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Out-of-pocket Payments (out-of-pocket + payment)
Selected AbstractsDo Defendants Pay What Juries Award?JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES, Issue 1 2007Post-Verdict Haircuts in Texas Medical Malpractice Cases Legal scholars, legislators, policy advocates, and the news media frequently use jury verdicts to draw conclusions about the performance of the tort system. However, actual payouts can differ greatly from verdicts. We report evidence on post-verdict payouts from the most comprehensive longitudinal study of matched jury verdicts and payouts. Using data on all insured medical malpractice claims in Texas from 1988,2003 in which the plaintiff received at least $25,000 (in 1988 dollars) following a jury trial, we find that most jury awards received "haircuts." Seventy-five percent of plaintiffs received a payout less than the adjusted verdict (jury verdict plus prejudgment and postjudgment interest), 20 percent received the adjusted verdict (within ± 2 percent), and 5 percent received more than the adjusted verdict. Overall, plaintiffs received a mean (median) per-case haircut of 29 percent (19 percent), and an aggregate haircut of 56 percent, relative to the adjusted verdict. The larger the verdict, the more likely and larger the haircut. For cases with a positive adjusted verdict under $100,000, 47 percent of plaintiffs received a haircut, with a mean (median) per-case haircut of 8 percent (2 percent). For cases with an adjusted verdict larger than $2.5 million, 98 percent of plaintiffs received a haircut with a mean (median) per-case haircut of 56 percent (61 percent). Insurance policy limits are the most important factor in explaining haircuts. Caps on damages in death cases and caps on punitive damages are also important, but defendants often paid substantially less than the adjusted allowed verdict. Remittitur accounts for a small percentage of the haircuts. Punitive damage awards have only a small effect on payouts. Out-of-pocket payments by physicians are rare, never large, and usually unrelated to punitive damage awards. Most cases settle, presumably in the shadow of the outcome if the case were to be tried. That outcome is not the jury award, but the actual post-verdict payout. Because defendants rarely pay what juries award, jury verdicts alone do not provide a sufficient basis for claims about the performance of the tort system. [source] Willingness to pay for a hearing aid: comparing the payment scale and open-ended questionJOURNAL OF EVALUATION IN CLINICAL PRACTICE, Issue 1 2009Janneke P. C. Grutters MSc Abstract Rationale & objectives, Different question formats elicit different willingness-to-pay (WTP) results, but there is no consensus on which method elicits the most valid WTP. In spite of the methodological controversies, WTP is a potentially valuable tool in health economics to value health services. Our general objective was to provide additional evidence on the validity of two WTP elicitation formats: the open-ended question and the payment scale. Methods, We elicited WTP for a hearing aid among hearing aid users (n = 108), using both a payment scale and an open-ended question. We compared the results from both formats. We tested criterion validity by comparing both formats with the actual out-of-pocket payment. Construct validity was tested by examining whether WTP was consistent with positive income elasticity. Results, The WTP results elicited with the payment scale and open-ended question were not statistically significantly different. Both formats showed good criterion validity, although the open-ended question showed a stronger association with the actual out-of-pocket payment. The open-ended format showed better construct validity, as it was influenced by family income. Conclusion, The results of the present study showed that the open-ended question was more valid than the payment scale question. We, therefore, recommend that in future WTP studies on hearing aids the open-ended question is used to directly elicit WTP values. The same recommendation may apply to other studies where respondents are familiar with costs or payments for the intervention under evaluation. [source] Does free complementary health insurance help the poor to access health care?HEALTH ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2008Evidence from France Abstract The French government introduced a ,free complementary health insurance plan' in 2000, which covers most of the out-of-pocket payments faced by the poorest 10% of French residents. This plan was designed to help the non-elderly poor to access health care. To assess the impact of the introduction of the plan on its beneficiaries, we use a longitudinal data set to compare, for the same individual, the evolution of his/her expenditures before-and-after enrolment in the plan. This before-and-after analysis allows us to remove most of the spuriousness due to individual heterogeneity. We also use information on past coverage in a difference-in-difference analysis to evaluate the impact of specific benefits associated with the plan. We attempt at controlling for changes other than enrolment through a difference-in-difference analysis within the eligible (rather than enrolled) population. Our main result is the plan's lack of an overall effect on utilization. This result is likely attributable to the fact that those who were enrolled automatically in the free plan (the majority of enrollees), already benefited from a relatively generous plan. The significant effect among those who enrolled voluntarily in the free plan was likely driven by those with no previous complementary coverage. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Reflections on and alternatives to WHO's fairness of financial contribution indexHEALTH ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2002*Article first published online: 28 FEB 200, Adam Wagstaff Abstract In its 2000 World Health Report (WHR), the World Health Organization argues that a key dimension of a health system's performance is the fairness of its financing system. This paper provides a critical assessment of the index of fairness of financial contribution (FFC) proposed in the WHR. It shows that the index cannot discriminate between health financing systems that are regressive and those that are progressive, and cannot discriminate between horizontal inequity on the one hand, and progressivity and regressivity on the other. The paper compares the WHO index to an alternative and more illuminating approach developed in the income redistribution literature in the early 1990s and used in the late 1990s to study the fairness of various OECD countries' health financing systems. It ends with an illustrative empirical comparison of the two approaches using data on out-of-pocket payments for health services in Vietnam for two years , 1993 and 1998. This analysis is of some interest in its own right, given the large share of health spending from out-of-pocket payments in Vietnam, and the changes in fees and drug prices over the 1990s. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] | ||||||||||