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Moral Values (moral + value)
Selected AbstractsMoral Values and Vote Choice in the 2004 U.S. Presidential ElectionPOLITICS & POLICY, Issue 2 2007Jonathan Knuckey Scholars and journalists have emphasized the growing importance of cultural issues and a "values divide" in shaping recent political behavior of the American electorate. Discussion of a values-based cleavage has been especially evident since exit polls for the 2004 presidential election revealed that "moral values" topped the list of issues that respondents cited as the "most important" issue in the election. While there has been considerable debate and disagreement over the influence of moral values in 2004, no analysis has performed a crucial test of the moral values hypothesis, namely developing a multivariate model to examine the effect of moral values on vote choice relative to other issue preferences and demographic variables. This article develops such a model using data from the 2004 American National Election Study. Findings suggest that moral values exerted an important effect on vote choice in the 2004 presidential election, even when other predictors of vote choice were included in a multivariate model. [source] The Search for the Source of Epistemic GoodMETAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 1-2 2003Linda Zagzebski Knowledge has almost always been treated as good, better than mere true belief, but it is remarkably difficult to explain what it is about knowledge that makes it better. I call this "the value problem." I have previously argued that most forms of reliabilism cannot handle the value problem. In this article I argue that the value problem is more general than a problem for reliabilism, infecting a host of different theories, including some that are internalist. An additional problem is that not all instances of true belief seem to be good on balance, so even if a given instance of knowing p is better than merely truly believing p, not all instances of knowing will be good enough to explain why knowledge has received so much attention in the history of philosophy. The article aims to answer two questions: (1) What makes knowingp better than merely truly believing p? The answer involves an exploration of the connection between believing and the agency of the knower. Knowing is an act in which the knower gets credit for achieving truth. (2) What makes some instances of knowing good enough to make the investigation of knowledge worthy of so much attention? The answer involves the connection between the good of believing truths of certain kinds and a good life. In the best kinds of knowing, the knower not only gets credit for getting the truth but also gets credit for getting a desirable truth. The kind of value that makes knowledge a fitting object of extensive philosophical inquiry is not independent of moral value and the wider values of a good life. [source] Teaching & Learning Guide for: Moral Realism and Moral NonnaturalismPHILOSOPHY COMPASS (ELECTRONIC), Issue 3 2008Stephen Finlay Authors' Introduction Metaethics is a perennially popular subject, but one that can be challenging to study and teach. As it consists in an array of questions about ethics, it is really a mix of (at least) applied metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and mind. The seminal texts therefore arise out of, and often assume competence with, a variety of different literatures. It can be taught thematically, but this sample syllabus offers a dialectical approach, focused on metaphysical debate over moral realism, which spans the century of debate launched and framed by G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica. The territory and literature are, however, vast. So, this syllabus is highly selective. A thorough metaethics course might also include more topical examination of moral supervenience, moral motivation, moral epistemology, and the rational authority of morality. Authors Recommend: Alexander Miller, An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003). This is one of the few clear, accessible, and comprehensive surveys of the subject, written by someone sympathetic with moral naturalism. David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Brink rehabilitates naturalism about moral facts by employing a causal semantics and natural kinds model of moral thought and discourse. Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). Smith's book frames the debate as driven by a tension between the objectivity of morality and its practical role, offering a solution in terms of a response-dependent account of practical rationality. Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson, Moral Relativism & Moral Objectivity (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1996). Harman argues against the objectivity of moral value, while Thomson defends it. Each then responds to the other. Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). Jackson argues that reductive conceptual analysis is possible in ethics, offering a unique naturalistic account of moral properties and facts. Mark Timmons, Morality without Foundations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). Timmons distinguishes moral cognitivism from moral realism, interpreting moral judgments as beliefs that have cognitive content but do not describe moral reality. He also provides a particularly illuminating discussion of nonanalytic naturalism. Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001). A Neo-Aristotelian perspective: moral facts are natural facts about the proper functioning of human beings. Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defence (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003). In this recent defense of a Moorean, nonnaturalist position, Shafer-Landau engages rival positions in a remarkably thorough manner. Terence Cuneo, The Normative Web (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007). Cuneo argues for a robust version of moral realism, developing a parity argument based on the similarities between epistemic and moral facts. Mark Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007). Schroeder defends a reductive form of naturalism in the tradition of Hume, identifying moral and normative facts with natural facts about agents' desires. Online Materials: PEA Soup: http://peasoup.typepad.com A blog devoted to philosophy, ethics, and academia. Its contributors include many active and prominent metaethicists, who regularly post about the moral realism and naturalism debates. Metaethics Bibliography: http://www.lenmanethicsbibliography.group.shef.ac.uk/Bib.htm Maintained by James Lenman, professor of philosophy at the University of Sheffield, this online resource provides a selective list of published research in metaethics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu See especially the entries under ,metaethics'. Sample Syllabus: Topics for Lecture & Discussion Note: unless indicated otherwise, all the readings are found in R. Shafer-Landau and T. Cuneo, eds., Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology (Malden: Blackwell, 2007). (FE) Week 1: Realism I (Classic Nonnaturalism) G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, 2nd ed. (FE ch. 35). W. K. Frankena, ,The Naturalistic Fallacy,'Mind 48 (1939): 464,77. S. Finlay, ,Four Faces of Moral Realism', Philosophy Compass 2/6 (2007): 820,49 [DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00100.x]. Week 2: Antirealism I (Classic Expressivism) A. J. Ayer, ,Critique of Ethics and Theology' (1952) (FE ch. 3). C. Stevenson, ,The Nature of Ethical Disagreement' (1963) (FE ch. 28). Week 3: Antirealism II (Error Theory) J. L. Mackie, ,The Subjectivity of Values' (1977) (FE ch. 1). R. Joyce, Excerpt from The Myth of Morality (2001) (FE ch. 2). Week 4: Realism II (Nonanalytic Naturalism) R. Boyd, ,How to be a Moral Realist' (1988) (FE ch. 13). P. Railton, ,Moral Realism' (1986) (FE ch. 14). T. Horgan and M. Timmons, ,New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth' (1991) (FE ch. 38). Week 5: Antirealism III (Contemporary Expressivism) A. Gibbard, ,The Reasons of a Living Being' (2002) (FE ch. 6). S. Blackburn, ,How To Be an Ethical Anti-Realist' (1993) (FE ch. 4). T. Horgan and M. Timmons, ,Nondescriptivist Cognitivism' (2000) (FE ch. 5). W. Sinnott-Armstrong, ,Expressivism and Embedding' (2000) (FE ch. 37). Week 6: Realism III (Sensibility Theory) J. McDowell, ,Values and Secondary Qualities' (1985) (FE ch. 11). D. Wiggins, ,A Sensible Subjectivism' (1991) (FE ch. 12). Week 7: Realism IV (Subjectivism) & Antirealism IV (Constructivism) R. Firth, ,Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer' (1952) (FE ch. 9). G. Harman, ,Moral Relativism Defended' (1975) (FE ch. 7). C. Korsgaard, ,The Authority of Reflection' (1996) (FE ch. 8). Week 8: Realism V (Contemporary Nonnaturalism) R. Shafer-Landau, ,Ethics as Philosophy' (2006) (FE ch. 16). T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), ch. 1. T, Cuneo, ,Recent Faces of Moral Nonnaturalism', Philosophy Compass 2/6 (2007): 850,79 [DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00102.x]. [source] I,The Relativism of Blame and Williams's Relativism of DistanceARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME, Issue 1 2010Miranda Fricker Bernard Williams is a sceptic about the objectivity of moral value, embracing instead a qualified moral relativism,the ,relativism of distance'. His attitude to blame too is in part sceptical (he thought it often involved a certain ,fantasy'). I will argue that the relativism of distance is unconvincing, even incoherent; but also that it is detachable from the rest of Williams's moral philosophy. I will then go on to propose an entirely localized thesis I call the relativism of blame, which says that when an agent's moral shortcomings by our lights are a matter of their living according to the moral thinking of their day, judgements of blame are out of order. Finally, I will propose a form of moral judgement we may sometimes quite properly direct towards historically distant agents when blame is inappropriate,moral-epistemic disappointment. Together these two proposals may help release us from the grip of the idea that moral appraisal always involves the potential applicability of blame, and so from a key source of the relativist idea that moral appraisal is inappropriate over distance. [source] BUDDHISM AND NEUROETHICS: THE ETHICS OF PHARMACEUTICAL COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENTDEVELOPING WORLD BIOETHICS, Issue 2 2009ANDREW FENTON ABSTRACT This paper integrates some Buddhist moral values, attitudes and self-cultivation techniques into a discussion of the ethics of cognitive enhancement technologies , in particular, pharmaceutical enhancements. Many Buddhists utilize meditation techniques that are both integral to their practice and are believed to enhance the cognitive and affective states of experienced practitioners. Additionally, Mah,y,na Buddhism's teaching on skillful means permits a liberal use of methods or techniques in Buddhist practice that yield insight into our selfnature or aid in alleviating or eliminating dukha (i.e. dissatisfaction). These features of many, if not most, Buddhist traditions will inform much of the Buddhist assessment of pharmaceutical enhancements offered in this paper. Some Buddhist concerns about the effects and context of the use of pharmaceutical enhancements will be canvassed in the discussion. Also, the author will consider Buddhist views of the possible harms that may befall human and nonhuman research subjects, interference with a recipient's karma, the artificiality of pharmaceutical enhancements, and the possible motivations or intentions of healthy individuals pursuing pharmacological enhancement. Perhaps surprisingly, none of these concerns will adequately ground a reflective Buddhist opposition to the further development and continued use of pharmaceutical enhancements, either in principle or in practice. The author argues that Buddhists, from at least certain traditions , particularly Mah,y,na Buddhist traditions , should advocate the development or use of pharmaceutical enhancements if a consequence of their use is further insight into our self-nature or the reduction or alleviation of dukha. [source] Justice and Moral Regeneration: Lessons from the Treaty of VersaillesINTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW, Issue 3 2002Catherine Lu The Treaty of Versailles, which concluded World War I, aimed to establish a "peace of justice"; sadly, it only seemed to pave the way to a second, more devastating world war. What lessons about justice and reconciliation can we learn from the treaty and its apparent failure? Some scholars argue that the fault of the treaty lay in its preoccupation with retributive justice, undermining prospects for reconciliation. Rather than positing justice and reconciliation as inherently conflictual moral values or goals, both need to be conceived as part of the project of moral regeneration. Such a multidimensional project requires a certain kind of justice and reconciliation, founded on mutual respect for the humanity and equality of others. An assessment of the relationship among truth, justice, and reconciliation in the framework of moral regeneration indicates that the most grievous moral fault of the Treaty of Versailles lay in its process, which facilitated neither a truthful accounting of the war's causes and consequences, nor the affirmation of moral truths by victors or vanquished. The lack of an authoritative and public moral accounting of the Great War undermined both justice and reconciliation in international society. [source] The Spiritual Turn and the Decline of Tradition: The Spread of Post-Christian Spirituality in 14 Western Countries, 1981,2000JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION, Issue 3 2007DICK HOUTMAN This article uses data from the World Values Survey to study the spread of post-Christian spirituality ("New Age") in 14 Western countries (1981,2000, N = 61,352). It demonstrates that this type of spirituality, characterized by a sacralization of the self, has become more widespread during the period 1981,2000 in most of these countries. It has advanced farthest in France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden. This spiritual turn proves a byproduct of the decline of traditional moral values and hence driven by cohort replacement. Spirituality's popularity among the well educated also emerges from the latter's low levels of traditionalism. These findings confirm the theory of detraditionalization, according to which a weakening of the grip of tradition on individual selves stimulates a spiritual turn to the deeper layers of the self. [source] Equality, Justice, and Paternalism: Recentreing Debate about Physician-Assisted SuicideJOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, Issue 4 2006ANDREW SNEDDON abstract Debate about physician-assisted suicide has typically focused on the values of autonomy and patient wellbeing. This is understandable, even reasonable, given the import-ance of these values in bioethics. However, these are not the only moral values there are. The purpose of this paper is to examine physician-assisted suicide on the basis of the values of equality and justice. In particular, I will evaluate two arguments that invoke equality, one in favour of physician-assisted suicide, one against it, and I will eventually argue that a convincing equality-based argument in support of physician-assisted suicide is available. I will conclude by showing how an equality-based perspective transforms some secondary features of debate about this issue. [source] A New Angelology: Mapping the Angel through Twentieth-Century LiteratureLITERATURE COMPASS (ELECTRONIC), Issue 2 2007Suzanne Hobson In ,Professions for Women', Virginia Woolf memorably calls on female writers to kill the ,Angel in the House'. She implies that the angel, traditionally connoting feminine virtue and chastity, has no place in twentieth-century literature. The literary texts and theoretical debates surveyed in this article suggest rather the opposite. They reveal that instead of being left behind at the end of the nineteenth century by a cultural imaginary which had outgrown religious orthodoxy and Victorian moral codes, the angel was reinvented, in a sense, modernised for the twentieth century. This article looks first at the importance of Walter Benjamin in carving out a politically charged space for this figure in contemporary literary criticism. It then turns to the angels in texts by Djuna Barnes, H.D., Carolyn Forché, Tony Kushner, D. H. Lawrence, Wyndham Lewis, Salman Rushdie and W. G. Sebald among others to show how the angel comes to figure the ,new', both the technologically advanced and the unexpectedly ,avant-garde' as regards moral values and sexual propriety. [source] The use of willingness-to-pay approaches in mammal conservationMAMMAL REVIEW, Issue 2 2001Piran C. L. White ABSTRACT With limited monetary resources available for nature conservation, policy-makers need to be able to prioritize conservation objectives. This has traditionally been done using qualitative ecological criteria. However, since declines in species and habitats are largely the result of socio-economic and political forces, human preferences and values should also be taken into account. An environmental economics technique, contingent valuation, provides one way of doing this by quantifying public willingness-to-pay towards specific conservation objectives. In this paper, the use of this approach for quantifying public preferences towards the UK Biodiversity Action Plans for four different British mammal species is considered. The species included are the Red Squirrel Sciurus vulgaris, the Brown Hare Lepus europaeus, the Otter Lutra lutra and the Water Vole Arvicola terrestris. Willingness-to-pay for conservation was increased by the inclusion of the Otter among the species, membership of an environmental organization and awareness of the general and species-specific threats facing British mammals. It was reduced by the presence of the Brown Hare among the species being considered. These findings for British mammals are compared with other willingness-to-pay studies for mammal conservation worldwide. Willingness-to-pay tends to be greater for marine mammals than terrestrial ones, and recreational users of species (tourists or hunters) are generally more willing than residents to pay towards species conservation. The choice of technique for eliciting willingness-to-pay from respondents is also shown to be highly significant. Willingness-to-pay values for British mammals derived from contingent valuation are sensitive to the species included rather than merely symbolic. This indicates that, with care, such measures can be used as a reliable means of quantifying public preferences for conservation, and therefore contributing to the decision-making process. However, irrespective of the internal consistency of contingent valuation, the validity of the approach, especially for use in nature conservation, is disputed. Willingness-to-pay is likely to reflect many interrelated factors such as ethical and moral values, knowledge and tradition, and monetary values may not be an adequate representation of these broader considerations. Willingness-to-pay approaches should therefore be used in addition to, rather than in place of, expert judgements and more deliberative approaches towards policy decision-making for conservation. [source] Does Capital Punishment Deter Homicide?: A Case Study Of Epistemological ObjectivityMETAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2001Rosalind S. Simson This paper uses the debate about whether capital punishment deters homicide as a case study for examining the claim, made by many feminists and others, that the traditional ideal of objectivity in seeking knowledge is misguided. According to this ideal, knowledge seekers should strive to gather and assess evidence independently of any influences exerted by either their individual and societal circumstances or their moral values. This paper argues that, although the traditional ideal rests on some valid precepts, it is neverthelesss untenable. the author goes on to propose an alternative epistemological ideal , one that retains these valid precepts but also recognizes an important and legitimate role for people's circumstances and moral values in their efforts to find knowledge. [source] The Moral Philosophy of Raimond Gaita and Some Questions of Method in the Philosophy of ReligionNEW BLACKFRIARS, Issue 1030 2009Mark Wynn Abstract Raimond Gaita's moral philosophy is distinguished by, among other things, its attention to the role of embodied, enacted witness in disclosing certain moral values, and its understanding of the emotions as forms of thought. In this paper, I consider how Gaita's insights on these matters may be applied to certain questions in the philosophy of religion, paying particular attention to the nature of religious experience and ,the problem of evil'. I suggest that Gaita's discussion of how we come to recognise moral values or ,meanings' can be extended to the question of how we might recognise religious meanings. On this view, religious experience may take the form of an appreciation of the meaning borne by a material context (rather than, for example, some supra-sensory encounter with a supernatural agent), and our sense of the goodness or otherwise of the world may be answerable to the authoritative example of particular lives. [source] Moral Conviction and Political EngagementPOLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 1 2008Linda J. Skitka The 2004 presidential election led to considerable discussion about whether moral values motivated people to vote, and if so, whether it led to a conservative electoral advantage. The results of two studies,one conducted in the context of the 2000 presidential election, the other in the context of the 2004 presidential election,indicated that stronger moral convictions associated with candidates themselves and attitudes on issues of the day uniquely predicted self-reported voting behavior and intentions to vote even when controlling for a host of alternative explanations (e.g., attitude strength, strength of party identification). In addition, we found strong support for the hypothesis that moral convictions equally motivated political engagement for those on the political right and left and little support for the notion that a combination of morality and politics is something more characteristic of the political right than it is of the political left. [source] Moral Values and Vote Choice in the 2004 U.S. Presidential ElectionPOLITICS & POLICY, Issue 2 2007Jonathan Knuckey Scholars and journalists have emphasized the growing importance of cultural issues and a "values divide" in shaping recent political behavior of the American electorate. Discussion of a values-based cleavage has been especially evident since exit polls for the 2004 presidential election revealed that "moral values" topped the list of issues that respondents cited as the "most important" issue in the election. While there has been considerable debate and disagreement over the influence of moral values in 2004, no analysis has performed a crucial test of the moral values hypothesis, namely developing a multivariate model to examine the effect of moral values on vote choice relative to other issue preferences and demographic variables. This article develops such a model using data from the 2004 American National Election Study. Findings suggest that moral values exerted an important effect on vote choice in the 2004 presidential election, even when other predictors of vote choice were included in a multivariate model. [source] Theological Pragmatism: A Critical EvaluationTHE HEYTHROP JOURNAL, Issue 2 2000Mikael Stenmark Theological pragmatists like Daly, Kaufman, McFague and Reuther claim that the God we should believe in and the kind of images we should use to express our religious faith should be evaluated primarily on the basis of the consequences they have for the maintenance of certain political or moral values. These views are presented and critically evaluated. One difficulty is that their pragmatism seems to clash with our intuition and experience that there is no automatic fit between our moral aspirations and political visions, on the one hand, and how the world is actually structured, on the other. Their strong emphasis on political and moral considerations is, therefore, questionable and only plausible under certain specific circumstances. [source] Talking the talk: Debating debate in northern AfghanistanANTHROPOLOGY TODAY, Issue 2 2009Magnus Marsden The ethnographic focus of this article is on the ways in which Afghan families who lived in northern Pakistan as refugees are currently reflecting upon to their complex experiences of return to their country through a rich and complex culture of debate, as well as the deployment of other verbal and peformative skills, especially imitation. More broadly, it argues that the comparative study of situated practices of debate offers unique insights for the anthropological analysis of Islam, which an expanding body of work on the ways in which piety minded Muslims embody and cultivate ethical and moral values has thus far overlooked. [source] Rural-urban differences in generation of Chinese and Western exemplary persons: The case of ChinaASIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 1 2010Xia Chen Chinese adolescents in urban cities (Beijing, Chengdu) and rural towns (Wei Shan Zhuang, Zheng Xing) generated Chinese and Western exemplary persons and rated the values these exemplary persons represent. The results showed that the tendency to differentiate Chinese culture from Western culture was greater among urban (vs rural) Chinese. Specifically, only urban Chinese consistently attributed Chinese moral values (more than other types of values) to self-generated Chinese exemplary persons and Western moral values (more than other types of values) to self-generated Western exemplary persons. Because urban Chinese have more frequent exposure to foreign cultures, our results suggest that frequent exposure to foreign cultures can lead to enhanced perceptions of cultural differences. [source] Preparing for Ethical Leadership in OrganizationsCANADIAN JOURNAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCES, Issue 4 2001Manuel Mendonca True and effective leadership is that in which the leader's behaviour and the exercise of the leadership influence process are consistent with ethical and moral values. This paper explores the need for ethical leadership and the ways in which it is manifested in organizations. It identifies the three components of the ethical leadership model proposed by Kanungo and Mendonca (1996): the ethics of the leader's motives, influence process strategies, and the nature of the self-transformation needed for ethical leadership. As a central theme, the paper then examines what the leader can do to prepare for ethical leadership in organizations. More specifically, it identifies some of the sources that the leader can tap to develop as a moral person possessed of inner strength and resourcefulness that lead to the self-transformation of both the leader and the followers. Résumé Le leadership véritable et efficace en est un dans lequel le comportement du leader et l'exercice du processus d'influence de leadership sont consistants avec des valeurs morales et éthiques. Cette étude explore le besoin d'un leadership éthique et les façons dont il est manifesté dans les organisations. Elle identifie les trois composantes du modèle de leadership éthique proposé par Kanungo et Mendonca (1996): l'éthique des motifs du leader, les stratégies du processus d'influence et la nature de la transformation de soi-même requises pour le leadership éthique. Comme thème central, l'étude examine ce que le leader peutfaire pour se préparer au leadership éthique dans les organisations. Spécifiquement, elle identifie quelques-unes des sources auxquelles le leader peut avoir accès pour se développer en tant que personne morale possédant une force intérieure et qui est pleine de ressources qui mènent à la transformation personnelle du leader et de ses adeptes. [source] | |||||||||||||