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Arguments
Kinds of Arguments Terms modified by Arguments Selected AbstractsSTRATEGIC RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: SOCIETAL OBJECTIVES AND THE CORPORATE WELFARE ARGUMENTCONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY, Issue 1 2009RICHARD T. GRETZ The article considers the optimal research and development subsidy regime in a two-firm two-country model where each firm is "located" in a specific country. Trade is intra-industry in that customers in both countries purchase from both firms. The article suggests that when both countries subsidize their local firm usually welfare increases compared to the case of zero subsidies. Making the same comparison, profit always falls in the symmetric game and falls about half the time in the asymmetric game. These results call into question some common notions about corporate welfare. (JEL O38, H25, F23) [source] DEWEY'S EPISTEMOLOGY: AN ARGUMENT FOR WARRANTED ASSERTIONS, KNOWING, AND MEANINGFUL CLASSROOM PRACTICEEDUCATIONAL THEORY, Issue 1 2006Deron R. BoylesArticle first published online: 3 FEB 200 Deron Boyles asserts that epistemology can and should represent an area of inquiry that is relevant and useful for philosophy of education, especially as it develops classroom practices that foster inquiry. He specifically seeks to revive Dewey's conception of warranted assertibility in an effort to show the value of fallibilist epistemology in practical and social teaching and learning contexts. By highlighting the distinctions between traditional epistemology and Dewey's conception of knowing, Boyles demonstrates that epistemology has value insofar as it highlights a more useful, instrumentalist theory of knowing that is applicable to classroom practice. [source] DENNETT ON THE BASIC ARGUMENTMETAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 4 2005John Martin Fischer Abstract: I argue that Dennett does not adequately support his rejection of the "Basic Argument" for the incompatibility of causal determinism and the sort of free will that involves genuine access to alternative possibilities (sometimes referred to as the "Consequence Argument"). In addition, I seek to highlight the plausibility and importance of the incompatibilist's interpretation of this sort of free will. [source] THE ARGUMENT FROM BINDING*PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES, Issue 1 2008Paul Elbourne First page of article [source] THE MODAL ARGUMENT FOR A PRIORI JUSTIFICATIONRATIO, Issue 2 2009Joachim Horvath Kant famously argued that, from experience, we can only learn how something actually is, but not that it must be so. In this paper, I defend an improved version of Kant's argument for the existence of a priori knowledge, the Modal Argument, against recent objections by Casullo and Kitcher. For the sake of the argument, I concede Casullo's claim that we may know certain counterfactuals in an empirical way and thereby gain epistemic access to some nearby, nomologically possible worlds. But I maintain that our beliefs about metaphysical necessities still cannot be justified empirically. Furthermore, I reject Casullo's deflationary thesis about the significance of such justification. Kitcher's most troublesome objection is that we can gain any modal justification whatsoever through testimony, i.e. in an experiential way. This can be countered by distinguishing between productive sources of justification, like perception, and merely reproductive sources, like testimony. Thus, some productive a priori source will always be needed somewhere.1 [source] THE KANTIAN ARGUMENT FOR CONSEQUENTIALISMRATIO, Issue 1 2009Michael Otsuka A critical examination of Parfit's attempt to reconcile Kantian contractualism with consequentialism, which disputes his contention that the contracting parties would lack decisive reasons to choose principles that ground prohibitions against harming of the sort to which non-consequentialists have been attracted.1 [source] A NOTE ON KRIPKE's FOOTNOTE 56 ARGUMENT FOR THE ESSENTIALITY OF ORIGINRATIO, Issue 3 2005Ross P. Cameron In footnote 56 of his Naming and Necessity, Kripke offers a ,proof' of the essentiality of origin. On its most literal reading the argument is clearly flawed, as was made clear by Nathan Salmon. Salmon attempts to save the literal reading of the argument, but I argue that the new argument is flawed as well, and that it can't be what Kripke intended. I offer an alternative reconstruction of Kripke's argument, but I show that this suffers from a more subtle fault. [source] THE KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT AND HIGHER-ORDER PROPERTIESRATIO, Issue 1 2005Amir Horowitz The paper argues that Jackson's knowledge argument fails to undermine physicalist ontology. First, it is argued that, as this argument stands, it begs the question. Second, it is suggested that, by supplementing the argument (and taking one of its premises for granted), this flaw can be remedied insofar as the argument is taken to be an argument against type-physicalism; however, this flaw cannot be remedied insofar as the argument is taken to be an argument against token-physicalism. The argument cannot be supplemented so as to show that experiences have properties which are illegitimate from a physicalist perspective. [source] DEMONS AND THE ISOLATION ARGUMENTTHE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 220 2005Scott Hendrigks Justifying a belief gives reason to think that the belief is true. So our concept of justification contains a ,truth connection'. I canvass a number of proposals for analysing this. In the end, two competing conceptions of the truth connection remain: the first, that justifying a belief makes the belief objectively probable, the second, that justifying a belief makes the belief probable in a world which would make true our other beliefs. I discuss reasons for embracing and rejecting these two versions of the truth connection. Ultimately, the two versions appear to represent distinct but equally plausible conceptions of justification. I conclude by rejecting the proposal that these truth connections respectively capture internalist and externalist conceptions of justification. [source] A CRITIQUE OF THE INNOVATION ARGUMENT AGAINST A NATIONAL HEALTH PROGRAMBIOETHICS, Issue 6 2007ALEX RAJCZI ABSTRACT President Bush and his Council of Economic Advisors have claimed that the US shouldn't adopt a national health program because doing so would slow innovation in health care. Some have attacked this argument by challenging its moral claim that innovativeness is a good ground for choosing between health care systems. This reply is misguided. If we want to refute the argument from innovation, we have to undercut the premise that seems least controversial , the premise that our current system produces more innovation than a national health program would. I argue that this premise is false. The argument requires clarifying the concept ,national health program' and examining various theories of human well-being. [source] BENEFICENCE, DETERMINISM AND JUSTICE: AN ENGAGEMENT WITH THE ARGUMENT FOR THE GENETIC SELECTION OF INTELLIGENCEBIOETHICS, Issue 1 2005KEAN BIRCH ABSTRACT In 2001, Julian Savulescu wrote an article entitled ,Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children', in which he argued for the genetic selection of intelligence in children. That article contributes to a debate on whether genetic research on intelligence should be undertaken at all and, if so, should intelligence selection be available to potential parents. As such, the question of intelligence selection relates to wider issues concerning the genetic determination of behavioural traits, i.e. alcoholism. This article is designed as an engagement in the intelligence selection debate using an analysis of Savulescu's arguments to raise a series of problematic issues in relation to the ethics of parental selection of intelligence. These problematic issues relate to wider assumptions that are made in order to put forward intelligence selection as a viable ethical option. Such assumptions are more generic in character, but still relate to Savulescu's article, concerning issues of genetic determinism, private allocation and inequality, and, finally, individual versus aggregate justice. The conclusion focuses on what the implications are for the question of agency, especially if intelligence selection is allowed. [source] DISCUSSIONS AND ARGUMENTS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS by John Henry Newman, introduction and notes by Gerard Tracey and James Tolhurst, Gracewing, Leominster & University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame IN, 2004, Pp. xlix + 490, £25.00 hbk.NEW BLACKFRIARS, Issue 1002 2005Todd C. Ream No abstract is available for this article. [source] ACADEMIC ARGUMENTS FOR THE INDISCERNIBILITY THESISPACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 4 2005CASEY PERIN I claim that these arguments, unlike modern sceptical arguments, are supposed to establish mere counterfactual rather than epistemic possibilities. They purport to show that for any true perceptual impression j, there are a number of alternative causal histories j might have had which would not have resulted in any change in the way in which j represents its object. [source] ANALYSIS, ABSTRACTION PRINCIPLES, AND SLINGSHOT ARGUMENTSRATIO, Issue 1 2006James Levine Frege's views regarding analysis and synomymy have long been the subject of critical discussion. Some commentators, led by Dummett, have argued that Frege was committed to the view that each thought admits of a unique ultimate analysis. However, this interpretation is in apparent conflict with Frege's criterion of synonymy, according to which two sentence express the same thought if one cannot understand them without regarding them as having the same truth,value. In a recent article in this journal, Drai attempts to reconcile Frege's criterion of synonymy with unique ultimate analysis by holding that, for Frege, if two sentences satisfy the criterion without being intensionally isomorphic, at most one of them is a privileged representation of the thought expressed. I argue that this proposal fails, because it conflicts not only with Frege's views of abstraction principles but also with slingshot arguments (including one presented by Drai herself) that accurately reflect Frege's commitment to the view that sentences alike in truth,value have the same Bedeutung. While Drai helpfully connects Frege's views of abstraction principles with such slingshot arguments, this connection cannot become fully clear until we recognise that Frege rejects unique ultimate analysis. [source] ON WILLIAMSON'S ARGUMENTS THAT KNOWLEDGE IS A MENTAL STATERATIO, Issue 2 2005Adam Leite In Knowledge and Its Limits, Timothy Williamson argues that knowledge is a purely mental state, that is, that it is never a complex state or condition comprising mental factors and non-mental, environmental factors. Three of his arguments are evaluated: arguments from (1) the non-analyzability of the concept of knowledge, (2) the ,primeness' of knowledge, and (3) the (alleged) inability to satisfactorily specify the ,internal' element involved in knowledge. None of these arguments succeeds. Moreover, consideration of the third argument points the way to a cogent argument that knowledge is not a purely mental state. [source] TWO ARGUMENTS AGAINST REALISMTHE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 231 2008Timothy Bays I present two generalizations of Putnam's model-theoretic argument against realism. The first replaces Putnam's model theory with some new, and substantially simpler, model theory, while the second replaces Putnam's model theory with some more accessible results from astronomy. By design, both of these new arguments fail. But the similarities between these new arguments and Putnam's original arguments illuminate the latter's overall structure, and the flaws in these new arguments highlight the corresponding flaws in Putnam's arguments. [source] METAPHYSICAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST ORDINARY OBJECTSTHE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 224 2006Amie L. Thomasson Several prominent attacks on the objects of ,folk ontology' argue that these would be omitted from a scientific ontology, or would be ,rivals' of scientific objects for their claims to be efficacious, occupy space, be composed of parts, or possess a range of other properties. I examine causal redundancy and over determination arguments, ,nothing over and above' appeals, and arguments based on problems with collocation and with property additivity. I argue that these share a common problem: applying conjunctive principles to cases in which the claims conjoined are not analytically independent. This unified diagnosis provides a way of defending ordinary objects against these common objections, while also yielding warnings about certain uses of general conjunctive principles. [source] THE STRUCTURE OF SCEPTICAL ARGUMENTSTHE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 218 2005Duncan Pritchard It is nowadays taken for granted that the core radical sceptical arguments all pivot upon the principle that the epistemic operator in question is ,closed' under known entailments. Accordingly, the standard anti-sceptical project now involves either denying closure or retaining closure by amending how one understands other elements of the sceptical argument. However, there are epistemic principles available to the sceptic which are logically weaker than closure but achieve the same result. Accordingly the contemporary debate fails to engage with the sceptical problem in its strongest form. [source] MORAL AND EPISTEMIC OPEN-QUESTION ARGUMENTSANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, Issue 2 2009CHRIS HEATHWOOD First page of article [source] REASONS-RESPONSIVENESS, ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES, AND MANIPULATION ARGUMENTS AGAINST COMPATIBILISM: REFLECTIONS ON JOHN MARTIN FISCHER'S MY WAY.ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2006Derk Pereboom First page of article [source] PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE: A NEW LOOK AT THE ARGUMENTSBIOETHICS, Issue 3 2007J.M. DIETERLE ABSTRACT In this paper, I examine the arguments against physician assisted suicide (PAS). Many of these arguments are consequentialist. Consequentialist arguments rely on empirical claims about the future and thus their strength depends on how likely it is that the predictions will be realized. I discuss these predictions against the backdrop of Oregon's Death with Dignity Act and the practice of PAS in the Netherlands. I then turn to a specific consequentialist argument against PAS , Susan M. Wolf's feminist critique of the practice. Finally, I examine the two most prominent deontological arguments against PAS. Ultimately, I conclude that no anti-PAS argument has merit. Although I do not provide positive arguments for PAS, if none of the arguments against it are strong, we have no reason not to legalize it. [source] The manualization of a treatment programme for personality disorderCRIMINAL BEHAVIOUR AND MENTAL HEALTH, Issue 1 2005Mary McMurran Background The advantages of manualized psychological treatments include: the promotion of evidence-based practice, the enhancement of treatment integrity, the facilitation of staff training, and the potential replicability of treatment. Argument The manualization of a multi-component, multidisciplinary treatment programme for male personality-disordered offenders is described. The background to this development is explained and the treatment setting is described briefly, followed by a description of the eight treatment manuals: (1) the treatment overview, (2) Psychoeducation focusing on personality disorder diagnosis and core beliefs, (3) Trust and Self-awareness group exercises, (4) Stop & Think! - a social problem-solving intervention, (5) Controlling Angry Aggression, (6) Controlling Substance Use, (7) Criminal Thinking/Belief Therapy, and (8) Skills for Living - a social skills manual. Conclusions In addition to the original aims of manualization, this exercise has clarified the treatment programme, included less highly trained staff in the delivery of therapy and permitted the evaluation of treatment modules, thus contributing to the incremental evaluation of the overall programme. These manuals may usefully be shared with other practitioners in the field. Copyright © 2005 Whurr Publishers Ltd. [source] Alcohol use and negative affect in the offence cycleCRIMINAL BEHAVIOUR AND MENTAL HEALTH, Issue 1 2003Andrew Day Introduction It is commonly acknowledged that, for many offenders, alcohol use is strongly associated with criminal behaviour. The belief held by many professionals that the two phenomena are associated, probably in a causal way, has led to the inclusion of alcohol use as a ,criminogenic need' in many settings where rehabilitation programmes are used to reduce recidivism. However, the mechanisms and pathways involved in the alcohol,crime link remain poorly understood. Argument and conclusion This paper reviews the literature relating to alcohol,offending links and draws some inferences about the role of alcohol use as a criminogenic need in offender rehabilitation. It is proposed that the bi-directional relationship between alcohol use and negative affective states is important in understanding the offence cycle, and that deficits in self-regulation not only characterize both alcohol misuse and negative affect but are also implicated in the offending behaviour itself. Copyright © 2003 Whurr Publishers Ltd. [source] A posteriori Necessity in Singular Causation and the Humean ArgumentDIALECTICA, Issue 1 2003M.J. GARCÍA-ENCINAS The absence of a necessary connection in singular causation is a key step in the Humean argument against any form of necessity in causation. I argue that Hume's defence of this step is unsuccessful, and that the step could be skipped, accepting the possibility of necessary a posteriori truths. Still this does not suffice to guarantee a necessary connection in singular causation. Necessary a posteriori truths should be backed by necessary a priori truths. Thus, a main object of this paper is to argue that an a priori philosophical concept of causality involves a necessary connection between its terms. [source] Does an Argument-Based Approach to Validity Make a Difference?EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT: ISSUES AND PRACTICE, Issue 1 2010Carol A. Chapelle Drawing on experience between 2000 and 2007 in developing a validity argument for the high-stakes Test of English as a Foreign LanguageÔ (TOEFL®), this paper evaluates the differences between the argument-based approach to validity as presented byKane (2006)and that described in the 1999 AERA/APA/NCME Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing. Based on an analysis of four points of comparison,framing the intended score interpretation, outlining the essential research, structuring research results into a validity argument, and challenging the validity argument,we conclude that an argument-based approach to validity introduces some new and useful concepts and practices. [source] Equality and Merit: A Merit-Based Argument for Equity Policies in Higher EducationEDUCATIONAL THEORY, Issue 4 2005Evan Simpson We assume, for the sake of argument, that the sole purpose of colleges and universities is the advancement of knowledge through teaching and research, and that academic merit, as defined by each discipline, ought to be the only relevant criterion in admissions and hiring decisions. Even on this restrictive set of assumptions, we argue that hiring and admitting women and people of color is sometimes the best way for colleges and universities to advance knowledge. We then address two objections to our argument, that race and sex are no more relevant than being left- or right-handed, and that the epistemic attributes we ascribe to women and people of color belong to people as individuals, not as members of certain groups. We conclude that academic merit and social justice are mutually compatible. [source] Playing the Odds: A New Response to Lucretius's Symmetry ArgumentEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2010Jeremy R. Simon There remains, however, dispute as to what the flaw is. After establishing what I understand the target of Lucretius's argument to be (a desire for a longer life as such), I argue for a novel interpretation of what the flaw is, namely, that extending one's life into the time before one was actually born would be an uncertain bet for one who wanted to extend his life, whereas extending one's life beyond the time one actually dies is a sure bet. This account of what the flaw is has the particular merit of relying only on simple concepts used in everyday reasoning and thus can explain why Lucretius's argument gains no traction even in the absence of sophisticated philosophical analysis. [source] Particularism, Generalism and the Counting ArgumentEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, Issue 1 2003Simon Kirchin In a recent collection of papers ,Moral Particularism (hereafter MP)1, some writers argue against a particularist explanation of thick ethical features, particularist in the sense developed by Jonathan Dancy. In this piece I argue that particularists can tackle what I regard as the most interesting argument put forward by these writers, an argument I call the Counting Argument. My aim is twofold. First, I wish to make clear exactly what the debate between particularists and their opponents about the thick rests on. Secondly, I do not wish to provide a ,knock-down' argument to show particularism as true, but merely to push the onus back onto particularism's opponents and show that far more needs to be said. One last introductory comment. After some necessary scene-setting in the first section, where I explain how the philosophical ground is carved up and introduce some terminology, I indicate why this debate is fundamental in ethical theory although I don't pursue the idea here. [source] Kant's Argument for Radical EvilEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, Issue 2 2002Stephen R. Grimm First page of article [source] The Rule-Following Considerations and Metaethics: Some False MovesEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, Issue 2 2001Gerald Lang In a series of influential papers, John McDowell has argued that the rule-following considerations explored in Wittgenstein's later work provide support for a particularist form of moral objectivity. The article distinguishes three such arguments in McDowell's writings, labelled the Anthropocentricism Argument, the Shapelessness Argument, and the Anti-Humean Argument, respectively, and the author disputes the effectiveness of each of them. As far as these metaethical debates are concerned, the article concludes that the rule-following considerations leave everything in their place. [source] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||