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One Jurisdiction (one + jurisdiction)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	75%

Selected Abstracts

The (Mis)Uses of Detention and the Impact of Bed Space in One Jurisdiction

JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JOURNAL, Issue 3 2002
LISA J. BOND-MAUPIN PH.D
ABSTRACT Analysis of booking data prior to and following the opening of a new facility doubling available bed space reveals that 53.0% of detentions end prior to or at a detention hearing, charges for 48.8% of bookings are for technical violations of probation or status offenses only, and that 62.5% of bookings are for a combination of the prior two offense and other minor offenses. These trends as well as the actual number of youths detained increased with the move into a new facility with twice the bed space. The data suggest that detention is frequently used as shelter and/or punishment even though a juvenile does not technically represent a threat to self, community, or of absconding. [source]

Unravelling the Capital Charging Riddle , Some Empirical Evidence from Victoria

FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY & MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2003
Tyrone M. Carlin
Since 1995, the State of Victoria has been experimenting with capital charging regimes for budget sector agencies. The intent of these schemes is to allow the opportunity cost of capital to be reflected in the assessed total costs of outputs produced by agencies the subject of the charge. While literature produced by government central financial agencies has forcefully advocated this experiment, and asserted a range of resulting improvements to budget sector asset management and general financial management practices, academic examinations of the subject have been mixed in their conclusions. Empirical evidence relating to the effect and effectiveness of these schemes has been scarce. This paper seeks to contribute to the literature by providing some empirical evidence on the impact of capital charging in one jurisdiction, Victoria, Australia. [source]

Fiskalischer Wettbewerb und Einkommensumverteilung

PERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, Issue 2 2000
Lars P. Feld
Fiscal competition is supposed to lead to the collapse of the welfare state because, first, it will become difficult for a single jurisdiction to levy a redistribution tax upon the rich and mobile, and second, such a policy, if undertaken in one jurisdiction, will attract poor individuals from other jurisdictions and erode the internal redistribution policy. In this paper, theoretical and empirical studies concerning the impact of taxes and transfer payments on residence decisions of taxpayers are reviewed. The relationship of fiscal competition and the erosion of the welfare state is illustrated with aggregate data on income redistribution in Switzerland. [source]

An Analysis of the Time to Adoption of Local Sales Taxes: A Duration Model Approach

PUBLIC BUDGETING AND FINANCE, Issue 1 2007
DAVID L. SJOQUIST
The timing of the decision of local governments to adopt a local sales tax is explored in a duration model with time-varying covariates. Our framework suggests a set of factors associated with the decision to adopt a local sales tax and we find empirical support for these factors. We also consider whether the adoption by one jurisdiction depends on the adoption by neighboring jurisdictions and find empirical support for interdependency of behavior. [source]