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Optimal Regulation (optimal + regulation)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting75%

Selected Abstracts

Optimal Regulation of Cooperative R&D Under Incomplete Information

THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2004
Isabelle Brocas
A regulator offers a cooperation contract to two firms to develop a research project. The contract provides incentives to encourage skill-sharing and coordinate subsequent efforts. Innovators must get informational rents to disclose their privately known skills, which results in distorting R&D efforts with respect to the first-best level. When efforts are strategic complements, both efforts are distorted downwards. By contrast, when efforts are strategic substitutes, the effort of the firm with most valuable skills is distorted downwards (to decrease rents) and the effort of the other firm is distorted upwards (to compensate the previous efficiency loss). [source]

Regulated Quality Diffusion Revisited

INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, Issue 4 2001
Andreas J. Novak
In many manufacturing applications, the regulation of a quality process to attain a given target is of central interest. In a recent paper, Liu and Nam (1999) present a model of optimal quality regulation. The underlying quality process evolves due to regulation actions and superimposed random disturbances. Optimal regulation is sought as to minimize the regulation costs and the mean squared deviation from the desired target over a finite time horizon. Unfortunately the model is incorrectly analyzed in Liu and Nam (1999), and we therefore present the correct results in the following paper. [source]

Regulation of Technology Transfer to Developing Countries: The Relevance of Institutional Capacity,

LAW & POLICY, Issue 1 2005
KEVIN E. DAVIS
This article revisits the debate over appropriate approaches to the regulation of technology transfer to developing countries. It begins by contrasting two stylized approaches, labeled for convenience the "New International Economic Order" model and the "Globalization" model, which have historically struggled for acceptance. It then explores the implications for the choice between these or alternative models of the fact that many developing countries presently lack the institutional capacity required to provide optimal regulation of technology transfer. Existing discussions appear either to assume that developing countries possess sufficient institutional capacity to design and implement sophisticated regulatory regimes, or to take the opposite approach and assume a drastic shortage of institutional capacity. Both approaches ignore the intermediate category of countries that do face constraints upon institutional capacity but are striving to overcome them. The analysis here is intended to demonstrate the general point that a country's present and future institutional capacity ought to be considered highly relevant to the design of central aspects of the regime that it uses to regulate technology transfer. The analysis is also designed to highlight the specific need for attention to the distinctive questions of regulatory design which arise in countries that are in the process of enhancing their institutional capacity in this and other regulatory contexts. [source]

National Treatment and the optimal regulation of environmental externalities

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2008
Sumeet Gulati
Abstract., We analyze the role of National Treatment in the regulation of environmental product standards for an open economy. A social planner uses product standards to control emissions from the consumption of a traded good. We show that whether National Treatment of standards interferes with welfare-maximizing policy depends on the instruments available to the policy maker (consumption or emissions tax) and differences in the cost of complying with the standard. We also highlight the asymmetric incidence of the domestic and import product standard when taxes are suboptimal. This asymmetric incidence can also cause welfare-maximizing policy to violate National Treatment. On analyse le rôle du principe de traitement identique des entités domestiques ou importées dans la réglementation des normes environnementales dans une économie ouverte. Un gouvernement utilise des normes pour contrôler les émissions découlant de la consommation d'un produit transigé internationalement. On montre que le fait que le traitement identique des normes va ou non interférer avec l'objectif poursuivi qui est de maximiser le niveau de bien-être va dépendre de l'ensemble des instruments disponibles pour l'architecte des politiques (une taxe sur la consommation ou sur les émissions) et des différences dans les coûts à encourir pour se conformer aux normes. On souligne aussi l'incidence asymétrique des normes sur les produits domestiques et importés quand les taxes sont sous optimales. Cette incidence asymétrique peut faire que la politique qui vise la maximisation du bien-être soit en violation du principe de traitement identique. [source]