufacturers exerting market power when purchasing wheat, barley, oats and triticale. [EconLit citations: C11, L66, Q11]. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Agribusiness 23: 349,376, 2007. [source] A welfare analysis of spectrum allocation policiesTHE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2009Thomas W. Hazlett Economic analysis of spectrum policy focuses on government revenues derived via competitive bidding for licenses. Auctions generating high bids are identified as "successful" and those with lower receipts as "fiascoes." Yet spectrum policies that create rents impose social costs. Most obviously, rules favoring monopoly predictably increase license values but reduce welfare. This article attempts to shift analytical focus to efficiency in output markets. In performance metrics derived by comparing 28 mobile telephone markets, countries allocating greater bandwidth to licensed operators and achieving more competitive market structures are estimated to realize efficiencies that generally dominate those associated with license sales. Policies intended to increase auction receipts (e.g., reserve prices and subsidies for weak bidders) should be evaluated in this light. [source] |