National Elections (national + elections)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Selected Abstracts

Coordination between electoral arenas in multilevel countries

This article shows the existence of a coordination dilemma in multilevel countries that hold elections for different parliaments, at different territorial levels and with different electoral rules. With evidence from Spain, the analysis identifies interaction or contamination effects between national and subnational electoral arenas that generate, just as in most mixed-member electoral systems, a centrifugal force that increases the number of electoral parties in national elections. The incentives that solve this coordination dilemma faced by small regional or local parties are theoretically discussed and empirically tested. [source]

Still the Anomalous Democracy?

Institutions in Italy, Politics
Until the early 1990s, the Italian political system was regarded as anomalous among advanced democracies because of its failure to achieve alternation in government. Since then, that problem has been overcome, but Italy has been popularly viewed as continuing to be different to other democracies because it is ,in transition' between regimes. However, this position itself is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain because of the length of time of this so-called transition. Rather than focus on what is rather an abstract debate, it may be more fruitful to analyse what, in substance, is distinctive about Italian politics in this period: the manner in which a debate over fundamental institutional (including electoral) reform has become entangled in day-to-day politics. This can best be exemplified through an analysis of two key electoral consultations held in 2006: the national elections and the referendum on radically revising the Italian Constitution. [source]

Politics and Society in The Gambia since Independence

David Perfect
This article examines politics in The Gambia since it achieved its independence from Britain in 1965. The Gambia was the longest continuously surviving multi-party democracy in Africa until a successful military coup in 1994, with civilian rule being restored in 1996. The article explores political developments under its two post-colonial leaders, Sir Dawda Jawara (1965,94) and Yahya Jammeh (1994,) in detail, discussing the major Gambian political parties and their performance in national elections; the military coups of 1981 and 1994; and other key events. The overall performance of both governments, in terms of economic and social developments and human rights, is also assessed. [source]

Mobile discourse: political bumper stickers as a communication event in Israel

L-R Bloch
The use of political bumper stickers in Israel began as a spontaneous protest medium, evolving into a routinized form of public discourse, taking place throughout the year, independently of national elections. The rules of interaction of this nontraditional means of political communication are identified and the complex relationships between the messages within their social situation are investigated using an ethnographic model. This analysis reveals that the medium does indeed constitute a structured means of expression with identifiable forms, rules, and usages, affording the person in the street a way of participating in the national discourse, bypassing traditional avenues of influence. The detailed examination of a single political bumper sticker reveals a structure parallel to the overall code, further demonstrating the intricacy of the messages. The analysis shows how this political discourse reflects social norms peculiar to Israel and how its use has become an affirmation of cultural identity. Because the fundamental properties of political bumper stickers have now been exposed, it is possible to examine how the actual use of this medium changes the structure of political agency in society through the presumption that ordinary individuals have the right of access to the public debate of national political issues, a right heretofore exclusively the prerogative of institutional power holders. [source]

The Political Economy of Polarization: The Italian Case, 1963,1987

POLITICS & POLICY, Issue 1 2003
Riccardo Pelizzo
Economic voting in Italy has received scant attention in the literature, and the few studies available show little or no empirical support for economic voting hypotheses as applied to Italy. We argue that this dearth of results is primarily due to poor operationalization and study design. In contrast to previous studies that focused on the relationship between the state of the economy and the electoral performance of individual parties, we investigate the impact of prices, employment, and economic output on the polarization of the party system. Using data on seven Italian national elections covering the period 1963,87, we show that polarization is, in fact, closely related to macroeconomic performance. Additionally, in contrast to past studies of Italy, the results are robust with respect to the lag period of the economic variables. [source]

Uncounted Votes: Informal Voting in the House of Representatives as a Marker of Political Exclusion in Australia

Sally Young
This article examines the implications of high levels of informal (or invalid) voting in Australian national elections using a social exclusion framework. The rate of the informal vote is an indicator of social and political exclusion with particular groups of Australians experiencing inordinate electoral disadvantage. Poorer voters, voters from non-English speaking backgrounds and those with low education levels are especially disadvantaged by factors peculiar to the Australian voting experience. We begin by exploring the character and pattern of informal voting and then canvass the technical and socio-economic factors which explain it. We conclude by considering proposed options for reducing informality, some of which are: the abandonment of compulsory voting, major structural change to the voting system as well as ballot re-design, electoral education and community information initiatives. [source]

Political manipulation in a majoritarian democracy: central government targeting of public funds to English subnational government, in space and across time

Peter John
This article argues that it is rational for the executive to target resources in space and through time if it seeks to maximise its chances of electoral success. In majoritarian democracies such as the United Kingdom, there are particularly strong incentives to target resources to marginal legislative constituencies, although similar opportunies exist in other political systems. The benefits of such a practice could be growing, because the costs of forms of temporal targeting predicted by theories of the political business cycle have increased, owing to the effect of the global economy. In the United Kingdom one channel through which resources can be targeted is central grants to local authorities. This model is tested with pooled cross-section data on the central finance of English local government between 1981/1982,1995/1996. The article confirms that central government spatially targeted marginals after 1988/1989 while it continued to allocate greater funds near national elections, conditional on its opinion-poll ratings. Hypotheses from the literature on distributional politics are also tested, finding evidence for the temporal allocation of resources to win local elections. [source]